County of Brown v. Winona & St. Peter Land Co.

• Decision Date: 14 May 1888
• Citation: 38 Minn. 397
• Parties: COUNTY OF BROWN <I>vs.</I> WINONA & ST. PETER LAND COMPANY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

38 Minn. 397

COUNTY OF BROWNvs.

WINONA & ST. PETER LAND COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 14, 1888.

Certiorari, to review a tax judgment of the district court for Brown county, where the action was tried by Webber, J., to whom the writ was directed. The petition for the writ states that, prior to the hearing in the district court, and thereafter until the latter part of December, 1887, negotiations were pending between the company and the county for an amicable adjustment of the taxes in question, and in respect to a large quantity of other lands, standing on the same footing as those described in this proceeding, but which had never been assessed for taxation; and that the company and the county came to an amicable agreement, which failed of consummation only because of the state auditor's refusal to approve it; and that on such refusal, and on December 27, 1887, the company applied to the district judge for a certificate, under Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, § 80, which was refused.

J. M. Gilman, for plaintiff in error.

Geo. W. Somerville and Lind & Hagberg, for defendant in error.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

This controversy arose in proceedings to enforce payment of taxes on real estate in the county of Brown. The defendant, owner of certain lands embraced in the proceedings, appeared, answered, and defended against the taxes appearing in the delinquent list upon those lands. After the court below had decided against the defence thus made, the defendant applied to the judge of that court to certify the proceedings to this court, under the statute, and he declined. The defendant thereupon applied to this court for a writ of mandamus requiring him to so certify the proceedings. Upon an order to show cause why the writ should not issue, we held that inasmuch as the statute (Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, § 80) provides that the court trying such proceedings may send its statement of facts and decision upon any defence or objection of this court, "if, in its opinion, the point is of great public importance, or likely to arise frequently," and as the writ of mandamus to a court can be issued only to require it to act in a matter properly before it for determination, and not to direct what the determination shall be, nor to coerce its judgment thereon, and as the court below had acted on the defendant's application, the writ could not issue. It was to be presumed that the application was denied for reasons sufficient in the judgment of the court. The order to show cause was therefore discharged. The defendant thereupon sued out the writ of certiorari. On its return a motion to quash it was made, on the ground that it will not lie in such cases.

The statute gives no appeal in proceedings to enforce taxes against real estate, and, in case the court below declines to certify its statement of facts and decision, as provided in the statute, there is no mode of bringing the record and proceedings to this court for its determination except by certiorari. The constitution (section 2, art. 6) provides that this court shall have "appellate jurisdiction in all cases, both in law and equity." This provision has been generally understood to mean that, in all judicial proceedings, the judgment which finally determines the rights of the parties is subject to review by this court, and we so hold. The legislature may prescribe the mode by which a cause is to be brought to this court, either by appeal or otherwise, and either directly from the court first determining it, or after a rehearing before some other court; but it cannot deprive a party of the right to bring the cause in some manner to this court. If no other mode is given by statute, this court may assert and exercise its appellate jurisdiction by means of the writ of certiorari. We therefore decided, on the motion to quash, that in proceedings such as these, if the court below declines, on a proper application made to it, to certify the matter under the statute, the writ of certiorari may issue.

Objection was made that, by delay in applying for the writ after the decision of the court below, (from August 2, 1887, to February 2, 1888,) the defendant had lost its right to it. There is no fixed time within which the application ought to be made. Undoubtedly, it ought to be made promptly. The delay in this case was sufficiently excused. The objection that the writ was directed to the judge of the court, instead of to the court, goes only to matter of form, and is not well taken. Where there is a proceeding in a court, and it has but one judge, he has the direction and control of the record; and the mandate of this court requiring him, as such judge, to certify the record and proceedings of this court, is, in substance and effect, a direction to his court to so certify. The motion to quash is denied.

The defendant interposed three defences to the taxes: First, that the lands were exempt from taxation; second, that, as to the taxes for some of the years included in the delinquent list, the right to enforce them was barred by the statute of limitations; third, that the auditor had no authority to include in the delinquent list filed any taxes but...