County of Yolo v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 16 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. C014003,C014003
• Citation: 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 681,20 Cal.App.4th 1771
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: COUNTY OF YOLO et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Michelle Yvonne GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 681

25 Cal.Rptr.2d 681

20 Cal.App.4th 1771

COUNTY OF YOLO et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Michelle Yvonne GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. C014003.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Dec. 16, 1993.

Legal Services of Northern California, Inc., David E. Jones, Gary F. Smith, Woodland, for defendant and appellant.

David C. Henderson, Dist. Atty., William C. Schemel, Deputy Dist. Atty., for plaintiffs and respondents.

BLEASE, Acting Presiding Justice.

Michelle Garcia appeals from a judgment in favor of the County of Yolo (the County) directing that she pay child support under Welfare and Institutions Code section 11350. ¹ The judgment awards the County restitution of a portion of the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits paid Garcia on behalf of her older son, during a period when he was in foster care. Garcia contends that the court erred because her sole income was AFDC benefits and there was no showing she shirked her obligation to seek work. She also contends that the court erred because she was the caretaker of her younger son, who was less than three years old, and thus exempt from seeking work under the AFDC statutes.

Both contentions have merit. There is no showing that Garcia failed to seek or accept employment. The AFDC statutes manifest a public policy that a single parent of a very young child be permitted to decline work outside the home.

We will reverse the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Although portions of the trial were not reported, the essential facts are uncontroverted. They were adduced by stipulations of record, exhibits admitted into evidence, or are related in descriptions by the trial court in the transcript of the oral statement of decision. Garcia's older son was in foster care from October 1989 to February 1991. During that time AFDC-Foster Care (§ 11400) benefits were provided for his support. During the same period Garcia received no income other than AFDC benefits based on her status as a single parent of her younger son. The parties stipulated that during a portion of this period Garcia was caring for her younger son, who was less than three years old. Garcia adduced a declaration of the custodian of her welfare records Garcia argued that it was inappropriate to make an award based upon her potential earning capacity because there was no evidence of "bad faith," i.e., that she shirked an obligation to seek work. The trial court responded as follows.

indicating that she received AFDC benefits from January through July 1990. The trial court "assumed" that Garcia was "caring for [her younger child] during [the] entire period of time [that her older child was in foster care]."

"Once again, it seems to me that based on what little evidence I have, I would not find that Ms. Garcia was unwilling to work, but rather that she chose not to do so, believing, understandably, that she needed to stay with her minor child.

"Now, having made those findings, the question becomes, does that mean that there is some bad faith on Ms. Garcia's part?

"... Clearly there is no evidence that Ms. Garcia was actively suppressing her income or refusing opportunities to work when they presented themselves. But, again, it seems to me that based on my previous analysis, that Ms. Garcia could have worked if she had chosen to do so, and her decision to stay at home with the baby, however laudable it may be, means that she chose to avoid working, and I would find that that is all that is necessary to decide that the use of the earning capacity standard is applicable to this particular case."

Garcia had also argued that she should not be held liable because her only income was AFDC benefits and she was the caretaker of her youngest child. The trial court responded as follows.

"Defendant has cited me to regulations and statutes which make it clear that welfare recipients--an AFDC recipient cannot be ordered to work when they have a child under I believe the age of five in the home. So, obviously, during the period of time in question, Ms. Garcia could not have been ordered to work to offset any of the AFDC payments she was getting.

"But that really doesn't seem to me to focus on the inquiry that is before me today. There is no case law that would indicate that if there is a child out of the home, that the various statutes and regulations cited by the defendant[ ] would preclude the AFDC recipient from reimbursing the county for money[ ] paid on behalf of the child out of the home."

In light of these conclusions, the trial court found that Garcia had the capacity to earn a minimum wage on a full-time basis during the period her son was in foster care, and entered judgment against her for $782.

DISCUSSION

I

Garcia contends that the trial court erred in making an award in favor of the County in light of her status as an AFDC recipient and single parent caretaker of a child under three. The County replies that Garcia failed to produce evidence showing that the work exemption statutes applied to her, that she should be responsible for support because public assistance costs were increased by the foster care placement, that the work exemption statutes are not designed to shield parents from liability for support, and that federal AFDC regulations formerly required that the earning potential of absent parents be considered in determining child support liability. None of these arguments is persuasive.

Section 11350 in pertinent part is as follows. ²"(a) In any case of separation or desertion of a parent or parents from a child or children which results in aid under this chapter being granted to such family, the non custodial parent or parents shall be obligated to the county for an amount equal to the following:

"...

"(2) The amount of support which would have been specified in an order for the support and maintenance of the family during the period of separation or desertion...."

"...

"(c) The amount of the obligation established under paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) shall be determined by using the appropriate child support guidelines currently in effect...."

At the time of trial, the pertinent child support guidelines were set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 1274. (See former Civ.Code, § 4720.1, subd. (a)(1), Stats.1990, ch. 1493.) ³ Under rule 1274 the amount of child support is calculated using a formula in which the parent's net monthly disposable income is a principal parameter. The rule provides that net income is generally calculated by subtracting from gross income certain prescribed deductions. (Rule 1274(g).) Excepted from gross income is "income derived from any public assistance program, eligibility for which is based on a determination of need." (Rule 1274(g)(3).) The rule also provides for an alternative to this income calculation: "The court may, in its discretion, consider the earning capacity of a parent in lieu of that parent's income, consistent with the best interests of the child." (Rule 1274(g)(2), emphasis added.)

The award cannot be predicated upon Garcia's income, since that consisted solely of AFDC benefits, a public assistance program, eligibility for which is based on a determination of need. The question is whether, in light of Garcia's status as a custodial parent, the trial court had discretion to predicate the award on her earning capacity under rule 1274(g)(2). Garcia argues that an award in these circumstances is beyond the range of discretion afforded by that provision. She relies principally upon an exemption from the work requirement for single parents of young children under statutes governing the AFDC work incentive programs, at sections 11300-11314.

The work incentive programs are intended to "reduce the incidence of persons with potential for self-support in existing [AFDC] caseloads...." (§ 11302.) Except as provided in section 11310, subdivision (b), every AFDC recipient must "register for manpower services, training, and employment." (§ 11310, subd. (a).) The exception to which Garcia points is section 11310, subdivision (b)(6), as follows:

"(b) The following individuals are not required to register:

"...

"(6) A parent or other relative who meets the criteria described in subparagraph (A) or (B).

"(A) Has primary responsibility for personally providing care to a child under the age of three years. An individual meeting this criterium who volunteers to register may not be required to participate unless it is guaranteed that: (1) child care will be provided and (2) participation will not be required for more than 20 hours per week.

"(B) Has primary responsibility for personally providing care to a child aged three to five years, inclusive, unless it is guaranteed that: (1) child care will be provided and (2) participation will not be required for more than 20 hours per week.

"(C) In a family eligible for [AFDC] payments due to the unemployment of the Garcia suggests that manifest in this exemption from the work incentive programs is a public policy that single parents with very young children should be allowed to decline work outside the home in order to care for these children, even when that results in the imposition on the government of costs of support under the AFDC program. We agree.

principal wage earner, the exemption criteria contained in subparagraph (A) or (B) shall be applied to only one parent."

As explained in the concurring opinion of Justice Wiener in Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1332-1337, 262 Cal.Rptr. 405, the exemption from the work incentive programs is imposed by long-standing federal statutes governing the AFDC program reflecting a congressional determination "that these children should be cared for by their parents or relatives until they reach sufficient maturity to function well in day care outside the home." (Id. at pp. 1336-1337, 262 Cal.Rptr. 405.) Under this policy there is no discretion in a section 11350 action to consider the ...