County of Bernalillo v. Sisneros
Decision Date | 01 December 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 14753,14753 |
Citation | 1994 NMCA 156,888 P.2d 980,119 N.M. 98 |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Parties | COUNTY OF BERNALILLO and New Mexico County Insurance Authority, Employer-Appellant, v. Ruben SISNEROS, Claimant-Appellee. |
Bernalillo County (Employer) appeals the award of attorney's fees to Ruben Sisneros (Worker) after settlement of a workers' compensation case. Worker accepted Employer's settlement offer but reserved the right to litigate attorney's fees. The Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ) awarded Worker $8,500.00 in attorney's fees pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-54 (Repl.Pamp.1987). Employer raises two issues on appeal. The first issue is whether the WCJ abused his discretion in awarding attorney's fees because Worker received no additional benefit from the attorney's action. The second issue is whether the finding that Worker prevailed on major contested issues is supported by substantial evidence. We reverse the fee award and remand for a redetermination consistent with this opinion.
Worker was injured on August 14, 1987, while working as a heavy equipment operator for Bernalillo County. He filed a claim for benefits on May 11, 1990. Before Worker filed his claim, Employer was voluntarily paying 20% permanent partial disability to Worker in biweekly installments of approximately $78.22, and had offered $22,095.77 in full settlement.
In response to Worker's claim, Employer admitted that Worker was 20% disabled. The recommended resolution arising out of a June 11, 1990, mediation conference included 20% permanent partial disability for 500 weeks (approximately $19,685), certain vocational benefits, consideration of a lump sum settlement, and other benefits. Employer accepted and Worker rejected the recommended resolution.
After Employer successfully disqualified the first WCJ assigned to the case, Worker filed a peremptory challenge to excuse the next judge assigned to the case. Worker's challenge was stricken because it was not timely filed. The case went to formal hearing on November 20, 1990, on the issues of permanent partial disability, vocational rehabilitation, temporary total disability, and attorney's fees.
Employer, in its answer and requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, denied causation, asserted that Worker was only 10% disabled, and asked for credit against past benefits paid. Worker was only awarded 15% permanent partial disability at trial; he appealed the disqualification, temporary total disability, and vocational rehabilitation issues, and won a remand on the disqualification issue only. Before the second formal hearing, Worker obtained employment and Employer filed an offer of compensation order for lump sum 20% permanent partial disability ($12,533.35) plus $2,500.00 lump sum future medical benefits. Worker accepted the offer, but reserved the issue of attorney's fees to be decided by the WCJ.
Worker, in his petition for attorney's fees, claimed counsel secured $20,286.63 in benefits. This number presumably arose from:
$12,533.35 -- lump sum for future weekly payments k 2,500.00 -- lump sum for future medical payments1 Note FN1. Pursuant to Section 52-1-54(F), future medical benefits secured shall not Note be considered in determining attorney's fees ---------------------- $15,033.35 -- settlement value k 2,124.16 -- past medicals (voluntarily paid by employer) k 3,129.12 -- past weekly benefits (voluntarily paid by employer) ---------------------- $20,286.63
The WCJ found the value of the settlement to be between $15,033.35 and $20,286.63; he based his $8,500.00 attorney's fee award on the above numbers in addition to certain "Fryar factors." See Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 487, 601 P.2d 718, 720 (1979); see also Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 102 N.M. 333, 336, 695 P.2d 483, 486 (1985).
In this case, we review the record for abuse of discretion in the WCJ's award of attorney's fees to Worker. Abuse of discretion constitutes an illogical and erroneous conclusion as to the facts and circumstances before the court, ignoring the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions which should be drawn. Bustamante v. City of Las Cruces, 114 N.M. 179, 181, 836 P.2d 98, 100 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 114 N.M. 82, 835 P.2d 80 (1992). However, Id.
Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a given conclusion. Estate of Mitchum v. Triple S Trucking, 113 N.M. 85, 91, 823 P.2d 327, 333 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 16, 820 P.2d 1330 (1991). Substantial evidence does not support the WCJ's determination of attorney's fees in this case.
One of the main purposes in fixing attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases is to avoid excessive legal costs which burden employers and insurers. Woodson, 102 N.M. at 337, 695 P.2d at 487. Unfortunately, the increased litigation over the proper interpretation of fee award standards has defeated the intended purpose. Id. The question in the present case is whether Worker's attorney was entitled to the attorney's fees awarded by the WCJ. A threshold inquiry posed by the parties is which subsection of Section 52-1-54 applies. This Court, in construing legislation, must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. See Sun Country Sav. Bank v. McDowell, 108 N.M. 528, 533, 775 P.2d 730, 735 (1989). In discussing the pertinent subsections of Section 52-1-54, we keep in mind that sections of statutes are not read in isolation. Id.
Worker contends that the relevant subsection for this Court to consider is 52-1-54(D), which provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all cases where compensation to which any person is entitled under the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act is refused and the claimant shall thereafter collect compensation through proceedings before the administration or courts," the WCJ shall determine a reasonable attorney's fee based on certain enumerated factors. (Emphasis added.) However, Woodson held that the factors set out in Subsection D are inapplicable to cases in which the parties settle compensation issues, such as the present case. Woodson, 102 N.M. at 339, 695 P.2d at 489; see also Tafoya v. Leonard Tire Co., 94 N.M. 716, 718, 616 P.2d 429, 431 (Ct.App.1980) ( ). Settled cases instead fall under Subsection C, but may include consideration of the applicable "Fryar factors." See Fryar, 93 N.M. at 487, 601 P.2d at 720.
As Worker points out in his answer brief, the attorney's fee provision in Section 52-1-54(E) also does not apply. Subsection E applies only to actions "arising under the provisions of Section 52-1-56 NMSA 1978, where the jurisdiction of the workers' compensation administration is invoked to determine the question whether the claimant's disability has increased or diminished." NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-56 (Repl.Pamp.1987), states that "[t]he hearing officer may, upon the application of the employer, worker or other person bound by the compensation order, fix a time and place ... upon the issue of claimant's recovery." (Emphasis added.) No compensation order was in effect, and the Workers' Compensation Administration's jurisdiction was ultimately invoked to approve a settlement agreement and determine attorney's fees.
Subsections C and F are the relevant portions of Section 52-1-54. Section 52-1-54(C) requires that
[i]n all cases where the jurisdiction of the administration is invoked to approve a settlement of a compensation claim ... the hearing officer shall determine and fix a reasonable fee for claimant's attorney, taking into account any sum or sums previously paid.
Worker and Employer ultimately settled this case after Worker's first appeal and before a new trial to determine compensation. Furthermore, pursuant to Section 52-1-54(F),
the hearing officer shall consider only those benefits to the worker that the attorney is responsible for securing. The value of future medical benefits shall not be considered in determining attorneys' fees.
Case law has also provided additional factors to weigh when determining a reasonable fee. See Woodson, 102 N.M. at 336, 695 P.2d at 486 ( ). Our recent case, Leo v. Cornucopia Restaurant, 118 N.M. 354, 881 P.2d 714 (Ct.App.1994), while providing helpful analysis on the attorney's fees issue, does not assist us in this case because we are concerned with an earlier version of the statute (Repl.Pamp.1987).
Employer offered a lump sum settlement of $22,095.77 before the filing of Worker's claim. Employer had been voluntarily paying 20% compensation, offered 20% before the claim, accepted the recommended resolution awarding 20% benefits and some vocational rehabilitation, and then tendered an offer of 20%. It may seem unfair that Employer should pay Worker's attorney's fees when Employer appears to have acted equitably but was forced to go into protracted litigation. However, Employer denied causation and requested credit for past benefits paid when faced with that litigation.
The principal argument against adding attorney's fees to a compensation award (against the norm of having litigants each pay...
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