County Com'rs v. Colorado Seminary

• Decision Date: 19 April 1889
• Citation: 21 P. 490,12 Colo. 497
• Parties: COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al. v. COLORADO SEMINARY.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

21 P. 490

12 Colo. 497

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al. v. COLORADO SEMINARY.

Supreme Court of Colorado

April 19, 1889

Appeal from district court, Jefferson county.

Appellee the Colorado Seminary, was duly incorporated for educational purposes on the 5th of March, 1864, by an act of the territorial legislature. (The sections of this statute involved in the present case sufficiently appear in the opinion.) The corporation thus provided for accepted the provisions of the charter, was duly organized, and has been and is now, a prosperous institution of learning. On the 25th of April, 1881, one James B. Avery donated and conveyed to the seminary certain lands aggregating about 200 acres 'and the said, the Colorado Seminary accepted and received the same for the sole use and purpose of such seminary, and for carrying out the design thereof in the best manner.' The lands thus conveyed 'were unoccupied and open prairie land,' and so remained during all the time they were so held and owned by the said the Colorado Seminary. In 1884 this land was sold and conveyed by the seminary to one Shellebarger; but prior to that date, to-wit in June, 1882, the same were sold for taxes by the county treasurer, the county itself becoming the purchaser at such taxsale, and receiving the certificate of purchase in pursuance thereof. The present action was brought to enjoin the county treasurer from issuing the tax-deed in pursuance of such sale; to compel the county to redeem these lands therefrom; and to have the sale canceled and satisfied, and the taxes 'declared null, void, and illegal, and of no effect.' To the complaint filed setting up the foregoing, with other essential facts, the defendant demurred on the ground that no cause of action was stated. This demurrer was overruled by the court below, and, defendant electing to stand thereby, a decree was entered in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. Prior to the ruling upon the demurrer, however, the following stipulation was filed in court, and became a part of the matters considered with the pleadings in rendering judgment: 'It is hereby stipulated that as matter of fact in this cause the lands described in the complaint in this action were not donated by said Avery to the plaintiff or held for the purpose of using the same for the erection of seminary buildings thereon, or for playgrounds for students attending the seminary, or for the campus of the seminary, but the same were so donated and given by said Avery to the plaintiff and held to the end that the increase thereof, if any, should be applied exclusively for carrying out the design of said seminary in the best manner, and that the avails of said lands, if sold, should be applied in like manner and not otherwise.' From the decree entered as aforesaid the present appeal was taken.

Joseph Mann, for appellants.

Wm. B. Mills, for appellee.

HELM C.J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

The Colorado Seminary having been organized as a corporation, and having proceeded in the performance of its appointed work under the special charter granted by the territorial legislature, the provision of this charter allowing exemptions from taxation became a part of the contract existing between it and the state. This contract could not be impaired by subsequent legislation, constitutional or statutory. Cooley, Const. Lim. 415, and cases cited; Railway Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 649; Delmas v. Insurance Co., 14 Wall. 661. But since it operates as a limitation of the taxing power, it is our duty to carefully scrutinize its conditions, and not permit an enlargement of its scope. We again quote with approval, as we have heretofore had occasion to do, the following language used by the supreme court of the United States: 'The taxing power is vital to the functions of government. It helps to sustain the social compact, and to give it efficacy. It is intended to promote the general welfare. It reaches the interests of every menber of the community. It may be restrained by contract in special cases for the public good where such contracts are not forbidden, but the contract must be shown to exist. There is no presumption in its favor. Every reasonable doubt should be resolved against it. Where it exists it is to be rigidly scrutinized, and never permitted to extend, either in scope or duration, beyond what the terms of the concession clearly require. It is in derogation of public right, and narrows a trust created for the good of all.' Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; Bank v. Tennessee, 104 U.S. 493; Washburn College v. Commissioners, 8 Kan. 344; People v. Hall, 8 Colo. 485, 9 P. 34; People v. Henderson, 12 Colo. ----, ante, 144. The wisdom and propriety of exempting from taxation certain property devoted to education are not questioned, but the foregoing principles are nevertheless to be applied in construing statutes granting such immunity. The charter provision under which exemption in the present case is claimed, reads: 'Sec. 5. Such property as may be necessary for carrying out the design of the seminary in the best manner, while used exclusively for such purpose, shall be free from all taxation.' If the land referred to in this action is exempt from taxation by virtue of the foregoing statute, it follows logically that all real estate owned by the corporation is favored with a like immunity; for the seminary is only authorized to acquire, hold, and convey property 'for carrying into effect the object of its incorporation.' It can become the proprietor of no estate which is not...