County of Westchester v. Department of Health of State of N.Y.

• Decision Date: 15 July 1996
• Citation: 229 A.D.2d 460,645 N.Y.S.2d 534
• Parties: COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH OF the STATE OF NEW YORK, etc., et al., Defendants-Respondents, Beth Israel Medical Center, et al., Proposed Intervenors-Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 534

645 N.Y.S.2d 534

229 A.D.2d 460

COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH OF the STATE OF NEW YORK, etc., et al Defendants-Respondents Beth Israel Medical Center, et al., Proposed Intervenors-Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

July 15, 1996.

Whiteman Osterman & Hanna, Albany (James W. Lytle, Carla E. Hogan, and John J. Henry, of counsel), for proposed intervenors-appellants.

Marilyn J. Slaatten, County Attorney, White Plains (Barbara F. Kukowski and Marguerite R. Wiess, of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, New York City (Scott A. Ziluck, of counsel), for defendants-respondents.

Before ROSENBLATT, J.P., and THOMPSON, PIZZUTO and HART, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the proposed intervenors appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Donovan, J.), entered March 8, 1995, which denied their motion to intervene, (2) an order of the same court, also entered March 8, 1995, which "so ordered" a stipulation preliminarily enjoining the defendants from enforcing Public Health Law §§ 2808-c(9)(e) and 2807-a(8)(e) and 10 NYCRR 86-1.11(g)(7) and 1.11(p)(7) as to the plaintiff, and (3) a decision of the same court, also entered March 8, 1995, which addressed the proposed intervenors' objections to the stipulation.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order entered March 8, 1995, which "so ordered" the stipulation is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as the appellants are not aggrieved thereby (see, CPLR 5511); and it is further,

ORDERED that the appeal from the decision is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as no appeal lies from a decision (see, Schicchi v. J.A. Green Const. Corp., 100 A.D.2d 509, 472 N.Y.S.2d 718); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order entered March 8, 1995, which denied the proposed intervenors' motion to intervene is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the motion to intervene is granted.

The plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, seeking a declaration that maintenance of effort (hereinafter MOE) regulations (see, 10 NYCRR 86-1.11[g][7], [p][7] ) are invalid, null, and void. The regulations were promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Health of the State of New York for determination and reallocation of bad debt and charity cost (hereinafter BDCC) funds to hospitals as part of the State's Medicaid reimbursement scheme. The plaintiff also seeks a permanent injunction barring the defendants from implementing the MOE regulations. The defendants have stipulated to a preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MOE regulations.

Before joinder of issue, the proposed intervenors moved for leave to intervene as defendants. The proposed intervenors are nine hospitals which, pursuant to the MOE regulations, are entitled to reallocated BDCC funds in excess of $40 million. The Supreme Court denied the motion to intervene. We reverse.

Generally, intervention should be permitted where the intervenor has a real and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings (see, Plantech Hous. v. Conlan, 74 A.D.2d 920, 426 N.Y.S.2d 81). Here, if the MOE regulations are declared invalid, the proposed intervenors may lose a substantial amount of BDCC funds. Accordingly, the proposed intervenors have a real and substantial interest in the outcome of the action (see, St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr. v. Department of Health of State of N.Y., 224 A.D.2d 1008, 637 N.Y.S.2d 821). Hence, the Supreme Court should have granted the motion to intervene.

The appellants are not aggrieved by the court's determination to ...