County of Chautauqua v. Civil Serv.

• Decision Date: 01 May 2007
• Citation: 8 N.Y.3d 513,869 N.E.2d 1
• Parties: In the Matter of COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA, Appellant, v. CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, County of Chautauqua Unit 6300, Chautauqua County Local 807, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

869 N.E.2d 1

8 N.Y.3d 513

In the Matter of COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA, Appellant, v. CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, County of Chautauqua Unit 6300, Chautauqua County Local 807, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 1, 2007.

Jaeckle Fleishmann & Mugel, LLP, Buffalo (Sean P. Beiter, Scott P. Horton and Matthew C. Van Vessem of counsel), for appellant.

Fessenden, Laumer & DeAngelo, Jamestown (Charles S. DeAngelo of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, J.

In this appeal, the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) seeks arbitration of grievances concerning layoffs and rights of displacement contained in its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the County of Chautauqua. The issue before us is whether the grievances are arbitrable.

Facts and Procedural History

In December 2003, County officials determined that it was necessary to lay off employees for reasons of economy. The County, however, perceived a conflict between section 14.05 of the CBA and Civil Service Law § 80 concerning reductions in force of competitive class civil service positions. Section 14.05 of the CBA provides, in part, that "[a]ll layoffs shall be pursuant" to the following:

"(a) For layoff purposes, an employee's seniority shall determine the order to be followed. In a department, the employee with the least seniority shall be the first to be laid off until the total number of employees required to decrease forces shall be reached. When all displacement possibilities are exhausted within the department, the employee shall have the right to displace in other departments" (emphasis added).

Civil Service Law § 80(1), entitled "Suspension or demotion," in turn, dictates how a public employer must reduce competitive class civil service positions. It provides, in part:

"Where, because of economy, consolidation or abolition of functions, curtailment of activities or otherwise, positions in the competitive class are abolished or reduced in rank or salary grade, suspension or demotion, as the case may be, among incumbents holding the same or similar positions shall be made in the inverse order of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service in the service of the governmental jurisdiction in which such abolition or reduction of positions occurs" (emphasis added).

Further, section 80(4) provides, in part that: "Upon the abolition or reduction of positions in the service of a civil division, suspension or demotion shall be made from among employees holding the same or similar positions in the entire department or agency within which such abolition or reduction of positions occurs" (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the County solicited advice from the Department of Civil Service concerning its view of the conflict between the statute and the CBA—specifically, that the CBA required that layoffs be made solely on the basis of seniority, irrespective of position or title, whereas section 80 mandates that layoffs be made by seniority within a position. In response, the Department advised the County that a collective bargaining agreement "may not alter the layoff units prescribed by section 80(4)."

After sharing the Department's opinion with CSEA, the County proceeded to lay off approximately 30 employees, which CSEA grieved. CSEA alleged, among other things, that the County violated section 14.05 of the CBA by refusing to (1) lay off "the employees with the least seniority within a department until the total number of employees required to decrease forces in that Department was reached" and (2) allow "employees to displace employees in other departments after they exhausted displacement rights in their own departments." The County objected to the arbitrability of these issues. After an unfavorable determination at a Step Three grievance hearing, CSEA served upon the County a notice of intent to arbitrate. The County then commenced this CPLR article 75 proceeding seeking a permanent stay of arbitration as to all issues. CSEA opposed the petition and cross-moved to compel arbitration.

The County asserted—and presses here—two issues that it deems repugnant to public policy as embodied in Civil Service Law § 80. It argues that CBA § 14.05 violates public policy because, whereas section 80(1) allows for layoffs by seniority within a job title or position, the CBA mandates that layoffs occur only by seniority. According to the County, the CBA inescapably forces it "to lay off every other less senior employee in the layoff unit (and eliminate essential positions) before it could ever eliminate the non-essential position." The County also asserts that another clause of the same CBA provision violates Civil Service Law § 80(4) by permitting interdepartmental displacements, or "bumping."

Supreme Court granted, in part, the County's petition to stay arbitration and denied, in part, CSEA's cross motion. The court agreed with the County that a conflict existed between Civil Service Law § 80(4) and CBA § 14.05. Relying on Matter of City of Plattsburgh (Local 788 & N.Y. Council 66, Am. Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Empls., AFL-CIO) 108 A.D.2d 1045, 485 N.Y.S.2d 618 [3d Dept. 1985], the court held that such a conflict was for a court, not an arbitrator, to resolve. Accordingly, it granted the County's petition, in part, and stayed arbitration to the extent that CSEA's demands concerned claims or rights on behalf of employees who were in "the Competitive Classification under the Civil Service Law." The court, however, concluded that because section 80(4) did not apply to non-competitive or labor class employees, arbitration was permissible as to them and granted CSEA's cross motion to that extent.

On an appeal to the Appellate Division from so much of the order as stayed arbitration, that court unanimously reversed and granted CSEA's cross motion to compel arbitration in its entirety (26 A.D.3d 843, 809 N.Y.S.2d 701 [2006]). Acknowledging the conflict between the parties' contract and the Civil Service Law, the court nonetheless held that such a conflict was "merely theoretical" (id. at 844, 809 N.Y.S.2d 701). The court concluded that the entire dispute was arbitrable because the statute did not contain "`clear exclusionary language'" that precluded arbitration (id., quoting Matter of Alden Cent. School Dist. v. Watson, 56 A.D.2d 713, 714, 392 N.Y.S.2d 729 [4th Dept. 1977]). We disagree and now modify the Appellate Division's order.

Discussion

The Taylor Law empowers and, in fact, requires a public employer to bargain with employee organizations and to enter written agreements governing the terms and conditions of employment (see Civil Service Law § 204[1], [2]; see also Matter of Professional, Clerical, Tech. Empls. Assn. [Buffalo Bd. of Educ.], 90 N.Y.2d 364, 372, 660 N.Y.S.2d 827, 683 N.E.2d 733 [1997]). An employer has wide latitude to negotiate such terms and can agree to submit disputes to arbitration subject, however, to "the absence of `plain and clear' prohibitions in statute or controlling decision[al] law, or restrictive public policy" (Matter of Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist. v. Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 273 386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 353 N.E.2d 569 [1976] [citations omitted]). Thus, although the Taylor Law reflects this State's "strong" policy favoring arbitration, this principle is not without limits (Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of N. Y., Inc. v. New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 6 N.Y.3d 563, 575, 815 N.Y.S.2d 1, 848 N.E.2d 448 [2006]; see Matter of New York City Dept. of Sanitation v. MacDonald, 87 N.Y.2d 650, 656, 642 N.Y.S.2d 156, 664 N.E.2d 1218 [1996]; Matter of Union Free School Dist. No. 2 of Town of Cheektowaga v. Nyquist, 38 N.Y.2d 137, 143, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10, 341 N.E.2d 532 [1975]).

The threshold determination of whether a dispute is arbitrable is well settled. Proceeding with a two-part test, we first ask whether the parties may arbitrate the dispute by inquiring if "there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance" (Matter of City of Johnstown [Johnstown Police Benevolent Assn.], 99 N.Y.2d 273, 278, 755 N.Y.S.2d 49, 784 N.E.2d 1158 [2002]). If no prohibition exists, we then ask whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their collective bargaining agreement. If there is a prohibition, our inquiry ends and an arbitrator cannot act (see Matter of United Fedn. of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 1 N.Y.3d 72, 80, 769 N.Y.S.2d 451, 801 N.E.2d 827 [2003]; Matter of Blackburne [Governor's Off. of Empl. Relations], 87 N.Y.2d 660, 665, 642 N.Y.S.2d 160, 664 N.E.2d 1222 [1996]).

A dispute is, thus, nonarbitrable, if a court can conclude "`without engaging in any extended factfinding or legal analysis'" that a law "`prohibit[s], in an absolute sense, [the] particular matters [to be] decided'" by arbitration (Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 99 N.Y.2d 1, 8-9, 750 N.Y.S.2d 805, 780 N.E.2d 490 [2002], quoting Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 N.Y.2d 623, 631, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 389 N.E.2d 456 [1979]; see Matter of United Fedn. of Teachers, 1 N.Y.3d at 80, 769 N.Y.S.2d 451, 801 N.E.2d 827). Put differently, a court must stay arbitration where it can conclude, upon examining the parties' contract and the implicated statute on their face, "that the granting of any relief would violate public policy" (Matter of City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Assn., Local 854, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 95 N.Y.2d 273, 284, 716 N.Y.S.2d 353, 739 N.E.2d 719 [2000]; see Matter of Blackburne, 87 N.Y.2d at 665, 642 N.Y.S.2d 160, 664 N.E.2d 1222; Matter of Committee of Interns & Residents [Dinkins], 86 N.Y.2d 478, 484, 634 N.Y.S.2d 32, 657 N.E.2d 1315 [1995]; Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v. New...