Cove Cay Village IV Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Plymouth Development Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-03358,88-03358
• Citation: 561 So.2d 307
• Parties: 15 Fla. L. Weekly D503 COVE CAY VILLAGE IV CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida nonprofit corporation, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. PLYMOUTH DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Florida corporation, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 307

561 So.2d 307

15 Fla. L. Weekly D503

COVE CAY VILLAGE IV CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., a Florida nonprofit corporation, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. PLYMOUTH DEVELOPMENT CORP., a Florida corporation, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 88-03358.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

Feb. 16, 1990.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1990.

Michael J. Brudny and Jeffrey E. Streitfeld of Becker, Poliakoff & Streitfeld, P.A., Tampa, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Daniel L. Moody and Michael C. Markham of Johnson, Blakely, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel & Burns, P.A., Port Richey, for appellee/cross-appellant.

ALTENBERND, Judge.

Both Cove Cay Village IV Condominium Association and Plymouth Development Corporation appeal the final judgment which impresses a constructive trust in favor of the association on a parcel of real estate owned by the developer. Under the declaration of condominium, the parcel of real estate is the site of the planned, but long-delayed, final phase of this condominium complex. The trial court impressed the constructive trust to forge a truce between the condominium association and the developer concerning a bitterly disputed shortage of parking at the complex. Although we approve the trial court's temporary solution in this case, we reverse in part. On remand, the trial court must amend the judgment to resolve two matters which have not yet been fully adjudicated.

The Cove Cay Village IV Condominium was begun in 1980. The developer intended to construct an eight-phase complex. This complex is a residential planned development under Pinellas County's zoning code. The complex is complete except for the planned final phase. The association contends that the development does not have sufficient parking to meet the county's zoning requirements. The developer maintains that the complex will ultimately satisfy the zoning requirements because the complex will have sufficient parking once the final phase is completed. The development currently suffers from a major parking shortage because the planned final phase of the complex, if and when it is built, will contain an abundance of the planned parking spaces.

The developer no longer controls the condominium association. The land involved in the initial phases of the development is owned by the association. The developer, however, continues to own the land which would be used to construct the final phase of the complex, including the additional parking. The developer is currently allowing the unit owners and their visitors to use the undeveloped land for parking, but it is not legally obligated to reserve the land for them and could possibly alienate the land unless the land is protected in some fashion.

At trial, the association requested that title to all the undeveloped land be transferred or dedicated to the association. In the alternative, it requested a constructive trust over the land. The trial court denied the association's request for title, but impressed a constructive trust to protect the association's right to use this land as parking until the final phase is developed. The trial court ruled that the association is not entitled to a trust over the entire parcel, but only over some portion of the land which is sufficient to resolve the existing parking problem. Once the final phase is developed, the land will be dedicated to the association and the constructive trust will cease to exist. ¹ This equitable remedy is unusual, but so is the problem. ² We affirm its use in this unique case. See Le Cain v. Becker, 58 So.2d 527 (Fla.1952).

The final judgment, however, does not describe which portion of the land constitutes the corpus of the trust. Instead, the judgment delegates the "conclusive and final"...