County of Bureau v. Thompson

Decision Date30 November 1990
Docket NumberNo. 69130,69130
Parties, 151 Ill.Dec. 508 The COUNTY OF BUREAU et al., Appellees, v. James R. THOMPSON, Governor, et al., Appellants.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J, Ruiz, Sol. Gen., and Jennifer A. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Larry Vandersnick, State's Atty., Cambridge, Gary L. Spencer, State's Atty., Morrison, Marc P. Bernabei, State's Atty., Princeton, and Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert L. Biderman and David E. Mannchen, of the Office of the State's Attys. Appellate Prosecuter, Springfield, for appellees.

Justice STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Bureau County has adjudged that section 4 of the Illinois and Mississippi Canal State Park Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 105, par. 482d) (the Canal Park Act) violates provisions of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 13). Defendants have appealed directly to this court (107 Ill.2d R. 302(a)) for reversal of the circuit court's judgment. We conclude that section 4 of the Canal Park Act is valid under the Illinois Constitution, and therefore we reverse.

FACTS

Section 4 of the Canal Park Act imposes upon plaintiffs, certain local governmental entities, the obligation of maintaining some 50 bridges that pass over the Illinois and Mississippi Canal, which is now a State park by virtue of the Canal Park Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 105, par. 482d); the bridges in issue connect public roads which plaintiffs are responsible for maintaining. Plaintiffs are the counties of Bureau, Whiteside, and Henry, and the commissioners of highways of the townships of Annawan, Alba, Arispie, Atkinson, Colona, Concord, Edford, Fairfield, Gold, Indiantown, Geneseo, Leepertown, Montmorency, Mineral, Tampico, and Wyanet. Plaintiff townships are responsible for the maintenance and repair of all roads and bridges within their respective jurisdictions, while plaintiff counties share in road and bridge maintenance projects undertaken by those townships located within each county's boundaries when the cost of a project exceeds $1,000. Defendants are James R. Thompson, Governor of the State of Illinois; the Department of Conservation (which manages the canal as a State park) and Mark Frech, the Director of Conservation; and the Department of Transportation and Gregory Baise, the former Secretary of Transportation.

The history of the canal and the bridges upon which this litigation centers extends into the last century. The canal connects the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers and was built in order to provide an efficient and economical means of transporting goods between the Great Lakes region and those territories adjacent to the Mississippi River. The United States Congress authorized the Secretary of War to construct the canal and, in the process of doing so, to acquire title to all lands through which the canal would pass. As the canal was to intersect a number of public roads, between 1896 and 1900 the Federal government, by means of condemnation suits, secured title to each parcel of land upon which a public road currently passed and across which the canal would be dug. Each of the condemnation decrees declared, with minimal variation, that "the United States shall build and Maintain good and sufficient Bridges and Also build and Maintain proper and safe approaches thereto over and across the said Canal, upon the public Highways crossing [the lots described] for the safe and convenient Passage thereover at all times * * * of Teams and vehicles" (United States v. Maxson (N.D.Ill.1898), No. 9118). In addition, the Federal government was ordered to pay $1 for each parcel of land taken. The canal was opened to navigation in 1907.

Regrettably, the canal quickly proved to be a commercial disappointment; it was obsolete within a few decades of being built. At this point, the United States began casting about for a method of disposing of the canal. The State of Illinois expressed interest in acquiring the canal for recreational purposes, and the Federal and State governments began lengthy negotiations regarding transfer of the canal to the State.

In 1955, the General Assembly enacted the Canal Park Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 105, par. 482a et seq.). Section 3 of the Canal Park Act authorizes the Department of Conservation to accept title to the canal in fee simple absolute from the United States by means of a quitclaim deed once the United States has fulfilled conditions as set out in section 1 of the Canal Park Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 105, par. 482a). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 105, par. 482c.) Once title is accepted, the Department of Conservation "except that (a) each bridge which connects sections of a road which is part of the system of State highdays [sic ], and any approach to such a bridge, shall become part of such system of State highways; (b) each other public road section or bridge, unless designated by the Department of Conservation as an access road or driveway of the Park, shall be maintained by the governmental unit which maintains the road of which such section or bridge is a part * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 105, par. 482d.)

[151 Ill.Dec. 512] is to manage the canal as a State park, with the following relevant condition:

Not until August 4, 1970, did the State of Illinois accept title to the canal by quitclaim deed.

Since before the Canal Park Act was enacted in 1955 until the present, plaintiffs, the local governments which section 4(b) of the Act, as quoted, makes responsible for maintaining some 50 canal bridges, have informed the State that they are unwilling to shoulder the heavy financial burden of maintaining these bridges. Still, when the State accepted title to the canal and made it into a State park, it was faced with the dilemma of providing for the maintenance of a large number of aging bridges which the United States no longer had the duty to maintain. The State's solution was to assume responsibility itself for those bridges which connected with State highways and to impose responsibility for the remaining bridges on those local governments that were already responsible for maintaining the roads that connected with those bridges. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 105, par. 482d.) Thus, as a result of negotiations between the United States and the State of Illinois, plaintiffs are now required to maintain a large number of these aging bridges which they had not built and over the building of which they had had no influence, for the United States had built them in the exercise of its formidable power of eminent domain. Over the years, an unspecified number of these bridges have been replaced by culverts, on top of which roads have been laid. Yet plaintiffs are as opposed to undertaking the obligation of maintaining the culverts as they are the bridges. (As the parties have used the word "bridges" to refer also to the culverts, and have not made the distinctions between the two structures an issue in this case, this opinion will do the same.) For a more detailed history of the canal and its bridges, see Commissioners of Highways v. United States (N.D.Ill.1979), 466 F.Supp. 745, 748-56.

Through the present cause of action plaintiffs seek to be absolved of this burden of bridge maintenance by a judgment that section 4 of the Act violates the equal protection and special legislation provisions of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; art. IV, § 13). Whether or not the plaintiffs' being saddled with the significant financial burden of maintaining these bridges seems fair, we are only to decide whether the imposition of this burden by the State violates the equal protection or special legislation provisions of the State constitution.

Before filing the present cause of action in the circuit court, plaintiffs pursued a cause of action against defendants' predecessors in interest and the United States in Federal court. (Commissioners of Highways v. United States (N.D.Ill.1979), 466 F.Supp. 745, aff'd in part & rev'd in part (7th Cir.1981), 653 F.2d 292.) In the Federal action, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the United States has a continuing obligation to maintain the bridges at issue and that section 4 of the Canal Park Act violates the special legislation and equal protection provisions of the Illinois Constitution; in addition, plaintiffs sought an injunction barring enforcement of section 4 by State officials. The district court held that when the United States transferred title to the canal to the State of Illinois in August 1970 by quitclaim deed, the United States also transferred to the State all of its future bridge maintenance obligations. Commissioners of Highways, 466 F.Supp. at 766.

Concerning the State constitutional claims (which the district court considered pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction), the district court held that plaintiffs are not denied equal protection because The only relief the district court granted plaintiffs was a damages award, to be paid by the United States, as compensation for the United States' failure to adequately maintain the bridges at issue between 1945 and the canal's transfer to the State in 1970. Commissioners of Highways v. United States (N.D.Ill. Apr. 29, 1980), No. 74-C-1861, slip op. at 7-12 (order specifying method and amount of payment by United States to plaintiffs and addressing other matters raised by parties' motions), modifying and enforcing prior findings (N.D.Ill.1979), 466 F.Supp. 745, 767.

[151 Ill.Dec. 513] the law and policy of Illinois impose a duty on all local governments which maintain public roads to also maintain any bridges that are a part of those roads. In the district court's opinion, it is beside the point that the parties have agreed that plaintiffs are the only local governmental entities required by State law to maintain bridges located in State parks ...

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