County of Orange v. Ranger Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 19 February 1998 |
Docket Number | No. G020681,G020681 |
Citation | 61 Cal.App.4th 795,71 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1235, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1713 COUNTY OF ORANGE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RANGER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. |
Ranger Insurance Company (Ranger) appeals the trial court's order denying its motion to overturn a bail forfeiture ruling. Finding the motion was properly denied, we affirm.
On September 1, 1995, Ranger, the surety for H & H Bail Bonds, posted a $25,000 bail bond to secure Ramiro Pineda's release from custody pending criminal charges. A month later, Pineda pleaded guilty to six counts of selling narcotics and admitted having suffered two prior narcotics convictions. (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11352, subd. (a), 11370.2, subd. (a).) However, because Pineda, a Mexican national, failed to appear for sentencing, the court ordered his bail forfeited. Notice of the forfeiture order was mailed to Ranger on November 6.
In April 1996, Ranger sent a letter to the Orange County District Attorney's Office which states,
Deputy District Attorney Burl Estes wrote back to Ranger, explaining the requirements of Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (g) had to be met before granting relief from bail forfeiture, including detaining and identifying the defendant in the presence of local law enforcement officers. 1 Estes also informed Ranger, "It is difficult, if not impossible, to extradite someone from Mexico." In fact, Estes warned, his office could not legally elect to extradite Pineda if he were a Mexican citizen.
On May 6, Ranger filed a motion to vacate the bail forfeiture. In support, it submitted information purportedly establishing Pineda's detention in Mexico, including Pineda's picture, fingerprints and Mexican driver's license, and an affidavit from a Mexican police officer. Ranger represented these documents would "be verified by the appropriate individuals prior to the motion." Ranger further asserted because Mexican nationals may be extradited to the United States in some cases, the district attorney was required to elect whether to seek Pineda's extradition under section 1305, subdivision (g).
In opposition to Ranger's motion, County Counsel objected to Ranger's documentary evidence purporting to establish Pineda's detention in Mexico (i.e., the picture, fingerprints, license, etc.) as lacking authentication. County Counsel also argued (1) section 1305, subdivision (g) did not apply where the defendant flees to a foreign country, (2) international extradition is "a matter of federal treaty and diplomacy" and therefore outside the prerogative of the Orange County District Attorney's Office, and (3) the district attorney was not required to elect whether to seek Pineda's extradition in light of Mexico's traditional reluctance to extradite its own citizens.
In support of the latter argument, County Counsel submitted a declaration from Estes stating that since he began handling extradition matters in 1987, he has
Estes further declared he had recently confirmed such policy with both federal and state authorities and been informed exceptions to the policy are made only in rare circumstances involving heinous crimes, not routine drug offenses. Thus, Estes opined,
At the motion hearing the trial court, over County Counsel's objection, allowed Ranger to authenticate its documentary evidence through Eduardo Rosiles, a private investigator for H & H Bail Bonds. Rosiles explained he located Pineda in Guerrero, Mexico, in April 1996, and with Pineda's permission, took him to the local police station. 2 There, Pineda was fingerprinted and photographed with a local law enforcement official. Rosiles also obtained a photocopy of Pineda's Mexican driver's license, which had been recently issued. Pineda told Rosiles, "I will never go back [to the United States], because I'm facing 20 years in jail."
Despite Rosiles' efforts, the trial court denied Ranger's motion to vacate the bail forfeiture. The court stated it is "common knowledge" extradition requests for Mexican nationals are "futile acts" and "there is no, quote, unquote, 'extradition back' " from Mexico. The court thus ruled section 1305, subdivision (g) is a "domestic statute," which was "designed and drafted in particular for extraditions that took place in this country."
Ranger argues section 1305, subdivision (g) does apply when the defendant flees to a foreign country and the district attorney's office must elect whether to seek extradition, even where any extradition attempt would likely be futile. After initial briefing on these issues, we asked the parties to submit additional briefing concerning the legislative intent behind section 1305, subdivision (g), and whether the district attorney's office has authority to extradite a defendant who is located in a foreign country.
In answering this inquiry, (People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 8, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776, 947 P.2d 1313.) This is done by examining "the plain meaning of the actual words of the law" and giving them "their usual and ordinary meaning." ( Ibid., citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) ( Ibid.)
The geographic scope of section 1305, subdivision (g) is set forth in simple language: It applies when a defendant is detained by bail agents "beyond the jurisdiction of the state." Plainly, this includes situations in which the defendant is located in another country. Therefore, we need not look beyond the words of the statute.
However, even assuming the statutory language were ambiguous, the legislative history indicates the statute was intended to apply when the defendant is located outside the country. The law's proponents informed the Legislature that section 1305, subdivision (g) was needed to address the situation where "a defendant is located in another state or country by the bail agent, but is not in custody." (Letter to Sen. Milton Marks from Mark L. Bernstein, May 4, 1995, p. 2, italics added.) The law's supporters even supplied examples in which defendants had been tracked "around the world," to such places as Canada and Europe. ( Ibid.; Sen. Com. on Criminal Procedure & Assem. Com. on Public Safety, legis. bill file on SB 1245 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.).) The Legislature's failure to restrict the scope of the statute under these circumstances suggests it intended the statute to have a global reach.
Prior decisional law also put the Legislature on notice section 1305 could apply when the defendant flees to another country. In People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 349, 90 Cal.Rptr. 714, the surety challenged a bail forfeiture order on the ground the defendant was being detained in Mexico on criminal charges. At the time, section 1305 allowed for forfeiture relief upon proof the defendant was dead or " 'physically unable, by reason of illness or insanity, or by reason of detention by civil or military authorities, to appear in court[.]' " ( Id. at p. 353, 90 Cal.Rptr. 714, original italics.) 3 The People argued section 1305 was inapplicable because the defendant was being held by officials of a foreign nation. ( Id. at p. 354, 90 Cal.Rptr. 714.) However, because the words "civil or military authorities" were unrestricted, the court found they applied when the defendant was being detained in a foreign country. ( Ibid.)
Despite the holding in United Bonding, County Counsel argues we should restrict section 1305, subdivision (g) to cases where the defendant is located within the United States because (1) the district attorney lacks authority to extradite a defendant located in a foreign country, and (2) the statute was ostensibly designed to provide forfeiture relief when the defendant had not been entered into the nationwide warrant system, NCIC (National Crime Information Center). (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety analysis of the June 19, 1995 version of SB 1245 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) (July 11, 1995).) 4 County Counsel misconstrues the statute.
Under section 1305, subdivision ...
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