Covell v. Chadwick

• Decision Date: 25 February 1891
• Citation: 153 Mass. 263,26 N.E. 856
• Parties: COVELL v. CHADWICK.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

153 Mass. 263

26 N.E. 856

COVELL v. CHADWICK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

February 25, 1891

COUNSEL

Edward Avery and T.F. Desmond, for plaintiff.

E.L Barney, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

It appears by the report in this case that at the hearing there was no request that the evidence should be taken down with a view to a revision of the finding of fact by the full court and it seems to have been the intention of the presiding justice to present upon this report merely the question whether the decree is supported by the facts found. There is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff at the trial expressed dissatisfaction with the direction given by the judge to the taking of testimony, or that he at any time intimated a desire to have that direction revised upon an appeal or a report; and we are of opinion that, on the report, it is not now open to the plaintiff to contend that he was injured by the limitation of the testimony to the questions considered. But, if it were open, we see no error in this particular. The appeal relates to nothing but the rights and the conduct of the parties in reference to names, letters, marks, devices figures, formulas, and trade-marks once used by Dr. Charles L. Spencer in connection with the manufacture of certain medicines. So far as the bill charges libels by the defendant on the plaintiff, unless he can show that they are something more than mere false representations as to the character or quality of his property, or as to his title thereto, he is not entitled to a remedy by injunction. Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf'g Co., 114 Mass. 69; Brandeth v. Lance, 8 Paige, 24; Fleming v. Newton, 1 H.L.Cas. 363, 376. His case depends upon his title and the title of the defendant to that which once belonged to Dr. Spencer. The three questions in regard to which evidence was received seem to embrace everything which is material to the plaintiff's claims. At all events, the plaintiff has brought to our attention nothing which could have been important that has not been fully heard.

Sarah T. Spencer, the widow of Dr. Charles L. Spencer, was the administratrix of his estate, and the defendant, without fraud, obtained from her formulas for the preparation of the medicines, and she intended "that the defendant should have the right to use both formulas, with the labels, wrappers, etc., serving to identify the medicines." A few days after the death of Mrs. Spencer and after the defendant had received the formulas, the plaintiff obtained an oral transfer or delivery of them from Mrs. Stetson, who, so far as appears, had no authority to represent the estate of Dr. Spencer or Mrs. Spencer in making the transfer. His first formal title was by a bill of sale given on December 16, 1887, by Alanson Borden, as administrator de bonis non of the estate of Charles L. Spencer, and as executor of the will of Sarah T. Spencer. But Borden had by a formal instrument previously ratified the conveyance by Mrs. Spencer to the defendant of the formula for the "Queen of Pain," and in the bill of sale he expressly excepted all rights and privileges previously given or granted by Dr. Spencer, or by himself, or by any other legal personal representative of either Dr. Spencer or Sarah L. Spencer. The question in the case is whether the plaintiff acquired, as against the defendant, the exclusive right to use the trade-mark formerly used by Dr. Spencer. In Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 23 N.E. 1068, it was decided that the defendant acquired no such right, and upon the authority of that case the defendant contends that the plaintiff is at least in no better position than she. ...