County of Dallas v. Wiland

• Decision Date: 16 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04-0247.,04-0247.
• Citation: 216 S.W.3d 344
• Parties: THE COUNTY OF DALLAS, Petitioner, v. Linda L. WILAND, as Administrator for the Estate of Stanley Gaines, Jim Gilliand, and Sonia Avina, Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

216 S.W.3d 344

THE COUNTY OF DALLAS, Petitioner, v. Linda L. WILAND, as Administrator for the Estate of Stanley Gaines, Jim Gilliand, and Sonia Avina, Respondents.

No. 04-0247.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued March 22, 2005.

Decided February 16, 2007.

Rick Thompson, Deborah G. Hankinson, Law Offices of Deborah Hankinson PC, Marc H. Richman, Law Offices of Marc H. Richman, Grant Hugh Brenna, Bart Bevers, Dallas TX, for Petitioner.

Steven K. DeWolf, Todd R. Hixon, Haakon Thomas Donnelly, Bellinger & DeWolf, L.L.P., Lisa Matz, Clerk, Fifth Court of Appeals, Dallas, Alex Wilson Albright, Douglas Alexander, Alexander Dubose Jones & Townsend, LLP, Austin TX, for Respondent.

Richard W. Carter, Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas, Fort Worth TX, for Amicus Curiae.

Justice HECHT delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice WAINWRIGHT, Justice GREEN, Justice JOHNSON, and Justice WILLETT joined.

Three deputy constables covered by Dallas County's civil service system contend that the County terminated their employment without just cause and without a hearing, thereby denying them substantive and procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,¹ and entitling them to actual damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871² (to which we refer as "section 1983"). The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the deputies on liability issues and rendered judgment on the jury's findings of actual damages, and the court of appeals affirmed.³ We hold that:

• the system's covered employees cannot be discharged without just cause, and thus they have a property interest in continued employment;

• the deputies were discharged without the hearing before the civil service commission promised by system rules to determine whether just cause existed, and thus they were denied procedural due process;

• for having been denied procedural due process, the deputies could recover damages for injuries resulting from the loss of their employment, as they requested, only if just cause did not exist for their termination;

• because the trial court erred in holding that the absence of just cause had been established as a matter of law, the deputies' claim for denial of procedural due process must be remanded for further proceedings; and

• a government employee's interest in continued employment is not protected by substantive due process, and even if it were, the County's decision to discharge the constables was not arbitrary and capricious so as to violate substantive due process.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court.

I

Before taking office on January 1, 2001, newly-elected Dallas County Constable Mike Dupree sent letters to deputy constables Stanley Gaines, Jimmie Gilliand, and Sonia Avina, notifying them that "your services under my administration will not be required." He did not say why. After taking the oath of office, Dupree refused to administer the oath to the three deputies⁴ and collected their badges and weapons.

"For well over a century, the general rule in this State, as in most American jurisdictions, has been that absent a specific agreement to the contrary, employment may be terminated by the employer or the employee at will, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all."⁵ This rule applies by statute to deputy sheriffs,⁶ leading some courts to conclude that a deputy sheriff's term of employment automatically expires when the sheriff's term of office does.⁷ While there is no similar statutory provision for deputy constables, they, too, are at-will employees generally, and in the case of Arrington v. County of Dallas, the court of appeals concluded that because the law enforcement authority granted sheriffs and their deputies is similar to the authority granted constables and their deputies, "[t]he term of deputy constables, as that of deputy sheriffs, expires when the principal's term expires."⁸

But at-will employment may be modified. For public employees, this may be done by agreement with the employer, as in a personnel manual,⁹ and through civil service systems.¹⁰ Since 1971, certain counties have been authorized to create civil service systems for certain employees,¹¹ and since 1981, certain counties have been authorized to create sheriff's department civil service systems for department employees, including deputies.¹² In 1989, while the Arrington case was pending decision, the Legislature expanded the group of employees that a county could include in its general civil service system,¹³ thereby allowing a county to choose to extend civil service protection to deputy constables.¹⁴

Dallas County has had a civil service system since 1975.¹⁵ Until the commissioners court orders establishing the system were codified on July 17, 2001¹⁶ — and therefore for purposes of this case — the system was set out in the Dallas County Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual ("the Manual"). From 1990 to 2003, deputy constables were Category "C" employees covered by the system under section 2.00.¹⁷

Section 1.00 of the Manual states that the Dallas County civil service system "is a systematic method of appointing employees to office and promoting them for competency and performance." On the inside of the cover page is the following statement: "Nothing in the [Manual] is to be construed as a contract of employment or a provision guaranteeing the specific term or tenure of employment."¹⁸ The rules governing dismissal state in pertinent part:

4.21 An employee may be dismissed from the County without prior notice for just cause including, but not limited to:

(A) incompetence;

(B) offensive conduct;

(C) insubordination;

(D) conviction of a felony;

(E) conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude;

(F) failure to report for work without reporting the reason for absence to his immediate supervisor within 24 hours of his normal working shift;

(G) gross or repeated neglect of duty; or

(H) other conduct inconsistent with the interest of the County.

4.22 The employee shall be furnished a written notice of termination at the time of termination, or the earliest possible time after the date of dismissal. Such notice shall specify the cause for termination. . . .

4.23 The supervisor shall inform his Elected Official/Department Head of his intention to dismiss an employee, specifying the cause(s) and do so only with the Elected Official/Department Head's approval unless the Elected Official/Department Head has previously given the supervisor termination authority.

4.24 Employees who are being dismissed are entitled to a predetermination conference with their Elected Official/Department Head to be told the reasons for termination.

4.25 If a non-probationary, regular employee feels he is being unjustly terminated he may utilize the grievance system. . . .

4.26 If a grievance is upheld, the . . . employee may be reinstated and may be granted back pay. . . .

Complaining that they had been wrongfully terminated, deputies Gaines, Gilliand, and Avina timely filed grievances. The civil service personnel director rejected them, explaining that

the Constable-elect did not terminate [the deputies]. However, it is the opinion of Dallas County that the newly elected Constable is not obligated to swear-in previous Deputy Constable employees. This conclusion was based on the premise that the Deputy Constable serves at the discretion of the Constable and the Constable has the authority and responsibility to select his own staff.

The civil service commission, comprised of three county commissioners, conducted a hearing limited to the issue of whether the deputies' grievances could be presented under the civil service system. The commission determined that the deputies' grievances could not be presented, relying on advice from the district attorney that the deputies' employment had automatically expired with the term of the prior constable, that the new constable's refusal to reappoint them was not a dismissal subject to the Manual's provisions, and that therefore no employment action had occurred of which the deputies could complain. The commission did not consider whether there was just cause for dismissing the deputies.

The three deputies did not attempt to appeal the commission's decision.¹⁹ Instead, they sued the County under section 1983, alleging that by terminating them without just cause and without a hearing, the County had denied them substantive and procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The deputies did not ask the trial court to order the commission to give them a hearing on the merits of their grievances. The deputies moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that they had been denied procedural and substantive due process, resulting in their loss of employment. The County, in its response, contended that the deputies' employment ended automatically when the previous constable's term expired and that the refusal to reappoint was not a dismissal. The trial court granted the deputies' motion, stating in its order:

Plaintiffs argue that Constable Dupree's failure to swear them in was tantamount to a dismissal. The Court, after reviewing the relevant law, agrees with Plaintiffs' position and concludes that the failure to swear in Plaintiffs Gilliand, Avina and Gaines was the equivalent of dismissal. Accordingly, they were entitled to the substantive and procedural protections set forth in the policies and procedures handbook including those set forth in the "dismissal" section beginning at section 4.21. To the extent that Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks a judicial determination that they were entitled to those protections but did not receive them, their motion is GRANTED.

Damages were then tried to a jury. The jury was instructed to consider only the deputies' lost earnings and benefits, and mental anguish and emotional...