County of Ramsey v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 14 September 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 48537.,48537. |
| Citation | 283 NW 2d 918 |
| Parties | COUNTY OF RAMSEY, petitioner, Respondent, v. Joseph STEVENS, Appellant, Northern States Power Company et al., Respondents-Below. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Scanlan & Carlson and John J. Scanlan, St. Paul, for Stevens.
William B. Randall, County Atty., and Steven C. DeCoster, Asst. County Atty., St. Paul, for Ramsey County.
LeVander, Gillen, Miller & Magnuson and Paul A. Magnuson, South St. Paul, for Northern States Power et al.
Heard before OTIS, ROGOSHESKE, and MAXWELL, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
Joseph Stevens appeals from the judgment of the Dakota County District Court awarding him damages in a condemnation proceeding against certain of his real property, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial. Appellant seeks a new trial on the ground that he was precluded from showing at trial, relative to his damages, (1) that when his property was actually, but unofficially, "taken," the highest and best use under the zoning ordinance was a mobile home park, or (2) in the alternative, that even if the taking did not occur until the formal condemnation proceedings, the enactment of an ordinance by Lilydale prohibiting mobile home park development was invalid and the highest and best use remained a mobile home park. We affirm.
The subject property is five undeveloped acres in Lilydale in Dakota County on the Mississippi River. Appellant purchased part of the property in 1962 and the remainder in 1971. He moved onto the property in 1965 at which time he observed 12 mobile homes and 18 permanent homes in the vicinity. While he resided on the property, the number of mobile homes increased to 103, and the population increased to 664. The area was flooded by the Mississippi River in 1965, 1969, and 1973, and few mobile homes remained by 1973. In 1968 appellant started to build up his property, using demolition materials from downtown St. Paul reconstruction. In 1971, after purchasing the remaining acres of his property, appellant entered into a contract under which he was to be paid a lump sum and monthly sums until 1974 in exchange for the right of the other party to dump demolition materials such as dirt, concrete, burned stumps, and wood onto the property. Appellant did not believe that he ever received the money, and not all of the contract terms were performed by the other party.
Appellant obtained permits from Lilydale in 1964 and 1970 to build wooden frame structures on the property, but decided not to build because of his understanding that the property would eventually be condemned. He was also issued a mobile home permit, which he used for his residence. On June 3, 1971, the Lilydale Village Council adopted a resolution reflecting a "very resistive attitude based on the results polled during the floods" towards development of lower Lilydale. In September of 1971, the chairman of the Metropolitan Council wrote to the mayor of Lilydale, reminding him that Lilydale had agreed to use the lowlands as a park and not to permit further development. A Lilydale trustee responded to the letter, explaining that even though appellant had nearly finished filling his property, he had been informed by Lilydale that he would not be granted permits for mobile homes.
On September 22, 1972, Dakota County, Ramsey County, and Lilydale entered into a Joint Powers Agreement pursuant to statute for the purpose of creating a park in the area including appellant's property. Later that fall, the Ramsey County Director of Parks and Recreation asked that Lilydale halt further filling operations. In November of 1974, the Ramsey County Administrator expressed his concern that improvements to real property in Lilydale be kept to a minimum. The Lilydale mayor replied that Lilydale shared his concern and referred to a resolution adopted on June 21, 1972, that established "a very restrictive policy towards improvement of real property. . . in anticipation of acquisition by Ramsey County." In September of 1974, the Lilydale Council informed Ramsey County that appellant had applied for 44 building permits. Ramsey County's Director of Parks and Recreation requested that Lilydale officials "take no action that will unnecessarily increase the cost of any property in Lilydale," announcing that the Lilydale Park Project had been approved by the Metropolitan Council for funding as a regional park and that acquisition of the property was commencing.
That same fall Lilydale was informed by the Federal Insurance Administration of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development that it had failed to adopt flood plain management ordinances, which were prerequisites to eligibility for flood insurance. In 1971 Lilydale had applied for flood insurance as one of the Minnesota communities subject to recurrent flooding. Lilydale was advised that noncompliance would mean that no flood insurance could be sold or renewed in the community. Lilydale's Council apprised the Federal Insurance Administration of the park project, explaining that no further building permits were being issued and that by the end of 1975 all purchase offers would be made. The Pool and Yacht Club of Lilydale, however, was excluded from the park project and, faced with projected spring flooding, requested Lilydale to enact a flood plain ordinance so that it could obtain flood insurance. Upon Lilydale's failure to do so, the Pool and Yacht Club brought a mandamus action in district court to compel the enactment of a flood plain ordinance. Appellant, who was then a member of the Lilydale City Council, was a party to the action. Finding that Minn.St. 104.08 imposed a mandatory duty upon Lilydale to participate in the national flood insurance program and that the Pool and Yacht Club faced imminent flooding with no possibility of insurance protection, the district court ordered the Council to enact an appropriate ordinance within 72 hours. The Council complied by enacting Ordinance No. 69 on April 10, 1975, but appealed the district court's order to this court on April 23, 1975. On May 15, 1975, three of the five Council members voted to enact Ordinance No. 70, which repealed Ordinance No. 69.
On June 4, 1975, the condemnation proceeding was commenced. The court-appointed commissioners' award of $72,000 in damages to appellant was filed on September 22, 1975, from which both appellant and Ramsey County appealed to the district court. On November 24, 1975, the Council enacted Ordinance No. 72, which allowed the issuance of mobile home permits, and the next day appellant was issued 44 mobile home permits for the property. On December 5, 1975, Ramsey County took possession of appellant's property.
In January of 1976, the Council, composed of several new members, dismissed its appeal to this court. Appellant, who was still on the Council, opposed complete dismissal, arguing that he had been involved in the mandamus action both individually and as a council member and that he was entitled to appellate review of the writ of mandamus. This court denied appellant's petition, holding that appellant was involved only in a representative capacity.
Prior to commencement of the jury trial on the parties' appeals from the commissioners' award, appellant brought the above facts before the district court on a motion for a finding that Ordinance No. 69, which prohibited mobile home development, should not be considered by the jury. The court found that Ordinance No. 69 was in effect at the time of taking.
The jury trial commenced on August 24, 1977, at which time appellant moved that Ordinance No. 70, which repealed Ordinance No. 69, should be submitted to the jury relevant to the question of highest and best use. Appellant argued again that Ordinance No. 69 had been invalidly enacted. Finding the validity of Ordinance No. 69 to be res judicata but also addressing the merits, the trial court ruled against appellant and excluded from evidence Ordinance No. 70 and the evidence that appellant had been issued 44 mobile home permits. Appellant was, however, allowed to testify as to his original plans for the property and its historical use.
Two real estate appraisers testified on behalf of appellant. One appraiser valued the condemned property at $148,500 on the basis that the highest and best use of the property was as a 43-lot mobile home park development. Also basing his opinion on the highest and best use as a mobile home park, the second appraiser valued the property at $96,800. Appellant testified that he planned to use the property for a bar-restaurant, a mobile home park and a marina. It appeared that passage from the river to Pickerel Lake, the site intended for the marina, was nearly impossible, however, due to natural filling over the years.
Ramsey County's expert witnesses testified that appellant's property was topographically and geologically unsuitable for development. The uncontrolled fill deposited on the property contained organic matter and was predicted to settle between one and five feet. Improper permeation prevented adequate sanitation. The access roads, if not the property itself, were subject to periodic flooding. Considering this evidence, the real estate appraisers concluded that, regardless of zoning, the property could not be developed for a mobile home park at a profit. The two appraisers found the highest and best use of the property to be open space and storage, one valuing the property at $35,000 and the other attaching a value of $38,800.
The jury awarded appellant $38,000 damages. Appellant moved for a new trial on the ground that the trial court erred in finding Ordinance No. 69 to be valid. His motion was denied and this appeal followed.
At issue is the adequacy of the damages awarded appellant for the condemnation of his land. Appellant sought to maximize his damages by convincing the jury that the highest and best use of his condemned...
To continue reading
Request your trial