Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 25 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. S098817,S098817
• Citation: 86 P.3d 290,32 Cal.4th 771,11 Cal.Rptr.3d 222
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: COVENANT CARE, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Lourdes M. Inclan et al., Real Parties in Interest.

11 Cal.Rptr.3d 222

86 P.3d 290

32 Cal.4th 771

COVENANT CARE, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent;

Lourdes M. Inclan et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. S098817

Supreme Court of California

March 25, 2004

Horvitz & Levy, Julie L. Woods, David S. Ettinger, Encino; Even, Crandall, Wade, Lowe & Gates, Randolph M. Even & Associates, Randolph M. Even, Woodland Hills and Stephanie Charles, North Hollywood, for Petitioners.

Hooper, Lundy & Bookman, Mark E. Reagan and Mark A. Johnson, Sacramento, for California Association of Health Facilities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Rudy, Paul A. Gordon, San Francisco, and Michelle L. Sullivan for California Association of Homes and Services for the Aging as Amicus curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, for Californians Allied for Patient Protection and

the Civil Justice Association of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Thelen Reid & Priest, Curtis A. Cole, Kenneth R. Pedroza, Los Angeles, and E. Todd Chayet for California Medical Association, California Dental Association and California Healthcare Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Houck & Balisok, Russell S. Balisok, Steven Wilheim, Glendale, Patricia L. Canner; Law Office of Carol S. Jimenez and Carol S. Jimenez, Long Beach, for Real Parties in Interest.

Peter G. Lomhoff, Oakland, for California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent and Real Parties in Interest.

Wilkes & McHugh, Stephen M. Garcia, Burlingame, David T. Bamberger; Robinson, Calcagnie & Robinson and Sharon J. Arkin, Newport Beach, for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.

WERDEGAR, J.

We granted review in this matter to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeal as to whether the procedural prerequisites to seeking punitive damages in an action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider, codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, subdivision (a) (section 425.13(a)), apply to punitive damage claims in actions alleging elder abuse subject to heightened civil remedies under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15600 et seq.) (Elder Abuse Act or Act). The Court of Appeal concluded section 425.13(a) does not apply. We agree, finding nothing in the text, legislative history, or purposes of either section 425.13(a) or the Elder Abuse Act to suggest the Legislature intended to afford health care providers that act as elder custodians, and that egregiously abuse the elders in their custody, the special protections against exemplary damages they enjoy when accused of negligence in providing health care. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Background¹

Lourdes M. Inclan and Juan C. Inclan (plaintiffs) sued Covenant Care California, Inc., and Covenant Care, Inc. (defendants), for damages caused by defendants' care and treatment of their father, Juan A. Inclan (decedent), during the approximately eight weeks that decedent, an elder,² resided at defendants' skilled nursing facility in Los Angeles. More than two years after filing their initial complaint, plaintiffs moved for leave to file a fourth amended complaint. In their proposed fourth amended complaint, plaintiffs sought damages, including "general damages for pain and suffering according to proof," for willful misconduct, intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive fraud, fraud, battery, false imprisonment, elder abuse, and wrongful death. They also sought punitive damages.

Plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint contained detailed and specific factual allegations of elder abuse. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that decedent suffered from Parkinson's disease. Plaintiffs contracted with a managed care organization to oversee decedent's care, to act within plaintiffs' directives, and to inform plaintiffs of any change in decedent's condition or other situation requiring their attention. The managed care organization, however, assumed rights and usurped powers over decedent neither contemplated nor agreed to by decedent or plaintiffs. The managed care organization, sometimes in conspiracy with defendants, admitted and ordered the discharge of decedent, without his consent, from various health care facilities, including a convalescent hospital owned and operated by defendants, and "withh[e]ld essential care, treatment and medical services from decedent including ... food, fluids, medicine, and basic nursing care including basic palliative care."

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired and otherwise "acted with malice and oppression" in moving and treating decedent in order to maximize revenue from the Medicare and Medicaid programs and to avoid regulatory penalties for noncompliance with certain federal and state regulations. At one point, decedent was compelled to transfer to defendants' skilled nursing facility. At that facility, defendants provided decedent only with hospice services and deprived him of skilled nursing services to which he was legally entitled. Decedent's subsequent injury and death flowed in part from defendants' actions.

While decedent was at defendants' nursing facility, plaintiffs further alleged, defendants knew he was suffering from Parkinson's disease and was unable to care for his personal needs. Defendants nevertheless failed to provide decedent with proper care, nutrition, hydration, and medication. Defendants' conduct was in conscious disregard of decedent's rights and safety. Decedent was left in his bed, unattended and unassisted, for excessively long periods. Although decedent increasingly could not feed or hydrate himself, he was for long periods not provided assistance with these activities. As a result, decedent was inadequately stimulated, became malnourished, and lost much of his body weight. Decedent was left in his excrement for long periods; he developed ulcers on his body that exposed muscle and bone and became septic; and he also became severely dehydrated.

As decedent deteriorated, he manifested signs and symptoms of starvation, dehydration, neglect, and abuse. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants deliberately failed to report such symptoms, neglect, and abuse to public authorities as they were legally required to do. Moreover, defendants misrepresented decedent's condition and failed to inform plaintiffs of his true condition, thus concealing his deterioration from plaintiffs.

When decedent was transferred out of defendants' nursing facility to another facility (where he died approximately a week later), plaintiffs alleged, decedent was in such condition that without immediate intervention and aggressive care he would surely die from the effects of starvation, dehydration, and infection. Decedent, however, was not transferred to an acute care facility but, rather, to a 24-hour care setting where, without any care for his acute needs, he languished and deteriorated further. As a direct and proximate result of defendants' neglect and abuse, decedent sustained personal injury, including severe emotional distress, and died.

Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file the fourth amended complaint claiming punitive damages on May 14, 1999. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that under section 425.13(a), which requires such a motion be "filed within two years after the complaint or initial pleading is filed," this was too late. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion, ruling plaintiffs were not required to comply with section 425.13(a) because the causes of action alleged in the fourth amended complaint "go beyond mere or simple professional negligence." The Court of Appeal summarily denied defendants' petition for writ relief, and we denied review.

Subsequent to the trial court's ruling, a different district of the Court of Appeal issued an opinion in Community Care & Rehabilitation Center v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 787, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 343 (Community Care). The court in Community Care held that section 425.13(a) applies to elder abuse actions in which punitive damages are sought, "whenever the gravamen of an action is professional malfeasance — that is, malfeasance in the provision of health care services." (Community Care, supra, at p. 797, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 343.) Defendants moved the trial court for reconsideration in light of Community Care, but the court denied the motion.

The Court of Appeal again denied defendants' petition for writ relief. Rejecting Community Care, the Court of Appeal ruled that plaintiffs' elder abuse claim was exempt from "the procedural hurdles created by section 425.13." We granted review.

Discussion

As originally enacted in 1982, the Elder Abuse Act established requirements and procedures for mandatory and nonmandatory reporting to local agencies of elder abuse, as defined,³ and the abuse of other dependent adults. The Act also addressed local agency investigation and criminal prosecution of such cases. (See Stats.1982, ch. 1184, § 3, p. 4223.) The Act continues to contain such provisions. (See generally Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15600 et seq.)⁴

In 1991, in order "to enable interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adults" (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15600, subd. (j)), the Legislature added Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657 to the Act. That section makes available, to plaintiffs who prove especially egregious elder abuse to a high standard, certain remedies "in addition to all other remedies otherwise provided by law" (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15657). Specifically, a plaintiff who proves "by clear and convincing evidence" that a defendant is liable for physical abuse, neglect, or financial abuse (as these terms are defined in the Act), and that ...