Coulter v. Coulter

• Citation: 215 N.W. 619,204 Iowa 575
• Decision Date: 25 October 1927
• Docket Number: 38451
• Parties: LUCILE COULTER, Appellant, v. CLARENCE COULTER, Appellee
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

215 N.W. 619

204 Iowa 575

LUCILE COULTER, Appellant, v. CLARENCE COULTER, Appellee

No. 38451

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 25, 1927

Appeal from Monona District Court.--MILES W. NEWBY, Judge.

Action for divorce on the ground of inhuman treatment. From a decree denying relief plaintiff appeals.

Reversed.

Prichard & Prichard, for appellant.

C. E Cooper, for appellee.

KINDIG J. EVANS, C. J., and STEVENS, FAVILLE, and WAGNER, JJ concur.

OPINION

KINDIG, J.

In August, 1916, at Des Moines, appellant, the plaintiff, then 19 years of age, was married to appellee, the defendant, ten years her senior. Previously, appellee met his future wife, when 17 years old, at Iowa City, where she was attending the university, of which institution he was a graduate. To this union two children were born,--one a girl, January 22, 1919, and the other a boy, June 6, 1921. After residing some time in Iowa, the parties moved to New York, where the husband was engaged as a sales manager, spending some months at St. Louis, Missouri, and there kept an apartment. Mrs. Coulter was in the last named city part of the time. Cause for a divorce is based upon the statutory ground of inhuman treatment.

I. Harmony in the domestic affairs seems to have prevailed until after the birth of the first child. As appellant approached motherhood for the second time, appellee commenced his cruel treatment of her. His actions in this regard continued almost without interruption until the final separation. Change, if any, in his attitude was not for the better, but rather revealed increased unkindness, misuse, and abuse. The question is, Was this conduct on the part of the husband sufficient to entitle the wife to a divorce because her life was endangered thereby? We have before said:

"Life may be endangered by treatment though it involves no physical violence." Thompson v. Thompson, 186 Iowa 1066, 173 N.W. 55; Cruse v. Cruse, 201 Iowa 810, 208 N.W. 324; Shors v. Shors, 133 Iowa 22, 110 N.W. 16; Berry v. Berry, 115 Iowa 543, 88 N.W. 1075.

Do the facts in this case come within the rule announced by said authorities? It is plain to us that they do. While appellant's parents were living at Moorhead, she, with her husband, was located in a distant city, large, strange and void of acquaintances and friendships for her. Yet, when she was an expectant mother for the second time, Mr. Coulter, failing to show love and sympathy for his wife and the ordinary paternal instincts, complained of maternity, and insisted that an abortion be performed. Upon the wife's refusal, the husband flew into a rage, and consulted physicians to procure the desired result. Soon after said child was born, appellee gave himself away to "brain storms," which frightened his wife and caused her to fear for her life. Under these spells, his eyes would blaze because of a nervous frenzy, and appellant trembled in terror. He threatened to commit suicide, and said "he would tell the world she was to blame," and accordingly went into the kitchen, closed the windows, and turned on the gas. Whether he was in earnest or merely pretending is not material. Nevertheless, Mrs. Coulter came to the rescue. Immediately before and also after childbirth, while the thoughts of the threatened abortion still haunted the mother, the husband complained because of failure to permit sexual indulgences, remarking that to so associate was his "God-given right," and that, if not allowed this request, he would go elsewhere, thereupon leaving the house and remaining away for periods of time ranging from an hour to a week. Furthermore, appellee introduced his wife to a professor of a New York college, saying that, when he (appellee) was out of the city, he desired this friend to take Mrs. Coulter automobiling, for her health; and when, upon one occasion, at the instance of her (appellant's) mother, appellant accepted an invitation for a short ride, appellee went into a rage, and wrongfully accused her of infidelity. A single accusation did not suffice, but reference was repeatedly made to this transaction throughout their entire married life. Consistent with this unusual disposition, at another time appellee invited said professor, together with the dean of the same school, to the Coulter home, providing for the event bootleg liquor, in imbibing which the three men became intoxicated. Part of said revelry was appellee's insistence that his wife drink some of the liquor. She refused. He then tore some of the clothing from her body; but notwithstanding, he insisted that she had voluntarily and intentionally undressed, for association with the professor. All of this, according to the record, was false, untrue, and a malicious slander. Appellant was at all times innocent, pure, and virtuous, yet throughout the future she was required to undergo the humiliation and annoyance of constant accusations of unchastity. Not only was appellee thus willing to torment his wife, but, not content therewith, he told the untrue story to relatives, friends, and strangers alike. At the hilarious party above referred to, the husband carried about the house a large butcher knife, while the "professor" was armed with a revolver. Finally, appellee admitted that all said accusations were false and untrue, and that his wife was guilty of no moral wrong. One witness testified that in her presence appellee threw a vase at appellant, scarcely missing the mark, and with insinuation, he falsely remarked that he was not responsible for the children. The testimony of appellant is corroborated. Our purpose has not been to set out all the testimony revealing inhuman treatment. Principal events only have been covered. There are many minor tributaries...