Richmond Funeral Directors' Ass'n v. Groth
| Decision Date | 12 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 5305,5305 |
| Citation | 202 Va. 792,120 S.E.2d 467 |
| Parties | RICHMOND FUNERAL DIRECTORS' ASSOCIATION, ET AL. v. W. L. GROTH, DIRECTOR, ETC. Record |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Jack N. Herod; Gordon W. Poindexter, Jr.; Bowles, Boyd & Herod, on brief, for the petitioners.
J. E. Drinard, City Attorney, on brief, for the respondent.
On February 27, 1961, the Richmond Funeral Directors' Association and the Richmond Funeral Directors' Association, Inc., hereinafter referred to as petitioners, filed in this court an original petition for a writ of mandamus against W. L. Groth, Director of Public Safety of the City ofRichmond, hereinafter referred to as respondent, after having served on him proper notice of the intended application and a copy of the petition. On the same date, respondent filed his answer to the petition.
The petition and answer present the following case for our consideration:
The petitioners are funeral directors engaged in conducting funerals from private homes, churches and funeral parlors in the city of Richmond.
On February 27, 1956, the city council of Richmond adopted an ordinance, § 22-136, City Code, (now § 22-149, City Code) directing the respondent to promulgate rules and regulations restricting the parking of vehicles on the highways of the city 'at places where funerals are conducted.'
On March 1, 1956, the respondent promulgated rules and regulations to carry out the directive contained in the ordinance.
On October 22, 1959, one E. W. McMinn was tried before the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond on a charge of violating the ordinance by parking his automobile in a zone set aside for a funeral to be conducted at a funeral parlor of one of the petitioners. In acquitting Mr. McMinn, the judge of the Hustings Court, in a written opinion, ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional.
As a result of this ruling, the respondent immediately withdrew the rules and regulations that had been promulgated pursuant to the ordinance and refused to comply with the provisions of the ordinance. He notified the petitioners that, because of the court's ruling, the rules and regulations could not be enforced.
On December 7, 1959, petitioners filed a petition in the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond, Part II, seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was constitutional. The respondent filed an answer to the petition, and joined in the prayer of the petition that the ordinance be declared constitutional.
On February 19, 1960, the judge of the Hustings Court, Part II, in a written opinion, ruled that the ordinance was valid and constitutional.
Notwithstanding this latter ruling, the respondent refused to reinstate the rules and regulations, or to promulgate new ones, to carry out the provisions of the ordinance.
The petition now before us prays that the ordinance be declared valid and constitutional; that a writ of mandamus issue compelling the respondent to reinstate the rules and regulations previously promulgated, or to promulgate other rules and regulations; that the respondent be ordered otherwise to comply with the provisions of the ordinance, and that he be required to enforce the ordinance and reasonable rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
In his answer to the petition, the respondent admits all of the allegations of fact set forth in the petition, and states that he does not dispute the jurisdiction of this court to hear and dispose of this matter. He prays that the ordinance be adjudged valid and constitutional, and states that he will abide by the decision of this court.
The sole question to be determined in this case is whether the ordinance is valid and constitutional.
The ordinance was adopted by the city pursuant to the provisions of the city charter, § 2.01 and 2.04, Acts of Assembly, 1948, c. 116, and the provisions of § 46-259, Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, (now Code, § 46.1-252).
The provisions of the city charter grant to the city the power to conduct its government so as to promote the general welfare of the city and the safety, health, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and morals of its inhabitants. Among the powers granted, the city is specifically authorized to regulate, by ordinance, the operation of motor vehicles and to exercise control over traffic in the streets of the city, provided that such regulation and control are not inconsistent with the state Motor Vehicle Code.
Code, § 46.1-252, authorizes the city council, by general ordinance, to provide for the regulation of parking within its limits, and to grant to specified administrative officials the right and authority to put such regulations into effect, including the right to classify vehicles with reference to parking and to designate the time, place and manner such vehicles may be allowed to park on city streets. The section further permits the council to delegate to the proper administrative officials the authority to make and enforce such additional regulations as parking conditions may require.
The ordinance adopted by the city council reads as follows:
It is fundamental that streets and highways belong to the public. Subject only to the limitation that constitutional rights must not be invaded, supreme control over the streets and highways is vested in the state, which, acting under its police power and through the legislature, may prescribe reasonable restrictions and regulations for their use....
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State ex rel. Perry v. Miller
...promulgation of an appropriate regulation. See also United Mine Workers of America v. Miller, supra; Richmond Funeral Directors' Association v. Groth, 202 Va. 792, 120 S.E.2d 467 (1961). We believe that directing the promulgation of an appropriate regulation is the proper relief in this cas......
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Rogers v. Hechler
...283 N.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Minn.1979); Stine v. Kansas City, 458 S.W.2d 601, 609-10 (Mo.Ct.App.1970); Richmond Funeral Directors' Ass'n v. Groth, 202 Va. 792, 797, 120 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1961). The petitioner's contention is that the Legislature has already spoken, but that the respondents are n......
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Richlands Medical Ass'n v. Com., ex rel. State Health Com'r, 841579
...to the functionary to the court which undertakes to award the writ. Id. at 372, 38 S.E. at 177-78; see Funeral Directors' Ass'n v. Groth, 202 Va. 792, 797, 120 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1961) (mandamus will not lie to control manner in which public official exercises Additionally, mandamus is applie......
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County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 760056
...Va. 80, 82 S.E.2d 597 (1954) (parking zone restricted to all but common carriers and commercial vehicles); Funeral Directors' Ass'n v. Groth, 202 Va. 792, 120 S.E.2d 467 (1961) (parking forbidden during funerals); Akron v. Davies, 111 Ohio App. 103, 170 N.E.2d 494 (1959) (street parking aro......