County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court

• Citation: 78 Cal.App.4th 212,92 Cal.Rptr.2d 668
• Decision Date: 14 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. B135420.,No. B135399.,B135399.,B135420.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Jose Valentin et al., Real Parties In Interest. Jose Valentin et al., Petitioners, v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Respondent; County of Los Angeles et al., Real Parties In Interest.

92 Cal.Rptr.2d 668

78 Cal.App.4th 212

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

Jose Valentin et al., Real Parties In Interest.

Jose Valentin et al., Petitioners, v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

County of Los Angeles et al., Real Parties In Interest.

No. B135399.

No. B135420.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7.

February 14, 2000.

Review Denied May 10, 2000.

Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, David D. Lawrence and Scott D. MacLatchie, Pasadena, for Petitioners and for Real Parties in Interest County of Los Angeles, Eleanor Konrad, R. Zaiden Corrado, John McQuay, Patrick Soil, John Mosak and Ralph Ruedas.

Manning, Marder & Wolfe, Eugene P. Ramirez and Steven J. Renick, Los Angeles, for Petitioner and Real Party in Interest Douglas Sparkes.

Eduardo M. Madrid, Diamond Bar, Robert Roman, Norwalk, Peter M. Gwosdof, Anaheim, Emmet J. Gantz and Morton Minikes, for Petitioners and Real Parties in Interest Jose Valentin et al.

No appearance for Respondent.

JOHNSON, Acting P.J.

Plaintiffs in the underlying action seek damages for injuries resulting from their false arrest, false imprisonment and violation of their federal civil rights by defendants, the County of Los Angeles and individual county employees. In a pretrial order, the trial court ruled that under their state law causes of action plaintiffs can only recover damages for the period between their arrest and the time the district attorney filed a criminal complaint against them. As to plaintiffs' claim under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the trial court ruled plaintiffs could recover damages only to the extent those damages were attributable to the defendants' pre-filing conduct. Both sides have challenged the trial court's ruling through petitions for writs of mandate. The plaintiffs contend the ruling is too restrictive; the defendants contend the ruling is too broad.

For the reasons explained below, we conclude with respect to plaintiffs' state law claims plaintiffs are entitled to all damages which are attributable to injuries arising from the false arrest and false imprisonment which preceded their arraignment. With respect to plaintiffs' federal civil rights claim, we conclude plaintiffs are entitled to all damages which are attributable to injuries arising from the false arrest and false imprisonment which preceded their arraignment plus all damages attributable to injuries arising from their incarceration subsequent to their arraignment if they can prove the prosecutor did not exercise independent judgment in filing the criminal complaint.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Plaintiffs were arrested without a warrant on April 6 and remained in custody on April 12 when they were arraigned on a criminal complaint filed that day. Plaintiffs were eventually released on bail. After a preliminary hearing the trial court dismissed all charges against them. Plaintiffs then brought the underlying action against the County of Los Angeles and its employees involved in their arrest and imprisonment.

In a previous trial of this action a jury found the defendants liable for false arrest, false imprisonment and violation of the plaintiffs' civil rights under the federal Civil Rights Act (§ 1983). The jury awarded plaintiffs $11.2 million in damages. In an unreported opinion we affirmed the judgment as to liability but reversed as to damages on the ground that with respect to the plaintiffs' state law causes of action the trial court's instructions and special verdict form improperly allowed the jury to award damages for injuries arising from plaintiffs' incarceration following arraignment, contrary to the holding in Asgari v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 15 Cal.4th 744, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273. We remanded the matter to the trial court "to determine compensatory damages consistent with the holdings of [Asgari] ... and to take any otherwise appropriate action." We expressed no view on the appropriate measure of damages for violation of plaintiffs' civil rights under section 1983, as the issue was not briefed by the parties.

On remand, the trial court entered the following order with respect to the admissibility of evidence on damages.

"1. Evidence of all actions of the defendants after the filing of the criminal complaint ... and damages flowing therefrom is inadmissible pursuant to the ... order of the Court of Appeal remanding the matter for retrial regarding compensatory damages and Asgari v. City of Los Angeles [supra].

"2. Evidence of the post-filing damages attributable to pre-filing conduct of the defendants is inadmissible regarding the state law false imprisonment claim pursuant to the ... Court of Appeal opinion and Asgari (supra).

"3. Evidence of post-filing damages attributable to the pre-filing conduct of the defendants is admissible under section 1983 pursuant to Smiddy v. Varney [(9th Cir.1981) 665 F.2d 261].

"4. The plaintiffs are precluded from offering any evidence of post-filing conduct or claiming any damages from post-filing conduct under the law of the case per the order of the Court of Appeal in the order remanding this case for retrial."

The parties interpret this order to mean that as to plaintiffs' state law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment plaintiffs' damages are limited to the period between the false arrest and the filing of the criminal complaint. With respect to plaintiffs' section 1983 cause of action plaintiffs can recover all damages attributable to defendant's pre-filing conduct (not just damages for the period between the false arrest and the filing of the criminal complaint) but may not recover any damages for injuries attributable to defendants' post-filing conduct.

Both sides seek a writ of mandate to correct the errors they perceive in the trial court's order specifying the measure of damages on retrial.

Plaintiffs maintain the trial court erred in cutting off state law damages at the point a criminal complaint was filed. Plaintiffs concede that under Asgari they cannot recover damages for injuries attributable to their criminal prosecution because state law immunizes public employees from liability for malicious prosecution. (Gov.Code, § 821.6; Asgari, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 754, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 937 P.2d 273.) Plaintiffs contend, however, under their state law causes of action they are entitled to recover compensation for all injuries they suffered as a result of defendants' pre-filing conduct even if those injuries continued beyond the point at which the criminal complaint was filed. Therefore the trial court erred in limiting their false arrest "damages" to the period between arrest and the filing of the criminal complaint.

Plaintiffs further contend the trial court erred in limiting their section 1983 damages to injuries which occurred prior to the filing of the criminal complaint. They argue under federal law they are entitled to compensation for all injuries attributable to defendants' conduct after the filing of the criminal complaint if they can prove the prosecutor did not exercise independent judgment in filing the complaint. (Smiddy v. Varney, supra, 665 F.2d at pp. 266-267.)

The county defendants argue the trial court erred in allowing plaintiffs to recover under their section 1983 claim for any damages suffered after the filing of the criminal complaint whether those damages are attributable to defendants' pre-filing or post-filing conduct.

We issued an order to show cause, stayed further proceedings in the trial court and consolidated the two writ petitions.

DISCUSSION

I. UNDER THEIR STATE LAW CLAIMS, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ALL DAMAGES WHICH ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO INJURIES ARISING FROM THE FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT WHICH PRECEDED THEIR ARRAIGNMENT.

We begin our discussion of state law damages for false arrest and false imprisonment by a public employee with a brief review of how that law developed.

In Gill v. Epstein (1965) 62 Cal.2d 611, 44 Cal.Rptr. 45, 401 P.2d 397, the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant and jailed on a charge of theft. Two days later he was arraigned and then returned to jail. He remained in jail until the preliminary hearing five days later, at which time the case against him was dismissed on motion of the district attorney. Plaintiff then brought an action under state law for false arrest and false imprisonment against the police officers who handled his case and the city which employed them. The trial court instructed the jury it could not award damages arising from plaintiffs confinement in jail after his arraignment. The Supreme Court held this instruction was erroneous:

"The arraignment would not have taken place had the arrest not been made. Thus, the arrest was a cause in fact of plaintiffs imprisonment. Although a chain of causation may be broken by an independent intervening act which is not reasonably foreseeable [citation], plaintiffs arraignment was not such an act. It was clearly a foreseeable result of the arrest and was actually contemplated by defendants, [¶] Under the circumstances, the arrest was a proximate cause of plaintiffs imprisonment both before and after the arraignment, and he is entitled to recover damages for physical and mental suffering during the entire period he was confined." (62 Cal.2d at pp. 617-618, 44 Cal.Rptr. 45, 401 P.2d 397; emphasis in original.)

In Jackson v. City of San Diego (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 579, 175 Cal.Rptr. 395, the police arrested Jackson without a warrant and charged him with robbery and murder. He was convicted and sentenced to state prison. Ten months later he was set free after another individual confessed to the crimes and was tried and convicted. Jackson successfully sued the City of San Diego on a state law claim for false imprisonment and the city appealed. The appellate court defined the issue as "whether an innocent man, convicted and...