Council of City of New York v. Bloomberg

• Decision Date: 14 February 2006
• Citation: 6 N.Y.3d 380,846 N.E.2d 433
• Parties: In the Matter of COUNCIL OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Michael R. BLOOMBERG, as Mayor of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

846 N.E.2d 433

6 N.Y.3d 380

In the Matter of COUNCIL OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. Michael R. BLOOMBERG, as Mayor of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

February 14, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steven L. Holley, New York City, David H. Braff, Bradley P. Smith, Julian C. Swearengin, Jay Damashek, Eric Lane and Robert J. Newman for appellant.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Alan G. Krams, Leonard Koerner, Martha Alfaro, June Buch, Spencer Fisher and Kristin M. Helmers of counsel), for respondents.

Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, New York City (Francis T. Murphy, John M. Callagy and Christopher C. Palermo of counsel), for Archdiocese of New York and others, amici curiae.

Dewey Ballantine LLP, New York City (Aldo A. Badini, Adam J. Kaiser, Sara Fuks and Eric Laufgraben of counsel), Sharon M. McGowan, James D. Esseks and Arthur Eisenberg for American Civil Liberties Union and another, amici curiae.

Morrison & Foerster LLP, New York City and San Francisco, California (Jodi K. Miller, Ruth N. Borenstein, Paul Borden, Yana S. Johnson and Ellen K. Eagen of counsel), for City and County of San Francisco and others, amici curiae.

Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, New York City (Sidney S. Rosdeitcher, Rebecca C. Shore and Judd Henry of counsel), and Paul K. Sonn for Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, amicus curiae.

Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., New York City (David F. Wertheimer, Joanna Swomley, A. Cristina Pérez-Labiosa, M. Gavan Montague, Eva L. Dietz and Sandhya P. Kawatra of counsel), Susan Sommer and Alphonso David for LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and another, amici curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

R.S. SMITH, J.

We hold that New York City's Equal Benefits Law is preempted by state and federal statutes. We therefore affirm the Appellate Division's dismissal of a CPLR article 78 proceeding brought by the New York City Council to compel enforcement of that law.

Facts and Procedural History

The Equal Benefits Law (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 6-126) was enacted by the City Council in 2004 over the Mayor's veto. It provides, in substance, that no city agency may enter into contracts having a value of $100,000 or more annually with any person or firm that fails to provide to its employees' domestic partners employment benefits equal to those provided to spouses. "Domestic partners," as defined in the Equal Benefits Law, means people who are registered as having that status under Administrative Code § 3-240(a), or who register with a contractor pursuant to the Equal Benefits Law itself (Administrative Code § 6-126[b][5]). "Employment benefits," as used in the Equal Benefits Law,

"means benefits including, but not limited to, health insurance, pension, retirement, disability and life insurance, family, medical, parental, bereavement and other leave policies, tuition reimbursement, legal assistance, adoption assistance, dependent care insurance, moving and other relocation expenses, membership or membership discounts, and travel benefits provided by a contractor to its employees" (Administrative Code § 6-126[b][7]).

Shortly before the Equal Benefits Law's effective date, the Mayor began a declaratory judgment action against the Council, asserting that the law was inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, provisions of the General Municipal Law and the New York City Charter relating to municipal contracting; that it was also preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 USC § 1001 et seq. [ERISA]); and that it was invalid because it curtailed the Mayor's powers without a referendum, in violation of the Municipal Home Rule Law and City Charter. After unsuccessfully seeking a temporary restraining order against the law's enforcement, the Mayor, through his counsel, informed Supreme Court that he would withdraw his motion for a preliminary injunction, that he would move promptly for summary judgment, and that in the meanwhile he would "comply with controlling state laws concerning procurement and the Charter" — i.e., that he would not implement the Equal Benefits Law. The next day, the Council began this CPLR article 78 proceeding, in the nature of mandamus to compel, against the Mayor and the City, asking for a judgment requiring them "immediately to implement and enforce the Equal Benefits Law." In response, the Mayor asserted, as he had in the declaratory judgment action, his reasons for considering the law invalid.

Supreme Court granted the petition without addressing the Mayor's arguments, relying on "the presumption of validity." The Appellate Division concluded that the Equal Benefits Law was preempted by both the General Municipal Law and ERISA, and dismissed the proceeding on that basis. We now affirm.

Discussion

I

The Council argues that we should grant its petition and order the Equal Benefits Law enforced without considering the merits of the controversy, on the ground that the validity of a legislative enactment cannot be decided in an article 78 proceeding. The Council's argument is misconceived.

The rule relied on by the Council that "article 78 does not lie to challenge a legislative act" (New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. McBarnette, 84 N.Y.2d 194, 201, 616 N.Y.S.2d 1, 639 N.E.2d 740 [1994]) means that a petitioner who is challenging the validity of legislation may not use an article 78 proceeding for that purpose; a lawsuit to challenge the validity of legislation should take the form of an action for a declaratory judgment. (See also Press v. County of Monroe, 50 N.Y.2d 695, 702, 431 N.Y.S.2d 394, 409 N.E.2d 870 [1980]; Matter of Kovarsky v. Housing & Dev. Admin. of City of N.Y., 31 N.Y.2d 184, 192, 335 N.Y.S.2d 383, 286 N.E.2d 882 [1972].) It does not mean that, when an article 78 proceeding is brought to compel the enforcement of legislation the petitioner claims is valid, the court must grant the petition whether the legislation is valid or not.

On the contrary, article 78 relief in the form of mandamus to compel may be granted only where a petitioner establishes a "clear legal right" to the relief requested (Matter of Brusco v. Braun, 84 N.Y.2d 674, 679, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291, 645 N.E.2d 724 [1994]). And we have repeatedly held that an officer against whom a proceeding for a writ of mandamus is brought may defend on the ground that the legislation he or she has been asked to enforce is invalid (Matter of Carow v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 272 N.Y. 341, 345, 6 N.E.2d 47 [1936]; People ex rel. Balcom v. Mosher, 163 N.Y. 32, 35, 57 N.E. 88 [1900]). The theory the Council advocates would put the courts in the unacceptable position of directing an officer to violate his or her oath of office by enforcing an unconstitutional law, and would contradict the principle that "mandamus is never granted for the purpose of compelling the performance of an unlawful act" (Matter of People ex rel. Sherwood v. State Bd. of Canvassers, 129 N.Y. 360, 370, 29 N.E. 345 [1891]).

Thus we hold that the Appellate Division was correct in concluding that the Mayor was entitled to raise the invalidity of the Equal Benefits Law as a defense in this case. We are not persuaded by our dissenting colleagues' arguments to the contrary.

The dissent asserts, without citation of authority, that the Mayor's duty is to "follow a duly enacted law . . . unless and until a court nullifies it" (dissenting op. at 396, 813 N.Y.S.2d at 12, 846 N.E.2d at 442). The assertion has a circular quality, for how can a law be "duly enacted" if the legislature that enacted it had no authority to do so? The Mayor does indeed have a duty to implement valid legislation passed by the City Council, whether over his veto or not, but he also has a duty to comply with valid state and federal legislation, including state competitive bidding laws and ERISA. Where a local law seems to the Mayor to conflict with a state or federal one, the Mayor's obligation is to obey the latter, as the Mayor has done here.

The dissent suggests that the procedural characteristics of an article 78 proceeding make it unsuitable for resolving the Mayor's contention that the Equal Benefits Law is invalid (dissenting op. at 401-402, 813 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17, 846 N.E.2d at 446-447). The suggestion is puzzling. Article 78 proceedings are indeed designed for the prompt resolution of largely legal issues, rather than for discovery, trials and "credibility judgments" (id. at 400, 813 N.Y.S.2d at 15, 846 N.E.2d at 445), but, as we explain below, the validity of the Equal Benefits Law turns entirely on issues of law, not of fact. The dissent says that the likely fiscal impact of the Equal Benefits Law presents an issue of fact (id. at 399, 813 N.Y.S.2d at 14, 846 N.E.2d at 444) but, as the next section of our opinion explains, it is not an issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment in this case. We assume the accuracy of the Council's assertion that the law will "not cost contractors much money" (id. at 400, 813 N.Y.S.2d at 15, 846 N.E.2d at 445). We conclude that the law is nevertheless preempted by the competitive bidding statute.

The dissent seems to shrink, understandably, from following to the limits of its logic the proposition that an executive must implement every law, valid or invalid, that a legislative body enacts until a court determines the law's validity. Certainly, the dissenters would not so hold in an extreme case: If a legislative body enacted a law requiring racial segregation of public schools, the dissenters would not say that it is the duty of police to bar black children from "white" schools until a court orders them let in. And even in this case, the dissent stops short of saying that the relief the Council seeks in this article 78 proceeding — an order requiring implementation of the Equal Benefits Law, issued without considering the law's validity — should be granted. The dissenters...