Courtright v. Burnes
Decision Date | 01 November 1881 |
Citation | 13 F. 317 |
Parties | COURTRIGHT v. BURNES. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Besides a general denial the defendant answers as follows:
This case was tried before the court by agreement of parties, a jury being waived.
Botsford & Williams and G. W. De Camp, for plaintiff.
Willard P. Hall, Silas Woodson, Benj. F. Stringfellow, and L. H. Waters, for defendant.
McCRARY D.J.
The answer alleges that this suit is being prosecuted by one of the attorneys for plaintiff upon a champertous contract by which he is to pay the expenses of the litigation and receive as his compensation 40 per cent. of the sum realized, and the defendant moves to dismiss the suit for that reason. The proof sustains the allegation of champerty, the testimony of the defendant himself being quite conclusive upon that point. This makes it necessary for the court to decide the important question whether the plaintiff can be defeated in his action upon the note by the proof that he has made a champertous contract with his attorney. In other words, can the defendant, the maker of a promissory note, avoid payment thereof or prevent a recovery thereon upon the ground that the holder of the note has made a void and unlawful agreement with an attorney for the prosecution of a suit upon it.
The authorities upon this question are in conflict. Some courts have ruled that if the fact that a suit is being prosecuted upon a champertous contract comes to the knowledge of the court in any proper manner it should refuse longer to entertain the proceeding. Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 142; Webb v. Armstrong, 5 Humph. 379; Morrison v. Deaderick, 10 Hump. 342; Greenman v. Cohee, 61 Ind. 201.
Other courts have held that the fact that there is an illegal and champertous contract for the prosecution of a cause of action is no ground of defense thereto, and can only be set up by the client against the attorney when the champertous agreement itself is sought to be enforced. Hilton v. Woods, L.R. 4 Eq.Cas. 432; Elborough v. Ayres, L.R. 10 Eq.Cas. 367; Whitney v. Kirtland, 27 N.J.Eq. 333; Robinson v. Beall, 26 Ga. 17; Allison v. Railroad Co. 42 Iowa, 274; Small v. Railroad Co. 8 N.W.Rep. 437.
This latter view is in my judgment supported by the better reason. It is not necessary for the full protection of the client to go so far as to dismiss the suit, for he is in no manner bound by the champertous agreement; nor are there any reasons found on public policy that should require such dismissal. If all champertous agreements shall be held void, and the courts firmly refuse to enforce them, they will thereby be discouraged and discountenanced to the same extent and in the same manner as are all other unlawful, fraudulent, or void contracts. If, on the other hand, the defendant in an action upon a valid and binding contract may avoid liability or prevent a recovery by proving a champertous agreement for the prosecution of the suit between the plaintiff and his attorney, an effect would thus be given to the champertous agreement reaching very far beyond that which attaches to any other illegal contract. The defendant in such case is no party to the champerty; he is not interested in it, nor in anywise injured by it. If the contract upon which he is sued is a bona fide contract, upon which a sum of money is due from him to the plaintiff, and he has no defense upon that contract, I can see no good reason for holding that he may be released by showing that the plaintiff has made a void and unlawful agreement with his attorney concerning the fee and expenses of the suit.
The tendency in the courts of this country is stronger in the direction of relaxing the common-law doctrine concerning champerty and maintenance, so as to permit greater liberty of contracting between attorney and client than was formerly allowed, and this for the reason that the peculiar condition of society which gave rise to the doctrine has in a great measure passed away. In some of the states the common-law rule is altogether repudiated, and it is held that no such contract is now invalid unless it contravenes some existing statute of the state. Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N.Y. 289; Voorhees v. Darr, 51 Barb. 580; Richardson v. Rowland, 40 Conn. 572; Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86; Hoffman v. Vallejo, 45 Cal. 564; Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 609.
The common-law doctrine, however, prevails in Missouri, according to the decision of the supreme court of the state in Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 55. While following that ruling, I am disposed, in view of the general tendency of American courts, to relax somewhat the rigor of the English rule, to apply it only to the champertous contract itself, and not to allow debtors to make use of it to avoid the payment of their honest obligations.
It follows that the defense of champerty in this case cannot be maintained, and that the motion to dismiss must be overruled.
This bring us to the consideration of the case upon its merits. The first defense, as set forth in the answer, is, in substance, that the note sued on was not intended to bind the defendant to pay the sum therein named 30 days after date, as appears from the face, but was intended as a mere memorandum to show that Winston, the payee, claimed an interest amounting to $7,333 in certain bonds turned over by him to defendant, and for which defendant was to account to him in the settlement of certain...
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