County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 760056

• Decision Date: 14 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 760056,760056
• Citation: 217 Va. 645,231 S.E.2d 231
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: COUNTY BOARD OF ARLINGTON COUNTY et al. v. Rudolph A. RICHARDS et al. Record

Page 231

231 S.E.2d 231

217 Va. 645

COUNTY BOARD OF ARLINGTON COUNTY et al. v. Rudolph A. RICHARDS et al.

Record No. 760056.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Jan. 14, 1977.

Charles G. Flinn, Deputy County Atty. (Jerry K. Emrich, County Atty., on briefs), for appellants.

Herbert C. Harper, Fairfax (Ray Elbert Parker, pro se, on brief), for appellees.

Arlington Chamber of Commerce (Charles McDonnell Radigan, Barham, Radigan, Suiters & Brown, Arlington, on brief), amicus curiae, for appellants.

Before CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN, POFF and COMPTON, JJ.

POFF, Justice.

Appellants ¹ challenge the trial court's judgment declaring a county ordinance authorizing permit parking on certain public streets unconstitutional as applied to appellees. ²

On May 18, 1974, County Board of Arlington County amended and reenacted § 29 D of its zoning ordinance. The preamble stated the legislative purpose to be:

'. . . to reduce hazardous traffic conditions resulting from the use of streets within areas zoned for residential uses for the parking of vehicles by persons using districts zoned for commercial or industrial uses or the Conditional Uses allowed in Special Districts under the Zoning Ordinance of Arlington County; to protect those districts from polluted air, excessive noise, and trash and refuse caused by the entry of such vehicles; to protect the residents of those districts from unreasonable burdens in gaining access to their residences; to preserve the character of those districts as residential districts; to promote efficiency in the maintenance of those streets in a clean and safe condition; to preserve the value of the property in those districts; and to preserve the safety of children and other pedestrians and traffic safety, and the peace, good order, comfort, convenience and welfare of the inhabitants of the County.'

The county manager was empowered to implement § 29 D (hereinafter, the ordinance) in those residential areas in which he determined that 'on the weekdays of any month' 75% Of street parking capacity was filled and more than 25% Of capacity was being occupied by 'operators of vehicles . . . using districts in which commercial or industrial uses are permitted'. In such residential areas, parking privileges were restricted to 'service or delivery vehicles' and vehicles displaying permits. Parking permits were to be issued to 'persons who are residents' of a restricted zone for 'every vehicle owned by those persons and registered in the County'; 'persons who are visitors of any residents'; and 'persons who do business with any residents'. Parking violations were declared unlawful.

Aurora Highlands, a residential community consisting largely of single-family homes, is located along State Route 1 opposite 'Crystal City', a complex of high rise office and commercial buildings where 20,000 workers are employed. Based upon an engineering study, the county manager designated a portion of Aurora Highlands as a permit parking zone. The zone embraced 81 buildings containing 101 residences and 192 parking spaces along portions of three streets. All but two of the single-family homes had off-street parking facilities.

Appellees were employed in Crystal City. Most commuted to work by automobile and parked on streets in Aurora Highlands. When the permit zone was established, they filed two motions against appellants seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance, as applied to them, denied them due process of law and equal protection of the laws, and praying for an injunction against its enforcement. The two motions were consolidated for trial, and the trial court, sitting without a jury, heard evidence Ore tenus.

By final order entered September 16, 1975, incorporating a letter opinion dated June 18, 1975, the trial court found that the classification bears no 'reasonable relationship to the stated objectives', ruled that 'the classification . . . is arbitrary and unreasonable', and declared that 'the application of the ordinance to the petitioners is found to be violative' of their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. The trial court decreed that appellants be 'enjoined permanently from enforcing the provisions of . . . (the ordinance) against the petitioners'. ³

On brief, appellants posed the question: 'Is the ordinance as it is applied to the appellees who are denied permits, a denial of due process . . . or . . . equal protection . . .?' At bar, however, both parties agreed that the effect of the final order was to declare the classification arbitrary and the ordinance unconstitutional on its face, and we will consider the question in that posture.

We find it unnecessary to address arguments concerning 'special' legislation proscribed by Article IV, § 14 of the Constitution of Virginia, or those related to the due process and privileges and immunities clauses of the Constitution of the United States, for we are of opinion that this ordinance offends the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.

The 14th Amendment does not forbid classification in legislative enactments. Rather, it commands that classification be reasonably structured to serve a proper governmental interest. Classifications based upon race, national origin, and alienage are suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and survive equal protection attacks only when designed to achieve an 'important', 'overriding', or 'compelling' governmental interest. Sandiford v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 117, 225 S.E.2d 409 (1976). When the basis is not suspect, the classification is constitutionally permissible if the governmental objective is 'legitimate' and the classification bears a 'reasonable' or 'subsantial' relation thereto. This is true even when the basis of the classification involves First Amendment guarantees. Young, Mayor of Detroit v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976); See also McWhorter v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 857, 63 S.E.2d 20 (1951).

The ordinance creates two classes, and we must first decide what they are. Appellants say they are two classes of vehicles. Some appellees view them as a government-employee class and a non-government-employee class. One appellee treats them on brief as a property-owner class and a non-property-owner class. In our view, the ordinance creates one class consisting of residents of a defined zone who own automobiles registered in the county and persons who are visitors of or do business with such residents, and another class consisting of all other persons.

Hence, it appears from the face of the ordinance that the crucial basis of the classification is residence in a selected area. Classifications in municipal ordinances enjoy a presumption of validity, but that presumption may be 'overcome by unreasonableness apparent on the face of the ordinance'. Kisley v. City of Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 697, 187 S.E.2d 168, 171 (1972). Clearly, the objectives stated here constitute a legitimate governmental interest. The question, then, is whether the classification bears a reasonable relation to those objectives.

Defending the ordinance, appellants cite two Virginia cases and several cases in other jurisdictions upholding ordinances regulating parking on public streets. Town of Leesburg v. Tavenner, 196 Va. 80, 82 S.E.2d 597 (1954) (parking zone restricted to all but common carriers and commercial vehicles); Funeral Directors' Ass'n v. Groth, 202 Va. 792, 120 S.E.2d 467 (1961) (parking forbidden during funerals); Akron v. Davies, 111 Ohio App. 103, 170 N.E.2d 494 (1959) (street parking around public buildings limited to public vehicles); Commonwealth v. Sargent, 330 Mass. 690, 117 N.E.2d 154 (1953) (parking by legislators permitted in no-parking zones).

We do not find the Virginia cases controlling or the other cases helpful. In each, the classification was sustained, but in none was the classification based upon residence. Nor is the decision in State v. Rush, 324 A.2d 748 (Me.1974) relevant to our determination of the validity of the classification here, for there the ordinance prohibiting overnight parking treated motorists as a single class.

In response to appellees' argument that the objectives of the ordinance could be better achieved by other parking regulations applied to motorists as a single class, appellants say that they are not required to select the optimum solution to a public problem. It is true...