Cotton v. State

Decision Date09 June 1924
Docket Number24117
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
PartiesCOTTON v. STATE. [*]

Division B

1 HOMICIDE. Aggressor resisting eviction by owner of premises not entitled to plead self-defense.

While ordinarily instructions denying the right of self-defense should not be given, still it is the law that a person has the right to preserve peace on his own premises and may by force, if necessary, evict from his place persons guilty of misbehavior, and a person who is the aggressor and at fault may not resist the right of the owner to evict him, and, if in doing so he kills such owner, he cannot set up the right of self-defense.

2. CRIMINAL LAW. Misconduct of prosecuting attorney to which objection sustained and attorney reprimanded held not to warrant reversal.

Where in the course of examination of a witness for the state, the district attorney asks the witness if she did not make a statement in the witness room contrary to the one made on the trial, and she denies making such statement and the district attorney replies, "All I have got to say is that you are an infamous liar," and such remark is objected to, the objection sustained by the court, and the district attorney reprimanded by the court, such remark will not cause a reversal of the case.

HON. T L. LAMB, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Attala county, HON. T. L. LAMB, Judge.

John Cotton was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Jas. T. Crawley, for appellant.

I. The instruction given the state fails to correctly announce the law. If it is the law, then a man is denied the right of self-defense under certain circumstances and under certain conditions. For instance, if that instruction is the law, then a visitor in a man's home may be attacked by another guest and, although under the law he has a right to defend himself from the attack of the other guest, he, under this instruction, has no right to defend himself from the attack of the owner of the home. No matter if he be brutally assaulted, no matter if he be fighting for his life against a cowardly assassin, yet under this instruction the owner of the home in which he may be at the time, can come forth and quell the disturbance and use whatever force is necessary to evict the man who is attacked, without giving that man the right to protect himself at the hands of the owner of the home.

There can be no doubt but that it takes away from John Cotton his right of self-defense. Then if it takes away from Cotton his right of self-defense, then certainly he had no legal right whatsoever to hit Jim Scott, and having hit him, he, under this instruction is bound to be guilty of the crime charged and there was nothing left for the jury to do but to find him guilty.

I respectfully submit that under the statement of facts in this case and under the evidence it was a very close question on the facts as to whether or not this defendant was guilty of any crime. I further submit that without this added instruction the state would not have gotten a conviction.

II. If it be possible that the conduct and the acts of a district attorney can be so grossly improper and can be calculated to be harmful towards the defendant and can be said to be so prejudicial as to keep the defendant from getting a fair and impartial trial, then the conduct of the district attorney in this case will certainly reverse the case at bar.

A negro is being tried for manslaughter. The jury of course is composed of white men. The attorneys of the court, both for the state and for the defendant are white men. The state is putting its case before the jury. The case up to the time that Jane Scott takes the witness stand is very weak indeed. Jane Scott is a daughter of Jim Scott, the deceased. She is called and placed on the stand by the state and testifies.

The district attorney as set forth in the bill of exceptions jumped up and asked her if it was not true that she had told him that the defendant hit her father while he was stopping over to get a stick, and if he had not been told a different statement about the facts in the conference room a minute ago by her and when she denied this, the district attorney, then and there, and in the presence of the jury and during open court said to her, "All I have got to say is that you are an infamous liar." Now under these 0circumstances what on earth was a poor negro woman to say? Everything in the world she had said was ruined and her testimony was destroyed. And I want to call the attention of the court to the fact that it was destroyed by an attorney of the state, who, in effect, impeached his own witness and in addition to that impeached his own witness by testifying while not under oath.

All of this was in direct violation of all known rules of procedure. See Martin v. State, 63 Miss. 505, 56 Am. Rep. 812; Hampton v. State, 88 Miss. 257, 40 So. 545.

We respectfully submit that this defendant was denied that fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the constitution. Therefore, his case should be reversed and he be given a new trial. Then he may have the opportunity of presenting his defense to the jury without being denied all or any of his rights. And he may be permitted to have the testimony favorable to him presented to the jury without having the district attorney impeach the testimony of his witness by both testifying in the case without being placed under oath and then arguing the case.

Rush H. Knox, Attorney-General, for the state.

I. In reply to the argument of learned counsel for the appellant with reference to the special bill of exceptions, we say that the cases cited by him do not in anywise control in this particular instance. The case of Martin v. State, 63 Miss. 505, is distinguishable. The case of Harrington v State, 88 Miss. 257, recites a different...

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20 cases
  • Vance v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 12 Septiembre 1938
    ...when the necessary facts or inferences therefrom are present, see, also, Ross v. State, 158 Miss. 827, 131 So. 367; Cotton v. State, 135 Miss. 792, 100 So. 383; Hays v. State, 130 Miss. 381, 94 So. 212; v. State, 177 So. 531, 178 So. 469. It may be construed by the court that the proffered ......
  • Goldsby v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 3 Octubre 1960
    ...court to the jury to disregard same, he should have moved the court for a mistrial and a new trial before another jury. Cotton v. State, 135 Miss. 792, 100 So. 383; Allen v. State, (Miss.), 114 So. 352.' To the same effect are Ransom v. State, 1928, 149 Miss. 262, 266-267, 115 So. 208; Thom......
  • Layne v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 29 Marzo 1989
    ...Patrick v. State, 285 So.2d 165, 168 (Miss.1973); Woodward v. State, 180 Miss. 571, 581, 177 So. 531, 534 (1937); Cotton v. State, 135 Miss. 792, 797, 100 So. 383, 383 (1924). See also Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329 To be sure, Layne's theory of defense was that following the robbery and D......
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    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 23 Febrero 1932
    ...provided he used no more force than the jury found to be proper. 2 R. C. L. 557; 3 Cyc. 1045; Ayers v. State, 60 Miss. 713; Cotton v. State, 135 Miss. 792. If were a good defense to the suit that appellee struck the first blow the burden would be on Harris to prove his plea of justification......
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