Coulter v. Stafford

• Decision Date: 27 November 1891
• Citation: 48 F. 266
• Parties: COULTER v. STAFFORD.
• Court: United States Circuit Court, District of Washington, Northern Division

48 F. 266

COULTER v. STAFFORD.

United States Circuit Court, D. Washington, Northern Division.

November 27, 1891

Tustin Gearin & Crews, for plaintiff.

Battle & Shipley, for defendant.

HANFORD J.

This is an action to recover real estate, situated in the city of Seattle. The plaintiff claims to be the owner in fee-simple deraigning his title by mesne conveyances from a patentee of the United States. The defendant is in possession, having entered in the year 1866, claiming title by virtue of a tax-deed to him executed by the sheriff pursuant to a sale of the land in 1883 to H. J. Jacobs for a delinquent tax for the year 1882. The plaintiff disputes the validity of the assessment and sale of the property for said tax, and denies that the sheriff had any authority to make the deed. The case has been, by stipulation of the parties, tried without a jury, and submitted to the court for its decision of all questions involved. On the trial objections were made to certain deeds offered in evidence by the plaintiff, and my decision of the questions so raised as to the validity of said deeds was reserved. I now overrule said objections, and give the plaintiff the full benefit of all the evidence offered in his behalf; and I hold that the plaintiff is the owner of the land, and entitled to a judgment as prayed in his complaint, unless the defendant acquired a valid title by the tax-sale and sheriff's deed, or unless the action is barred by the statute of limitations. In 1882 the land in controversy, as part of a larger tract owned by Albert Carr was listed for taxation in the name of said Carr upon the assessment roll of King County. Said assessment roll was made in the form prescribed by statute, being ruled in columns so as to admit of descriptions of property in the most convenient and concise way. The tract referred to, of which the property in controversy formed a part, was described in the assessment roll following the owner's name thus:

N.E. 1/4 of S.W. 1/4 of N.W. 1/4 of S.E. 1/4 20 (FN25) 4 2.50 / 31

The figures in columns indicate, as shown by explanatory head-lines, section No. '20,' township No. '25,' range No. '4;' number of acres in the tract, '2.50;' and road-district No. '31.' This description is accurate so far as it goes. Objection is made to it, however, on the ground that it is incomplete, in this: that it does not specify township 25 north and range 4 east of the Willamette meridian; and this supposed imperfection in the description is the basis of the only point made against the regularity and validity of the assessment and sale of the property. In connection with this objection it is proper to note, as it is a matter of common knowledge, that King county is wholly north of the parallel and east of the meridian, which are the initials of the government surveys of all the land therein.

One objection to the tax-deed is on the ground that the original certificate of sale issued to Jacobs was not produced to prove the assignment thereof to the defendant. The fact of the assignment was testified to on the trial by both parties to it, Mr. Jacobs and the defendant. The law in force at the time of the sale secured to the delinquent tax-payer a right to redeem his land at any time within a period of three years from the date of the sale, and provided that, in case of his failure to redeem within that time, the holder of the certificate of sale should be entitled to have a deed executed by the sheriff of the county, which should have the effect to convey to him absolutely the title to the property. This land was not redeemed, and on the 14th day of July, 1886, which was more than three years after the sale, a deed was made by the sheriff to defendant, purporting to be a tax-deed pursuant to the above-mentioned sale to Mr. Jacobs. Before the right of the holder of the certificate to have a deed had matured by lapse of the time allowed for redemption, section 2934 of the Code, which contains the provisions of law conferring upon the sheriff all the authority which he had to execute the deed, was amended by the addition of a proviso requiring the holder of the certificate to serve a notice upon the person in whose name the land was assessed, personally, or by publication, if he be not found within the county, not less than 60 days prior to the expiration of the time for redemption, and to make proof of the giving of such notice in a prescribed manner before he should be entitled to receive a deed. This amendatory act is general in its terms, making no exceptions of cases in which the redemption period was about to expire. It repeals all conflicting statutes, and contains no saving clauses. The act was approved February 3, 1886, and went into effect the same day. The 6th day of May, 1886, was the last day of the three years allowed for redemption of this property from the tax-sale. The time intervening between the approval of said act and the 6th of May was only 91 days. This time was not sufficient, considering the usual delay in publication of the laws after their passage, to afford a reasonable opportunity for compliance with the exactions of the new law. Although it was, for the reason just given, impracticable to comply with the requirements of this statute, the plaintiff now insists that, without compliance, no right to a deed could mature, because the law so declares in plain and mandatory language. The defendant, arguing to the contrary, maintains that, if the act be construed literally, it would deprive him of all rights under his contract of purchase, and therefore impair the obligation of a contract, and therefore render said act unconstitutional and void.

The defendant also relies upon the statute of limitations as a bar to this action. Section 2939 of the Code provides that 'any suit or proceeding for the recovery of lands sold for taxes, except in cases where the taxes have been paid or the land redeemed, as provided by law, shall be commenced within three years from the time of recording the tax-deed of sale, and not thereafter, except by the purchaser at the tax-sale. ' The defendant's deed was recorded more than three years before this suit was commenced. The land was sold for a tax, which has not been paid, and it has not been redeemed. If the deed is held to be valid, there can be no question but what the case is fully within the statute, and barred by it. The only argument in behalf of the plaintiff on this point is that the deed is void, and entirely impotent to serve either as a conveyance of the...