County of Santa Cruz v. Waterhouse

• Decision Date: 30 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. H024127.,H024127.
• Citation: 127 Cal.App.4th 1483,26 Cal.Rptr.3d 543
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Kenneth WATERHOUSE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

26 Cal.Rptr.3d 543

127 Cal.App.4th 1483

COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Kenneth WATERHOUSE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. H024127.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District.

March 30, 2005.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 28, 2005.

Review Denied June 29, 2005.^*

Dana McRae, Dwight L. Herr, Office of the Santa Cruz County Counsel, Santa Cruz, Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant County of Santa Cruz.

David Spangenberg, Lark L. Ritson, Law Office of Spangenberg & Ritson, Attorney for Defendant and Respondent Kenneth Waterhouse et al.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Senior Assistant Attorney General, John Davidson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Mark William Poole, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents California Department of Housing & Community Development.

RUSHING, P.J.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

Yacht Harbor Manor Mobilehome Park is owned and operated by defendants and respondents Kenneth Waterhouse and Waterhouse Corporation (Waterhouse).

Pursuant to the California Mobilehome Parks Act (MPA), which vests the power to issue permits for the installation of mobilehomes in California with the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD), Waterhouse applied for a permit to install a two-story mobilehome in the Yacht Harbor Manor Mobilehome Park. HCD initially rejected the application because it was incomplete, but subsequently issued the permit in August 2001.

Prior to HCD issuing the permit to Waterhouse, in June 2001, plaintiff and appellant County of Santa Cruz (the County) adopted an interim ordinance, which prohibits mobilehomes within mobilehome parks from exceeding one story or 17 feet in height unless the County grants an exception.

The County filed an action in superior court requesting injunctive and declaratory relief against Waterhouse for its plan to install the two-story mobilehome without the County's express approval. The case was submitted by stipulation of the parties on the basis of briefs, requests for judicial notice stipulation of fact and oral argument. The court denied the County's request for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief, and held the County's ordinance requiring local approval for the installation of two-story mobilehomes was preempted by the MPA.

The County filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the MPA preempts a county ordinance requiring local planning approval for the installation of multistory mobilehomes.

Because the question presented in this case is whether state law preempts a local ordinance, it is a pure question of law subject to de novo review. (Roble Vista Associates v. Bacon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 335, 339, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 295.)

Santa Cruz County Ordinance No. 4628

The California Constitution provides counties such as Santa Cruz general police power to enact ordinances and regulations deemed necessary to protect the public health. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) Such ordinances and regulations prevail over all state laws other than those that specifically address matters of statewide concern. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 5.)

In that vein, and in order to address the issue of multistory mobilehomes, County adopted Santa Cruz Ordinance No. 4628 (Ordinance No. 4628), which prohibits mobilehomes within mobilehome parks from exceeding one story or 17 feet in height unless the County grants an exception. Specifically, the ordinance provides: "[e]xisting mobile home parks shall be subject to the restriction that an individual mobile home or accessory building shall not exceed one story or seventeen (17) feet in height unless an exception is granted pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 13.10.684." (Santa Cruz County Code, § 13.10.458.).

Validity of Ordinance No. 4628

The question of whether Ordinance No. 4628 is valid depends on whether state law preempts it. The California Supreme Court in Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215 844 P.2d 534 set forth the standard for determining if a state law preempts a local ordinance. A local ordinance will be preempted if it conflicts with state law, and a conflict exists if the local legislation "`"`duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.'"' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 897, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534.) Full occupation of the field is demonstrated by the Legislature's express manifestation of its intent to occupy the field, or "when it has impliedly done so in light of one of the following indicia of intent: (1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to the locality. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 898, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534.)

The Mobilehome Parks Act

Here, the state law at issue is the MPA, which is embodied in Health and Safety Code section 18300 et seq.,¹ and provides for the regulation of mobilehome construction and installation in California. The MPA clearly expresses that it is California state policy to ensure that mobilehome parks are operated to assure the "health, safety, general welfare, and ... decent living environment" of the residents, as well as protect the investment value of mobilehomes. (§ 18250.) The MPA's goals of promoting the health and safety of mobilehome residents are implemented through the HCD's establishment of standards for "construction, maintenance, occupancy, use, and design of parks." (§ 18251.) The MPA mandates that these standards, found in the California Code of Regulations, title 25, section 1000 et seq., "should be flexible enough to accommodate new technologies and to allow designs that reduce costs and enhance the living environment of park residents." (§ 18251; see §§ 18253, 18610.)

The Legislature's goal of promoting uniformity in mobilehome construction and installation standards impliedly demonstrates that California fully occupies the area of mobilehome regulation. Indeed, the goal of uniformity can only be achieved through occupation of the field, alleviating variances in local regulation. The MPA's purpose of protecting the health and welfare of the residents of mobilehome parks, as well as the investment value of mobilehomes, can only be achieved through the centralized regulatory power of the HCD. Without such centralized regulation, mobilehome owners would be subject to the specific and particularized whims of a local county or municipality, and would in effect be hampered in his or her ability to move the mobilehome within the state.² This result is clearly what the Legislature intended to prevent with the enactment of the MPA.

In addition to the Legislative goals of the MPA impliedly demonstrating full occupation of the field, the Legislature expressly states its intent that the MPA preempt local regulation. Importantly, the outset of section 18300 contains language that the MPA "supercedes any ordinance enacted by any city, county, or city and county, whether general law or chartered, applicable to this part." (§ 18300, subd. (a).) However, the preemption language in section 18300 has changed through amendment in recent years. In its previous wording, section 18010 (the predecessor to section 18300) allowed local regulation in "areas which, although not specifically excepted, are not covered by the 80 sections of said part." Section 18010 as it existed in 1963 provided, in relevant part:

"The provisions of this part apply to all parts of the State and supercede any ordinance enacted by any city, county, or city and county applicable to the provisions of this part." (Added by Stats. 1961, ch. 2176, § 2, p. 4503.)

In its 1963 analysis of the MPA, the Attorney General concluded that the State did not fully occupy the field of mobilehome regulation, stating that had the section read "applicable to this part," rather than "`applicable to the provisions of this part,'" "`the [state's] occupation of the field ... would be clear.'" (41 Ops.Cal. Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 32.)

Currently, section 18300 reads: "[t]his part applies to all parts of the state and supercedes any ordinance enacted by any city, county, or city and county, whether general law or chartered, applicable to this part." (§ 18300, subd. (a), italics added.) The state makes much of the fact that this change in the legislation occurred after the Attorney General's opinion, arguing that the amendment was in response to the opinion and demonstrated the state's intent to occupy the field. The County is quick to point out, however, the amendment was made in 1985, over 22 years after the Attorney General's opinion, and was part of "clean-up" legislation, not a substantive change in the MPA to indicate the state's intent to occupy the field.

Regardless of the parties' position on the timing of the amendment of the MPA and whether it was in fact in response to the Attorney General's opinion, it is unmistakable that the MPA now clearly states: "applicable to this part." The Attorney General's opinion that the phrase: "applicable to this part," demonstrates the state's intent to occupy the field is as true today as it was in 1963. It is immaterial that the amendment occurred 22 years after the opinion, and as part of clean-up legislation; the language clearly demonstrates the state's intent to occupy the...