Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen

• Decision Date: 21 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 5715,5715
• Citation: 655 P.2d 1226
• Parties: COTTONWOOD STEEL CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation; Scott L. Bracken, Appellants (Defendants), Claudette Olson and Laurel Olson, (Plaintiffs), Marie J. Hansen, the personal representative of the Estate of Erik Bundgaard Hansen, (Defendant), Federal Resources Corporation, American Nuclear Corporation and Federal American Partners, a Wyoming co-partnership, (Defendants), Gail L. Lucas, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Martin Floyd Lucas, deceased, (Plaintiff), Mary Arima, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Jack K. Arima, deceased, (Plaintiff), v. Marie HANSEN, Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of Erik Hansen, deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1226

655 P.2d 1226

COTTONWOOD STEEL CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation; Scott L. Bracken, Appellants (Defendants) Claudette Olson and Laurel Olson, (Plaintiffs) Marie J. Hansen, the personal representative of the Estate of Erik Bundgaard Hansen, (Defendant) Federal Resources Corporation, American Nuclear Corporation and Federal American Partners, a Wyoming co-partnership, (Defendants) Gail L. Lucas, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Martin Floyd Lucas, deceased, (Plaintiff), Mary Arima, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Jack K. Arima, deceased, (Plaintiff), v. Marie HANSEN, Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of Erik Hansen, deceased, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 5715.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 21, 1982.

W.W. Reeves, of Vlastos, Reeves & Murdock, P.C., Casper, for appellants.

James W. Owens, of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellee.

Before ROSE, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.

ROSE, Chief Justice.

As a result of a two-vehicle accident which occurred between the workplace of the occupants of the workers' vehicle and their home town of Riverton, suits were filed by the injured passengers and representatives of the deceased passengers of the automobile which was driven by Erik Hansen, the workers' driver. ¹ The complaints were lodged against the estate of Hansen, Cottonwood Steel Corporation and its employee, Scott Bracken, who was driving the other vehicle. Suit was also filed against Federal Resources Corporation, American Nuclear Corporation and Federal American Partners but these companies are not parties to this appeal. Hansen and his passengers were co-employees at Pathfinder Mines Corporation and worker's compensation benefits had been paid to the survivors of Hansen and his two deceased passengers. Pathfinder paid a "daily vehicle maintenance allowance" to each of its employees in an amount determined by the distance between their residence and the mine where they worked. Cottonwood and Bracken settled these cases and obtained releases in their favor and in favor of their co-defendants, including Hansen's estate.

In each of the three suits brought against the Hansen estate on behalf of the injured passengers and the survivors of Hansen's fellow workers, Hansen's personal representative pleaded that Hansen, and, therefore, his estate was immune from suit under the co-employee immunity provisions of the worker's compensation law, namely, § 27-12-103(a), W.S.1977, ² and for the further reason that Hansen was not "culpably negligent" at the time of the accident. This same position was taken in the Hansen estate's motion for summary judgment.

Cottonwood Steel and Scott Bracken responded with their own motion for partial summary judgment, averring that, under our holding in Beard v. Brown, Wyo., 616 P.2d 726 (1980), when the collision occurred, Hansen, being en route to his home from the workplace, was not in the "scope of * * * [his] employment" as that term is contemplated by the immunity provisions of § 27-12-103(a), supra. It follows, the appellants say, that Hansen's estate was not immune from suit in tort by his co-employees and that ordinary negligence was the appellant's only proof responsibility. Cottonwood and Bracken go on to argue that the injuries and deaths suffered by the occupants of the Hansen vehicle could well be compensable under § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S.1977, ³ because, at the time of the collision, it was possible for them to have been within the "course of [their] employment," while Hansen, who was the driver of the vehicle, was, nonetheless, not then within the "scope of * * * [his] employment" under the immunity provisions of § 27-12-103(a), supra n. 2.

At the pre-trial conference, the court entered its order in which it was decided that

" * * * § 27-12-103(a) is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires proof of culpable neglect as a prerequisite to recovery against a co-employee."

Thereafter, Cottonwood and Bracken consummated settlements and all claims were dismissed with prejudice. They were then granted leave to amend their counterclaims against Hansen's estate in order to allege first that the settlements had been made, second that Cottonwood had paid more than its pro rata share of the common liability and third that contribution by the Hansen estate should be ordered by the court under the auspices of the contribution among joint tort-feasors statute, § 1-1-110, W.S.1977. ⁴

Following the opinion of this court in Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235 (1982), which held that § 27-12-103(a) is constitutional, ⁵ Hansen's personal representative renewed her motion for summary judgment, alleging the protection of the statute.

By agreement of the parties, the court took into account the settlements as well as the relevant worker's compensation files in which the survivors of Hansen and the survivors of the two deceased passengers had applied for and received worker's compensation benefits. Having previously found in the worker's compensation cases that Hansen was not culpably negligent, the court granted a summary judgment in favor of the Hansen estate. The effect of the judgment is to hold that at the time of the collision Hansen was in the "scope of * * * [his] employment," as that term is employed in § 27-12-103(a), supra, and Hansen's estate was therefore immune from suits by Hansen's passengers and the representatives of the estates of deceased passengers--and any parties who stood in their shoes.

We will affirm.

THE ISSUE

The sole question in this appeal asks whether the court erred in holding that, as a matter of law, the estate of Hansen was immune from suit by his fellow passengers and their estates under § 27-12-103(a), supra n. 2, thus foreclosing Bracken and Cottonwood's right to contribution under § 1-1-110, supra n. 4.

Given the concession of all litigants that Cottonwood and Bracken--with respect to their claims for contribution against the estate of Hansen--stand in the shoes of the co-employee passengers of Hansen, and given the admission that "culpable negligence" is not relied upon by the appellants (two admissions of fact which, for purposes of this opinion, we consider to be the law of the case), we hold that § 27-12-103(a), W.S.1977 clothes Hansen's estate with absolute immunity. ⁶

THE LAW

At the outset, it must be understood that the appellants Cottonwood and Bracken concede:

" * * * that if the provisions of § 27-12-103(a), W.S. (1977) were a bar to the passengers' suit against Hansen, then they also operate to bar contribution claims for amounts paid to the passengers." (From the appellants' brief.)

The appellants then go on to identify the issue when they say:

"Hence, the very simple issue is whether Hansen could have defeated the suits brought against him by his passengers on the grounds that he was within the scope of his employment ⁷ at the time of the accident and that he was not culpably negligent. That is to say, does this defense apply to workmen who are commuting home from work? " (Emphasis added.) (From the appellants' brief.)

The appellants would have us answer this question in the negative according to the following reasoning:

"Cottonwood Steel and Bracken contend that in this case the distinction between the definition of compensable injuries on the one hand, [see § 27-12-102(a)(xii) ] and 'scope of employment,' [see § 27-12-103(a) ] which is the key to determining when the immunity applies, must be maintained as was done in Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 737 (Wyo.1980), where the Court repeatedly says that determining 'scope of employment' is an altogether different problem of proof from determining compensable injuries which are those '... arising out of and in the course of employment ...' § 27-12-102(a)(xii), W.S. (1977)." (Emphasis added.) (From the appellants' brief.)

The appellants argue that it is consistent that the court could find that Hansen and his passengers were in the "course of employment" under § 27-12-102(a)(xii) and thus their injuries and deaths would be compensable, while at the same time finding Hansen not to be in the "scope of * * * [his] employment" under § 27-12-103(a), the immunity statute. If we were to hold with this reasoning, the effect would be to permit one covered employee to bring suit against his covered fellow employee for ordinary negligence notwithstanding the immunity provisions of the statute.

The appellee, on the other hand, contends that, except for culpable acts which are not at issue in this appeal, Hansen was in the "scope of * * * [his] employment" at the time of the collision and thus § 27-12-103(a), supra, furnishes Hansen's estate with absolute immunity from the claims of the passengers and the personal representative of the estates of Hansen's co-employees or any persons standing in their shoes. Therefore, argues the appellee, Hansen's estate cannot be jointly liable with Cottonwood and Bracken to the passengers and the estates of Hansen's fellow workers through the application of the joint tort-feasor contribution statute, § 1-1-110, supra n. 4.

We would describe the overriding issue in this appeal differently from the way the appellants have identified it. The question for our decision actually is: Does "scope of their employment" as that term is used in § 27-12-103(a), W.S.1977, Worker's Compensation Act, mean the same thing as or something different than it does when it is utilized in a negligence action where the plaintiff seeks to hold the employer vicariously liable through the doctrine of respondeat superior as was the case in Beard v. Brown, supra. We say this because in order for the appellants to make Beard v. Brown work for them, they must be able to show that the going-to-and-from-work "scope of their employment" concept means the same in a worker's compensation statute, (as the case at bar) as it does in a tort context. This is so because Beard posed a vicarious-liability...