Covin v. State, A04A2364.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A04A2364.,A04A2364. |
| Parties | COVIN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Joseph Key, Sexton & Morris, P.C., Stockbridge, for Appellant.
Tommy Floyd, District Attorney, Sandra Rivers, Thomas McBerry, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
Dexter Covin was charged with trafficking in cocaine and two counts of obstruction of an officer. Covin retained counsel, pled not guilty and proceeded to a trial by jury. On the second day of trial, after the state had rested its case and after co-defendant Tony Lynn Lowe announced his intent to plead guilty, Covin changed his plea and entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and to the two counts of obstruction of an officer. Approximately one month later, Covin filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied by the trial court. He appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw. We find no error and affirm.
As a threshold matter, we note the evidence at trial provided the trial court with a sufficient factual basis for entry of the guilty plea. Evidence at trial showed that a Henry County police officer stopped an automobile driven by Lowe for traffic violations. While the officer was talking to Lowe, Covin exited the automobile and ran away. The officer chased after Covin and saw that Covin was carrying a small white bag. As the officer approached Covin, Covin tore open the bag, and its contents, a white powdery substance, began to spill.
When the officer reached Covin, Covin threw the bag on the ground and attacked the officer with his fists. The officer was able to subdue Covin, but when another officer arrived, Covin again became combative and kicked the other officer. The two officers then wrestled Covin to the ground and placed him under arrest. The bag which Covin had been carrying contained 950.1 grams of cocaine with 76.3 percent purity.
1. Covin contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his guilty plea was not freely and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the rights he was waiving and the consequences of the plea.
Once sentence is pronounced (as occurred in this case), a withdrawal of a plea is within the sound discretion of the court, and this discretion will not be disturbed unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. After a [defendant] raises the question of the validity of his plea of guilty, the burden is on the state to show that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered. The state may accomplish this end by two means, (1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea; or (2) fill a silent record by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.
(Citations omitted.) Clark v. State, 249 Ga.App. 722, 723, 549 S.E.2d 520 (2001).
The record in the instant case reveals that prior to accepting Covin's guilty plea, the trial court posed a series of questions relating to the knowing and voluntary nature of Covin's plea. In response to the trial court's inquiries, Covin affirmatively stated he understood the rights he was waiving including the right to trial by jury, the right to confront witnesses, the right to call witnesses on his behalf and the right not to incriminate himself.1 Covin further voiced his understanding of the nature of the charges against him, the maximum and mandatory minimum sentences on those charges, and the terms of his negotiated plea. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8. Covin also stated that he was entering his guilty plea freely and voluntarily and that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Covin now contends he was forced to quickly decide whether to plead guilty and that as a result, he was stunned and did not comprehend what was happening at the time he entered his guilty plea.2 The transcript of the guilty plea hearing belies Covin's assertion; Covin responded appropriately and cogently to the trial court's inquiries. Covin's initial response to one inquiry was inaudible, but we do not find that a single inaudible response evidences a lack of comprehension on his part.
Additionally, the record reflects Covin made a reasoned decision to plead guilty. While Covin testified at the motion to withdraw his guilty plea that he could not remember the guilty plea colloquy, he testified that he did remember the evidence presented against him at trial. He admitted that such evidence, along with the fact that his co-defendant had elected to enter a guilty plea and could possibly testify against him, influenced his decision to change his plea. Further, evidence at the hearing on Covin's motion to withdraw his guilty plea established that appellant had previously entered guilty pleas to two other felonies and thus was familiar with the guilty plea process. See Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11(1), 287 S.E.2d 26 (1982).
At the motion hearing, Covin testified that shortly before he entered...
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David v. State, No. A06A0612.
...the trial court was entitled to conclude that David freely and voluntarily entered pleas of guilty. See, e.g., Covin v. State, 272 Ga.App. 65, 66(1), 611 S.E.2d 729 (2005); Smith v. State, 254 Ga.App. 832, 833, 563 S.E.2d 923 (2002); Miller, 241 Ga.App. at 398-399(1), 527 S.E.2d Finally, Da......
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Hill v. the State., A11A0444.
...did not. A guilty plea can waive the right to appeal certain issues, such as the denial of a motion to suppress. Covin v. State, 272 Ga.App. 65, 67(2), 611 S.E.2d 729 (2005). But even an unconditional plea of guilty cannot waive a jurisdictional issue: [A] plea of guilty generally waives al......