Couch v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1913
• Parties: COUCH v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

158 S.W. 347

COUCH v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 28, 1913.

1. DAMAGES (§ 15) — SPECULATIVE DAMAGES.

Damages must be real and not conjectural or speculative, but this rule will not be followed where it leads to unjust results.

2. DAMAGES (§ 112) — MEASURE — DESTRUCTION OF MEADOWS.

The measure of damages for destroying a meadow is the expense of reseeding it and the rental value of the land during the time plaintiff is deprived of crops of hay from the meadow by reason of its destruction, and not the depreciation in the value of the land.

3. EVIDENCE (§ 5) — JUDICIAL NOTICE — VALUE OF MEADOWS.

The Supreme Court will take judicial notice that meadows are sometimes valuable to prevent the soil from washing and also to give it a rest from producing grain crops.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Vernon County; B. G. Thurman, Judge.

Action by Lucy E. Couch against the Kansas City Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, where judgment was affirmed, and the case transferred to the Supreme Court because of conflict with rulings of the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

Plaintiff recovered a judgment for $193.50 for 22 acres of meadow and 27 rods of fence which defendant destroyed by permitting fire to be communicated from its engines to said meadow. The evidence quite clearly proves the quantity and value of the meadow and fence destroyed, and that the defendant's agents caused the fire by permitting sparks to escape from its engines. The roots of the meadow were destroyed so that it became necessary to reseed same. There was some evidence tending to prove that a reseeded meadow would not yield a full crop of hay the first season after such reseeding. The only issue urged here for reversal of the judgment is the instructions of the trial court which authorized a recovery for the expense of reseeding the meadow and the rental value of the land during the time plaintiff was or will be deprived of crops of hay therefrom by reason of the fire. The appellant contends that the real measure of plaintiff's damages is the depreciation in the value of her land (the injury to the inheritance) caused by burning her meadow.

Cyrus Crane, of Kansas City, and H. C. Clark, of Nevada, Mo., for appellant. Scott & Bowker, of Nevada, Mo., for respondent.

BROWN, P. J. (after stating the facts as above).

This appeal was submitted to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court through an able opinion by Broaddus, Judge. 141 Mo. App. 256, 124 S. W. 1077. The case was, however, transferred to this court because the opinion filed therein conflicts with several opinions of the St. Louis Court of Appeals prescribing a different rule for ascertaining damages of this character.

The decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals affirming the judgment is well sustained by its own prior rulings. Adam v. Railroad, 137 Mo. App. 204, 122 S. W. 1136; Doty v. Railroad, 136 Mo. App. 254, 116 S. W. 1126; Knight Bros. v. Railroad, 122 Mo. App. 38, 98 S. W. 81; and Mattis v. Railroad, 138 Mo. App. 61, 119 S. W. 998. While, on the other hand, the views of appellant are ably supported by the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Wiggins v. Railroad, 119 Mo. App. 492, 95 S. W. 311; Wiggins v. Railroad, 129 Mo. App. 369, 108 S. W. 574; and Carter v. Railroad, 128 Mo. App. 57, 106 S. W. 611. So it becomes our duty to finally determine what shall be the rule throughout the state for measuring damages caused by the burning of meadows.

Something could be said in favor of each method of ascertaining such damages. The appellant insists that the method adopted by the trial court, and sanctioned by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, for ascertaining damages in this class of cases, is too much a matter of conjecture or speculation.

It is a cardinal rule that when damages are awarded against any one such damages must be actual and real—not conjectural or speculative. This, however, is only an abstract rule of law; a general guide to be followed so long as it promotes justice, and to be put aside when it leads in the opposite direction. It would be difficult, indeed, to find a rule of law upon which the courts have not found it necessary to in graft some...