Couilliard v. Eaton

• Decision Date: 07 March 1885
• Citation: 139 Mass. 105,28 N.E. 579
• Parties: COUILLIARD v. EATON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

139 Mass. 105

28 N.E. 579

COUILLIARD

v.EATON.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 7, 1885.

Exceptions from superior court, Suffolk county; BRIGHAM, Chief Justice.

Leander A. Couilliard sued Albert S. Eaton for mutilating a promissory note by removing defendant's name from it, and also for the conversion of the note. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant took exceptions. Reversed.

D.F. Crane, (E.O. Howard, with him,) for plaintiff.

W. Gaston and R. Lund, for defendant.

DEVENS, J.

It is within the discretion of the court to submit to the jury special questions as to facts in dispute in the trial of a case, and to rule that, as the finding shall be thereon, a verdict shall be rendered for either the plaintiff or the defendant. If there are admitted and undisputed facts, these may properly be included as a part of the basis of the ruling. If there are disputed facts, the correct finding upon which is unimportant to the decision of the case, they may be disregarded. When a ruling is made by the court, upon special questions submitted to the jury, that the verdict shall be for the plaintiff or the defendant, it is necessarily assumed that a finding upon any disputed facts in favor of the contention of the party against whom a verdict is rendered would afford no reason why it should not be thus rendered. Where a verdict may properly be ordered, if a question of damages is left for decision it must be submitted to the jury, unless these are fixed by a rule of law, as when they are nominal, or capable of simple mathematical computation. Graves v. Insurance Co., 12 Allen, 391; Spoor v. Spooner, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 281; Dorr v. Fenno, 12 Pick. 521, 525;Todd v. Whitney, 27 Me 480. In the case at bar, after a proctracted trial, and after numerous requests for rulings by the defendant, the judge submitted to the jury five questions, and upon the answers of the jury thereto directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount of the note for the mutilation and conversion of which damages were sought. If, under this mode of procedure, all the facts in dispute in the case which had any legitimate bearing thereon were decided, and if the ruling then made was correct, the requests on behalf of the defendant for instructions as to the law governing the case would become immaterial. Before the general verdict was rendered by direction of the court, the defendant, among other things, objected that all the disputed issues of fact in the case had not been submitted to the jury; and further contended that, if any damages were recoverable, they could be only nominal.

The declaration in the action contained two counts,-one in case, for the mutilation of a certain promissory note, signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and Charles W. Stetson, payable in four months to the order of the bearer, and of the date of September 13, 1876; the other in trover, for the conversion of the same note. Without in detail repeating the questions addressed to the jury, and their answers thereto, the facts as found were that the defendant did not sign the note for the accommodation of the plaintiff and Charles W. Stetson, but for the purpose of having it used by the plaintiff in raising money for a business in which the defendant was jointly interested with the plaintiff and Charles W. Stetson; that the defendant took his name from the note in question on September 29, 1880, without the consent of the plaintiff, against his will, “and wrongfully.” As the jury were not instructed as to the legal rights of the defendant in and to this note, either as requested by the defendant or otherwise, and as to the bearing of the facts thereon, we do not understand by the use of the word “wrongfully” that anything more is intended than that the act was done without authority, and in violation or derogation of the actual possession of the note by the plaintiff. To treat it as more than this would be to hold that the jury had been permitted to pass upon the legal rights of the defendant, which could not have been the intention of the learned judge who presided.

The evidence on behalf of the plaintiff tended to show that he became a partner with Stetson in the business of constructing and putting upon the market a patented machine; that subsequently the defendant engaged in the business with them, taking an interest of one-third therein, and agreeing to furnish one-third of the money; that the note in suit was made for the purpose of raising money for the partnership, and was intended to be paid by the sale of machines on hand; that it was given to the plaintiff that he might get it discounted; that he took it for that purpose; that he did not use it for that purpose, but raised the money on his own note and his own collateral security, and lent it to the partnership, paying the money into the hands of the defendant, who it had been agreed should have charge of it; that when his own...