County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra

• Citation: 27 Cal.3d 184,165 Cal.Rptr. 440,612 P.2d 24
• Parties: , 612 P.2d 24 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF ALHAMBRA, Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 31084.
• Decision Date: 05 June 1980
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 440

165 Cal.Rptr. 440

27 Cal.3d 184, 612 P.2d 24

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF ALHAMBRA, Defendant and Appellant.

L.A. 31084.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

June 5, 1980.

Rehearing Denied July 17, 1980.

Leland C. Dolley, Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Mark C. Allen, Jr., Los Angeles, and Talmage V. Burke, Alhambra, for defendant and appellant.

James B. Lindholm, Jr., County Counsel, San Luis Obispo, David K. Hughes, Deputy County Counsel, Donald L. Clark, County Counsel, San Diego, Lloyd M. Harmon, Jr., Chief Deputy County Counsel, and C. Larry Davis, Deputy County Counsel, San Diego, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, and John P. Farrell, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

John W. Witt, City Atty., San Diego, and Janis Sammartino Gardner, Deputy City Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

NEWMAN, Justice.

In this case we consider the validity of § 12.08.010 of the Alhambra Municipal Code ("the ordinance"), which provides for the city's collection of parking-violation fees and for prosecution under the state Vehicle Code of only those violations as to which the city fee remains unpaid. ¹ Penal Code § 1463 provides for distribution to the County of Los Angeles of 13 percent of Vehicle Code fines and forfeitures collected following arrests by Alhambra employees. ² On August 13, 1974, the county sued Alhambra to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance and for a share of the fees collected under it. After trial on stipulated facts the trial court awarded judgment (1) for 13 percent of fees collected since August 13, 1971, with interest, (2) declaring that the ordinance was preempted by the Vehicle Code, and (3) permanently enjoining its enforcement. Alhambra appeals.

PREEMPTION

The Vehicle Code contains its own preemption rule. Section 21 declares that "no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly authorized herein." ³ Is the ordinance here consistent with that provision?

Code sections delegate to cities authority to regulate parking on streets (§ 22507) and in municipal parking lots (§ 22519), and to fix fees for parking-meter zones (§ 22508) and offstreet parking (Gov. Code, § 54037). ⁴ There appears, however, to be no statute that authorizes cities to set penalties for violation of their parking regulations.

The Vehicle Code, by way of contrast, provides comprehensively for such penalties. Violation of a parking ordinance is an infraction presumed to have been committed by the vehicle's registered owner if notice requirements are met. ⁵ The notice must be attached conspicuously to the vehicle and must state the ordinance section violated, the time and place of violation, and where and when the accused must appear in response; and further written notice must be given of the bail due, with directions for mailing payment to a specified address. ⁶ Penal Code § 1269b requires the municipal and justice court judges of each county to adopt a uniform bail schedule for misdemeanors and infractions. The parties here stipulated that bail for overtime parking at a meter in Alhambra has been $5.00 since April 1, 1976, and before then was "$2.00 before the complaint went to notice and.$7.00 thereafter."

Alhambra contends its ordinance merely fixes the parking fees authorized by §§ 22507, 22508, 22519, and Government Code § 54037 (fn. 4, ante ). Yet on its face § 12.08.010 treats the fees not as reasonable charges for parking but rather as penalties for parking violations. The section is titled "Enforcement procedure". Its subdivision (a), titled "Procedure for Payment of Penalty", states that "as a deterrent to the abuse of parking privileges" a fee of "fifty cents for each hour or portion thereof during which the violation continues" shall be paid the city "for overtime or illegal parking". "Any overtime parking violation . . . which continues . . . longer . . . than one hour shall be deemed to be a continuing violation and each complete one hour period plus any remaining fraction of an hour shall be deemed to be a separate violation. . . . If such penalty is paid after nine a. m. of . . . the next business day . . . the penalty shall be two dollars instead of the fifty cents penalty . . . provided the two dollar penalty is paid prior to the date specified for the court appearance of the violator."

Moreover, subdivision (b) of the ordinance directs city employees, "when any vehicle is unlawfully parked overtime," to issue a "Notice of Violation" patterned after that prescribed by § 41103 (fn. 6, ante ) and telling the "time and place for appearance by the person committing such violation to answer such notice." In practice the notice begins with a warning that "if you do not pay the fee for overtime parking in the manner provided below, you must appear in the Municipal Court" at a specified place and time. There follow directions on how to "pay the proper penalty" by "placing the fee in the enclosed envelope and depositing it in any courtesy box . . . or by paying it in the City Treasurer's Office . . . ." ⁷

Alhambra argues that its notice complies with § 41103(1) and fulfills that section's requirements for initiating prosecution of violators who fail to pay the city for overtime parking. The notice omits, however, the information required by § 40309.5 (fn. 6, ante ): bail due, where payment may be sent, and a statement that payment may be mailed. The city fees admittedly are not "bail". Alhambra contends that § 40309.5 does not refer to the notice attached to the parked vehicle (§ 41103(1)) but applies only to the subsequent notice that must be mailed or personally delivered before a warrant of arrest may be issued or the Department of Motor Vehicles notified (§ 41103(2), (3)). Alhambra reasons that, because the enforcing officer is not required to attach a notice to the vehicle if the violator can immediately be located and served with a notice to appear (People v. Bebbington (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 709, 711-712, 71 Cal.Rptr. 509), § 40309.5 is satisfied by a notice directed to a named person. The section, though, purports to apply without exception to "(e)very written notice of a violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to parking offenses." Those words clearly include not only every notice under § 41103(1) but also Alhambra's "overtime parking notice" (fn. 7, ante ).

The ordinance therefore conflicts with the Vehicle Code. It prescribes not authorized fees for lawful parking but unauthorized penalties for unlawful parking. Moreover, instead of implementing the code's provisions for bail the ordinance offers the violator an immunity from code-mandated proceedings on payment of a non-code penalty directly to the city. The ordinance thus transgresses § 21's prohibition of local enactments that deal with "matters covered by" the code (§ 21, fn. 3, ante ; see People v. Moore (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 221, 228, 40 Cal.Rptr. 121; Board of Trustees v. Municipal Court (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 322, 328, 157 Cal.Rptr. 133. ⁸)

Alhambra contends that those conflicts with state statutes do not preclude it from enforcing the ordinance pursuant to the autonomous powers of chartered cities over municipal affairs (Cal.Const., art. XI, § 5). It is settled, however, that parking-meter regulation is a form of traffic control as to which state statutes supersede even ordinances authorized by charter. (Siegel v. City of Oakland (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 351, 357, 145 Cal.Rptr. 62; Bragg v. City of Auburn (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 50, 61 Cal.Rptr. 284; Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 561-562, 11 Cal.Rptr. 340.) There is no significant distinction between the parking-meter regulations considered in those cases and the ordinance here. The court below thus correctly declared the ordinance preempted by the Vehicle Code and enjoined enforcement that fails to comply with the code.

COUNTY'S SHARE OF PARKING-TICKET COLLECTIONS

The damages awarded the county were measured by the amount it would have received if the fees collected under the city ordinance had been fines or forfeitures under Penal Code § 1463.

Does that section apply to bail paid in response to a ticket left on an unattended vehicle? The section calls for deposit with the county treasurer and the subsequent distribution of fines and forfeitures collected "in any municipal court or justice court." Board of Trustees v. Municipal Court, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d 322, 327, 157 Cal.Rptr. 133, 136, and City of San Diego v. Municipal Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 775, 779, 162 Cal.Rptr. 420, which held those courts had no duty to accept money paid because of tickets attached to vehicles (§ 41103(1)), reasoned that money paid to the enforcing agency (e. g., a city) is not collected "in any . . . court" and thus need not be deposited under Penal Code § 1463. Those opinions did not, however, consider the effect of § 42201.5, which states that forfeitures, "(f)ines, . . . and deposits of bail collected as a result of a charge or conviction of an infraction shall be deposited and distributed in the same manner as fines, forfeitures, and deposits of bail collected from a person charged with or convicted of a misdemeanor." (Italics added.) The reference to funds "collected as a result of a charge . . . of an infraction" clearly covers payments in response to a § 41103(1) parking ticket. Since collections from misdemeanants are governed by Penal Code § 1463, payments because of § 41103(1) would seem to be subject to the same rules.

Distribution under Penal Code § 1463, however, depends on whether the "arrest" that preceded the underlying misdemeanor charge or conviction was made by a state, county, or city officer. (See fn. 2, ante ; cf. Pen.Code, §§ 1463.2-1463.4, 1463.5a-1463.13 on proceeds collected following arrests by other local agencies.) Thus, if there...