Couto v. Palmer
| Decision Date | 24 June 1942 |
| Citation | 312 Mass. 23,42 N.E.2d 802 |
| Parties | JACINTHO COUTO, administrator, v. TRUSTEES OF NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
May 4, 1942.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, QUA DOLAN, & COX, JJ.
Jurisdiction, Motor vehicle case, Objection to jurisdiction. Motor Vehicle Operation. Superior Court, Jurisdiction. District Court Jurisdiction. Practice, Civil, Commencement of action Improper exercise of jurisdiction; Exceptions: what questions open. Railroad, Grade crossing. Negligence, Licensee, Invited person, Grade crossing. Under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 218, Section 19, as amended by St. 1934, c. 387,
Section 1, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction of an action, begun there, against the trustees of a railroad corporation for causing the death of the operator of a motor truck resulting from a collision between the truck and a railroad train at a grade crossing with a private way.
Evidence, relating to the character and frequency of use of a dirt road leading from a highway south of a railroad paralleling the Cape Cod
Canal across the railroad to the location of work carried on by the national government at the canal and as to a renewal of planking at the crossing by railroad employees, did not warrant a finding of an invitation by the railroad to the operator or owner of a truck going to the canal to use the crossing as its business visitor.
It was the duty of this court to examine into the jurisdictional foundation under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 218, Section 19, as amended by St. 1934, c.
387, Section 1, of an action originally brought in the Superior Court for damages caused by a collision of a railroad train with a motor vehicle, although there was no exception directed to that question.
TWO ACTIONS OF TORT, the first begun by writ returnable to the Superior Court and dated November 28, 1938, and the second by writ in the First District Court of Barnstable dated April 7, 1939.
On removal of the second action to the Superior Court, the cases were tried together before Collins, J., who ordered entered a verdict for the defendant in each action pursuant to leave reserved.
J. E. Lajoie, for the plaintiffs, submitted a brief. J. J. Whittlesey, for the defendants.
These two actions arise from a collision on June 14, 1938, between a passenger train of the defendants and a motor truck at a "private crossing" at grade in Bourne. The first action was originally brought in the Superior Court and was intended to be an action under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 229 Section 3, for so negligently operating the train as to cause the death of the plaintiff's intestate, who was driving the truck. The second action, originally brought in a District Court and later removed to the Superior Court, is by the truck owner for negligence of the defendants causing the demolition of the truck.
The defendants contend that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the death case, and they further contend that the deceased was a mere licensee on the crossing without invitation from the railroad.
(1) As to jurisdiction. This point is well taken. General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 218, Section 19, as amended by St. 1934, c. 387, Section 1, contains this provision, "District courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of actions of tort arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle." The action for death, although brought by virtue of a statute creating a cause of action for death against railroads and street railways, is nevertheless an action of tort; and it none the less arises "out of the operation of a motor vehicle" because it could also be said to arise out of the operation of a locomotive engine. It would hardly be contended that an action resulting from a collision between a motor vehicle and a bicycle does not arise out of the operation of a motor vehicle, although it could also be said to arise out of the operation of a bicycle. The effect of the statute is not limited to cases arising out of accidents upon public ways. The statute of 1934 "was the means adopted to reduce the number of cases that were being brought in the Superior Court and thus permit the more expeditious dispatch of business by that court." Blair v. Boston Elevated Railway, 310 Mass. 1 , 3-4. Its purpose was to remove from the list of cases that could be brought in the Superior Court a whole large class of tort actions -- those arising out of the operation of motor vehicles -- and to require them in the first instance to be brought in the District Courts in the hope that many of them would be permitted to remain there. The difficulty is not one of venue which can be waived. It is jurisdictional. This was stated in Pinson v. Potter, 298 Mass. 109, 111, Chandler v. Dunlop, 311 Mass. 1 , 4, and Blair v. Boston Elevated Railway, supra. The fact that if the action had been brought in the proper District Court it could afterwards have been removed to the Superior Court by any party under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 102A, inserted by St. 1934, c. 387, Section 3, does not give to the Superior Court jurisdiction of an action not so brought and removed. An entry of judgment on the merits in the Superior Court in this action, originally brought there, would be the exercise of an original jurisdiction which the amended c. 218, Section 19, provides shall be exclusively lodged in District Courts. We can think of no way to enforce the 1934 act except by denying the jurisdiction of the court to entertain actions brought in violation of it. The discussions in Thayer v. Shorey, 287 Mass. 76 , 79, 80, and Universal Supply Co. v. Hildreth, 287 Mass. 538 , 540, 541, are not applicable here.
(2) As to invitation or license. The railroad runs south of and parallel with the Cape Cod Canal and, according to a plan in the case, is about one hundred forty feet from the bank of the canal. A dirt road, referred to as a "private road," three or four hundred feet in length runs from the crossing to a highway which is south of the railroad and which parallels the railroad and the canal. The private road and the crossing afford access from the highway to the land between the railroad and the canal. This road "was used by trucks for carting loam and other materials used in connection with the development of the south bank of the canal and land immediately north of the railroad under the supervision and control of...
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