Couch v. Jabe

• Citation: 679 F.3d 197
• Decision Date: 11 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–6560.,11–6560.
• Parties: William R. COUCH, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. John M. JABE; Daniel A. Braxton; Steve Hollar, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

679 F.3d 197

William R. COUCH, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.John M. JABE; Daniel A. Braxton; Steve Hollar, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 11–6560.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: March 23, 2012.

Decided: May 11, 2012.

ARGUED:Jeffrey Edward Fogel, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Earle Duncan Getchell, Jr., Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of Virginia, Charles E. James, Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation, TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and SHEDD, Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge TRAXLER wrote the opinion, in which Justice O'CONNOR and Judge SHEDD joined.

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

William R. Couch, a Sunni Muslim currently incarcerated in a state correctional facility, brought this action alleging that prison officials violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) by refusing to permit him to grow a one-eighth-inch beard in compliance with the requirements of his faith. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison officials, and Couch appeals. Because the prison officials did not explain how a one-eighth-inch beard would implicate health or security concerns, they failed to satisfy their burden under RLUIPA of showing that the general grooming policy that they rely upon is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Couch is a prisoner in the Augusta Correctional Center in Craigsville, Virginia. He has been incarcerated since 1990 and is serving multiple life sentences. As a Sunni Muslim, Couch claims that his religion requires that he grow a beard. Prior to 1999, he continuously maintained a beard in compliance with his faith.

In 1999, however, the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) instituted a grooming policy (“Policy”), which applies to the Augusta Correctional Center. The purpose of the Policy is “to facilitate the identification of offenders and to promote safety, security, and sanitation.” J.A. 18. Under the policy, “[n]o beards ... are allowed.” J.A. 20. The policy further states that “beards that could conceal contraband; promote identification with gangs; create a health, hygiene, or sanitation hazard; or could significantly compromise the ability to identify an offender are not allowed.” J.A. 19. Excepted from the prohibition on beards, however, are inmates who receive a “No Shave Pass” from a prison's medical authority based on a medical condition that is aggravated by shaving. Prisoners with a “No Shave Pass” are permitted to maintain a one-fourth-inch beard.

Prisoners without a “No Shave Pass” who nonetheless grow a beard are first given an order to shave. If they refuse to comply with the order, they are initially segregated from the general prison population. Continued refusal to comply with the grooming standards results in a transfer to the Graduated Privilege Program (“GPP”), which is located in a separate facility. The GPP is a program in which prisoners “have certain privileges restricted for a short term so that they may focus on more appropriate behaviors to enter regular general population.” J.A. 36. Some of the privileges that are restricted or limited as part of the GPP include access to personal property, movement rights, the right to eat and associate with others, recreation time, and visitation time.

In December of 2009, Couch requested permission to grow a one-eighth-inch beard in order to comply with his religious obligations.¹ He suggested that the prison's ability to accommodate medically exempt prisoners who grow one-fourth-inch beards shows that a shorter one-eighth-inch beard would not be problematic. Couch's initial request and all of his subsequent requests, including an Informal Complaint, a Regular Grievance (Level I), and an appeal from the Regular Grievance (Level II), were denied.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Couch filed a civil action in the Western District of Virginia against John Jabe, the Deputy Director of Operations for the VDOC; Daniel Braxton, the Warden of the Augusta Correctional Center; and Steve Hollar, the Assistant Warden of the Augusta Correctional Center (collectively the “Prison Officials”). In his two-count complaint, Couch alleged a violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and a violation of RLUIPA. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment to the Prison Officials. On appeal, Couch challenges this grant of summary judgment, raising his RLUIPA claim only.

II.

“We review a district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court.” Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir.2008). Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part, that

[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden ... (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). A plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on whether the policy or practice substantially burdens his exercise of religion. See42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(b). If the plaintiff satisfies this requirement, the government must then prove that the challenged policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Id.§ 2000cc–1(a); Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.2009). “As to those elements on which it bears the burden of proof, a government is only entitled to summary judgment if the proffered evidence is such that a rational factfinder could only find for the government.” Smith, 578 F.3d at 250.

A. Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise

RLUIPA defines the term “religious exercise” broadly to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A). Couch testified that the primary religious texts of Islam command that he grow a beard and that the refusal to maintain a beard is a sin comparable in severity to eating pork. Accordingly, we find that maintaining a beard is a qualifying religious exercise under RLUIPA in this case. See Smith, 578 F.3d at 249, 251 (Rastafarian's desire to grow hair was qualifying religious exercise); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 991, 996 (9th Cir.2005) (Native American's desire to grow hair was qualifying religious exercise).

RLUIPA does not define the term “substantial burden”; however, we have explained that a substantial burden

is one that put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, or one that forces a person to choose between following the precepts of h[is] religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of h[is] religion ... on the other hand.

Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir.2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The stated purpose of the GPP is “to guide the offender to more appropriate behaviors,” J.A. 36, a purpose that is achieved, in part, by limiting or taking away governmental benefits. The practices implemented through the GPP fit squarely within the accepted definition of “substantial burden.” See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995–96 (removing privileges in effortto compel compliance, despite not physically forcing inmate to cut his hair, qualifies as substantial burden). Therefore, Couch has satisfied his obligation of showing a substantial burden on his religious exercise.²

B. Compelling Governmental Interest

Because Couch has demonstrated a substantial burden on his religious exercise, we turn next to the Prison Officials' burden under RLUIPA. We first address whether the Prison Officials can establish that the denial of Couch's request was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. See42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1 (a)(1).

Although RLUIPA must “be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–3(g), it must be applied “with particular sensitivity to security concerns,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). In this regard, “RLUIPA [is not meant] to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution's need to maintain order and safety.” Id. We must “apply the Act's standard with due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures.” Id. at 723, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “a court should not rubber stamp or mechanically accept the judgments of prison administrators.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 190. Rather, due deference will be afforded to those explanations that sufficiently “take[ ] into account any institutional need to maintain good order, security, and discipline.” Id.

We have explained that the burden of justifying a policy in terms of security concerns is an “unremarkable step.” Id. However, we have also found some attempts to demonstrate compelling governmental interests to be insufficient. See Smith, 578 F.3d at 252 (justification that policy was “ ‘for security reasons' ... does not, by itself, explain why the security interest is compelling” (internal...