Great Northern Railway Company, a Corp. v. The County of Grand Forks
| Citation | 164 N.W. 320,38 N.D. 1 |
| Decision Date | 22 August 1917 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
From a judgment of the District Court of Grand Forks County, Cooley J.
Affirmed.
Geo. E Wallace and O. B. Burtness, for appellants.
There is no allegation that the assessments are unfair, unjust excessive, or inequitable. Even if they were, equity furnishes no relief or ground for restraining collection or securing cancelation of the assessments and taxes. Comp. Laws 1913, § 2240, subd. 5; Holland v. Baltimore, 69 Am. Dec. 199, note, and authorities cited; State v Duluth Gas & Water Co., 76 Minn. 96, 57 L.R.A. 63, 78 N.W. 1032; Frost v. Flick, 1 Dak. 139, 46 N.W. 508.
If the tax is in itself a legal one, and the property on which it is levied subject to taxation, then it cannot be said that any injury could result from its taxation. A court of equity will not interfere with the taxing powers of the state. The presumption is that the tax is valid, and this presumption extends to every act upon which the tax in any measure depends. Farrington v. New England Invest. Co., 1 N.D. 102, 45 N.W. 191; Northern P. R. Co. v. Barnes, 2 N.D. 310, 51 N.W. 386; Schaffner v. Young, 10 N.D. 252, 86 N.W. 733; Cooley, Taxn. p. 772 and cases in note 2; Clarke v. Ganz, 21 Minn. 387; Savings & L. Soc. v. Austin, 46 Cal. 417.
In tax cases the rule is settled that special facts must be inserted in the bill or complaint calling for equitable relief, and when there are no such averments, the suitor will be relegated to his legal remedies. 1 Spelling, Extr. Relief, § 658; 2 Desty, Taxn. p. 667, and cases cited in note 2; Wason v. Major, 10 Colo.App. 181, 50 P. 741; Linehan R. Transfer Co. v. Pendergrass, 16 C. C. A. 585, 36 U. S. App. 48, 70 F. 1; Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 594, 37 L.Ed. 275, 11 S.Ct. 646; Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall, 77, 21 L.Ed. 63; Farrington v. New England Invest. Co., 1 N.D. 102, 45 N.W. 191; St. Anthony & D. Elevator Co. v. Bottineau Co. (St. Anthony & D. Elevator R. Co. v. Soucie) 9 N.D. 346, 50 L.R.A. 262, 83 N.W. 212; Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. v. Dickey County, 11 N.D. 107, 90 N.W. 260.
In such cases the plaintiff must plead facts that will bring him within some recognized head of equity jurisprudence. Douglas v. Fargo, 13 N.D. 467, 101 N.W. 919; Bismarck Water Supply Co. v. Barnes, 30 N.D. 555, L.R.A.1916A, 965, 153 N.W. 454; Merchants' State Bank v. McHenry County, 31 N.D. 108, 153 N.W. 386; Barnum v. Rallihan, Ind.App. , 112 N.E. 561; State Finance Co. v. Beck, 15 N.D. 374, 109 N.W. 357.
The statutes provide due process. The question of due process implies merely the right to be heard. In taxation matters including the meeting of the boards of review and boards of equalization, the law gives all the notice required. Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461, 42 L.Ed. 236, 17 S.Ct. 829; Bell's Gap. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 33 L.Ed. 892, 10 S.Ct. 533; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345, 31 L.Ed. 763, 8 S.Ct. 921; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 33 L.Ed. 772, 10 S.Ct. 324; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U.S. 316, 35 L.Ed. 419, 11 S.Ct. 825; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 37 L.Ed. 637, 13 S.Ct. 750.
Plaintiffs claim that they are denied the equal protection of the law. This provision of the Federal Constitution is satisfied when the means and methods shall be applied impartially to all the constituents of each class, so that the law shall act equally and uniformly upon all persons and under similar circumstances. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U.S. 321, 29 L.Ed. 414, 6 S.Ct. 57; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Reynolds. 183 U.S. 471, 46 L.Ed. 283, 22 S.Ct. 176; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 33 L.Ed. 892, 10 S.Ct. 533; Michigan R. Tax Cases, 138 F. 236; Michigan C. R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 246, 50 L.Ed. 744, 26 S.Ct. 459.
The legislature has directed that any portion of the right of way of a railroad company which is held under a lease for a term of years shall be taxed as the property of the lessee. Comp. Laws 1913, § 2118; Douglas v. Fargo, 13 N.D. 467, 101 N.W. 919; Hackney v. Elliott, 23 N.D. 375, 137 N.W. 433; 37 Cyc. 1295; Doherty v. Real Estate Title, Ins. & T. Co., 85 Minn. 518, 89 N.W. 853; Maney v. Dennison, 110 Ark. 571, 163 S.W. 783; State ex rel. MacKenzie v. Casteel, 110 Ind. 174, 11 N.E. 219; Peckham v. Millikan, 99 Ind. 352; Sloan v. Sewell, 81 Ind. 180.
For assessment purposes the description is wholly sufficient. "An assessment of real estate need not describe the property with that certainty required in a deed; it is sufficient where the property can be located with reasonable certainty, from the description given." Ludlow v. Ludlow, 152 Ky. 545, 153 S.W. 783; Lancaster Sea Beach Improv. Co. v. New York, 161 A.D. 469, 146 N.Y.S. 734; Ventrinigeia v. Eichner, 155 A.D. 236, 140 N.Y.S. 395; People ex rel. National Park Band v. Metz, 141 A.D. 600, 126 N.Y.S. 986; Abercrombie v. Simmons, 71 Kan. 538, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 806, 114 Am. St. Rep. 509, 81 P. 208, 6 Ann. Cas. 239; Houghton v. Kern Valley Bank, 157 Cal. 289, 107 P. 113; McLaughlan v. Bonynge, 15 Cal.App. 239, 114 P. 798; Fox v. Townsend, 152 Cal. 51, 91 P. 1004, 1007; Chapman v. Zoberlein, 152 Cal. 216, 92 P. 188; Slaughter v. Dallas, 101 Tex. 315, 107 S.W. 48; Baird v. Monroe, 150 Cal. 560, 89 P. 352.
Where a tax debtor owned certain lots in a particular square the number and street boundaries of which are given, the property is sufficiently described for purposes of assessment and sale for taxes as "certain lots" in a "designated square" assessed to a person by name (the owner), and such description including all the lots owned by such person in the designated square. This is a sufficient description. Conzales v. Saux, 119 La. 657, 44 So. 332; Weber v. Martinez, 125 La. 663, 51 So. 679; People ex rel. Sweet v. Blake, 72 Misc. 646, 132 N.Y.S. 191; Continental Distributing Co. v. Smith, 74 Wash. 10, 132 P. 631.
The description, "south part of section 25, township 3, range 11, 80 acres" was held sufficient. Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 44 Wash. 239, 87 P. 257; Webb v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 105 Miss. 175, 62 So. 168; Hackney v. Elliott, 23 N.D. 373, 137 N.W. 433.
The test is "whether a man of ordinary intelligence would identify the land with reasonable certainty." Hackney v. Elliott, supra.
Our statute has for one of its principal objects the curing of irregularities in taxation proceedings, and relief therefrom is rather limited in such matters. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 2193, 2201; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. 457; Ensign v. Barse, 107 N.Y. 329, 14 N.E. 400, 15 N.E. 401; Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N.D. 256, 74 N.W. 241; Shattuck v. Smith, 6 N.D. 56, 69 N.W. 6.
This statute, being prospective, was of greater power and could cure greater irregularities, and hence the alleged defects here are cured by such statute. Beers v. People, 83 Ill. 488.
Such curative statutes are liberally construed by the courts. Reynolds v. Bowen, 138 Ind. 434, 36 N.E. 756, 37 N.E. 962; Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27 Iowa 160; Townsen v. Wilson, 9 Pa. 270; Mitchell v. Bratton, 5 Watts & S. 451; Dietrick v. Mason, 57 Pa. 40; Laird v. Hiester, 24 Pa. 452; Polk County v. Kauffman, 104 Iowa 639, 74 N.W. 8; Auditor General v. Sparrow, 116 Mich. 574, 74 N.W. 881; Boyce v. Stevens, 86 Mich. 549, 49 N.W. 577; Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Comptroller (Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts) 177 U.S. 330, 44 L.Ed. 792, 20 S.Ct. 642; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 24 L.Ed. 365; People v. Turner, 145 N.Y. 451, 40 N.E. 400, 117 N.Y. 238, 15 Am. St. Rep. 498, 22 N.E. 1022; Ensign v. Barse, 107 N.Y. 339, 14 N.E. 400, 15 N.E. 401; Re Lamb, 22 N.Y.S. R. 650, 4 N.Y.S. 858; People ex rel. Flower v. Bleckwenn, 55 Hun, 169, 7 N.Y.S. 914.
The legislature, having the power to pass such a law, likewise had the power to render valid an assessment which follows such proposed law. Reed v. Heard, 97 Miss. 743, 53 So. 400.
The statute forms a part of the contract between the state and the purchaser at such tax,--the defendant in this case. Roberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 N.D. 504, 79 N.W. 1049; Fisher v. Betts, 12 N.D. 197, 96 N.W. 132; Dondna v. Harlan, 45 Kan. 484, 25 P. 883; Martin v. Garrett, 49 Kan. 131, 30 P. 168; Hiles v. LaFlesh, 59 Wis. 465, 18 N.W. 435; Coulter v. Stafford, 48 F. 266; Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis. 324, 17 N.W. 252; Bardon v. Land & River Improv. Co., 157 U.S. 327, 39 L.Ed. 719, 15 S.Ct. 650; Edwards v. Sims, 40 Kan. 235, 19 P. 710.
"A statute prescribing the time and place at which the board shall meet and hear complaints is sufficient." 27 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 707 and cases cited in note 2; Inland Lumber & Timber Co. v. Thompson, 11 Idaho 508, 114 Am. St. Rep. 274, 83 P. 933, 7 Ann. Cas. 862; Baltimore v. State, 105 Md. 1, 65 A. 369, 11 Ann. Cas. 716; Monticello Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 90 Md. 428, 45 A. 210; Billinghurst v. Spink County, 5 S.D. 84, 58 N.W. 272; Tripp v. Yankton, 10 S.D. 516, 74 N.W. 447; Carney v. People, 210 Ill. 434, 71 N.E. 365; Fell v. West, 35 Ind.App. 20, 73 N.E. 719; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Richardson County, 72 Neb. 482, 100 N.W. 950; State ex rel. Morton v. Back, 72 Neb. 402, 69 L.R.A. 447, 100 N.W. 952; Hacker v. Howe, 72 Neb. 385, 100 N.W. 1127, 101 N.W. 255; Ankeny v. Blakeley, 44 Ore. 78, 74 P. 485.
It is generally held that personal notice to taxpayers is not necessary where a public statute so fixes the time and place. All persons are bound to take notice of the law. State R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 610, 23 L.Ed. 672; Merchants & M. Nat Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461, 42 L.Ed. 236, 17 S.Ct. 829; ...
To continue reading
Request your trial