Covington v. City of New York, 94 Civ. 4234.

• Decision Date: 09 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94 Civ. 4234.,94 Civ. 4234.
• Citation: 916 F. Supp. 282
• Parties: Ronnie COVINGTON, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

916 F. Supp. 282

Ronnie COVINGTON, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

No. 94 Civ. 4234.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 9, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ronnie Covington, Comstock, NY, pro se.

Marc Frazier Scholl, Ass't Dist. Atty., Robert M. Morgenthau, District Atty., NY County, New York City, Jose Antonio Aquino, Paul A. Crotty, Corp. Counsel of the City of New York, New York City, for defendants.

SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

I have carefully reviewed this thorough and comprehensive Report and Recommendation although I extended plaintiff's time to object to this Report to and including January 25, 1996, no objection has been received. The time to object has now expired. I therefore accept and adopt in full the excellent Report of the Magistrate Judge. A status conference with respect to the remaining claims will be held on February 22, 1996 at 4:30 p.m.

So Ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PECK, United States Magistrate Judge.

Defendants Robert M. Morgenthau ("District Attorney Morgenthau") and former Assistant District Attorney Saul Bienenfeld ("A.D.A. Bienenfeld") (collectively, the "District Attorney Defendants") move to dismiss plaintiff Ronnie Covington's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the Court grant the District Attorney Defendants' motion because (1) Covington's false imprisonment and false arrest claims are barred by the statute of limitations, (2) Covington's malicious prosecution, prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury, and conspiracy claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity, and (3) Covington failed to adequately state a "failure to train" claim against District Attorney Morgenthau.

FACTS

On February 18, 1991, Ronnie Covington was arrested and charged with criminal sale and possession of controlled substances in the third degree. (Amended Complaint hereafter, "Cplt.", ¶¶ 25, 28-29, 35-36; Affidavit of Ronnie Covington, dated 3/13/95, Ex. G.) After A.D.A. Bienenfeld presented the case to the grand jury, the grand jury dismissed the charges against Covington on May 29, 1991. (Cplt. ¶ 41; Covington Aff. Ex. H.) On June 12, 1991, the Supreme Court (New York County) dismissed the indictment against Covington. (Cplt. ¶ 42; Covington Aff. Ex. H.)

On May 23, 1994, Covington filed his original complaint when he handed it, along with a completed disbursement request, authorized advance request and an affidavit of service and cover letter, to prison officials. (Covington's Aff. ¶ 8 & Ex. B; see also Cplt. ¶ 2.) The complaint was docketed with the Court on June 9, 1994.

Covington's claim against the District Attorney Defendants is summarized in the amended complaint as follows:

That defendant police officers then conspired with ... defendants Morgenthau ... and Bienenfeld to fraudulently, maliciously and without the necessary probable cause commence and prosecute a criminal action against plaintiff Covington, and to therein slanderously, libelously, maliciously and criminally charge plaintiff verbally and in open Court and in a felony complaint and before a Grand Jury of Criminal Possession and Sale of a Controlled Substance ..., and to present false testimony against plaintiff and to withhold exculpatory evidence from plaintiff in the course of said criminal action, to falsely imprison plaintiff in jail until, and subsequent to, the termination of said criminal action, to defame and injure plaintiff's reputation and, to intentionally or recklessly cause plaintiff extreme emotional distress and suffering. ...

(Cplt. ¶ 35.)

ANALYSIS

I. COVINGTON'S FALSE ARREST AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The statute of limitations applicable to actions brought in federal court in New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years. E.g., Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 251, 109 S.Ct. 573, 582, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989); Woods v. Candela, 13 F.3d 574, 575 (2d Cir. 1994); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 189 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 1368, 67 L.Ed.2d 347 (1981). A § 1983 cause of action accrues "when the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis of the cause of action." Woods v. Candela, 13 F.3d at 575. Thus, in determining when the statute begins to run, the "`proper focus is on the time of the illegal act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful.'" Bailey v. Tricolla, CV-94-4597, 1995 WL 548714 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 1995) (quoting Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 29, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981)).

In a § 1983 action involving separate wrongful acts, the court must analyze each claim separately to determine when it accrued, and therefore when the limitation period runs. Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d at 192; Ramirez v. City of New York, 89 Civ. 6659, 1991 WL 120363 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1991). Read liberally, Covington's amended complaint appears to state six causes of action against the District Attorney Defendants: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) malicious prosecution; (4) conspiracy; (5) misconduct before the grand jury; and (6) failure to adequately train prosecutors. (Cplt. ¶¶ 35-44.)

The statute of limitation for the constitutional torts of false arrest and false imprisonment accrue at the time of arrest. Bezerra v. County of Nassau, 846 F.Supp. 214, 218-19 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (citing Woods v. Candela, 13 F.3d at 575, and Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d at 191); see also, e.g., Covington v. City of New York, 94 CV 3382, 1995 WL 322222 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 1995); Thompson v. City of Mount Vernon, 93 Civ. 4788, 1994 WL 561253 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1994); Oakes v. Cooke, 858 F.Supp. 330, 334 (N.D.N.Y.1994); Grant v. State of New York, 88 Civ. 8703, 1992 WL 84549 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 1992), aff'd mem., 986 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 230, 126 L.Ed.2d 185 (1993).¹ Imprisonment does not toll the statute of limitations. Thompson v. City of Mount Vernon, 1994 WL 561253 at *1.

Thus, Covington's claims for false arrest and false imprisonment accrued on February 18, 1991, the date of his arrest. The three year statute of limitations for such claims, therefore, expired on February 18, 1994.

Covington correctly asserts that, due to the "unique" difficulties faced by incarcerated pro se litigants, the Supreme Court has held that a prisoner's complaint is deemed to be properly filed at the time he hands the papers to prison guards for transmittal to the court. E.g., Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-76, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2382-85, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988); Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d 679, 681-82 (2d Cir.1993). That does not help Covington, however, because he gave his first complaint to prison officials on May 23, 1994, some three months after the statute of limitations expired on February 18, 1994. (See Covington Aff. Ex. B.)

Covington attempts to avoid the statute of limitations by arguing that all his claims are part of an ongoing conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights and that the limitations period thus did not begin to run until the conspiracy ended. (Covington Aff. ¶¶ 9-14.) But, as Covington is aware from previous litigation in which he unsuccessfully made the identical argument, "`characterizing defendants' separate wrongful acts as having been committed in furtherance of a conspiracy or as `a single series of interlocking events' does not postpone accrual of claims based on individual wrongful acts.'" Covington v. City of New York, 1995 WL 322222 at *3 (quoting Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d at 192); see also, e.g., Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1156 (2d Cir.1995).

Thus, Covington's false arrest and false imprisonment claims are barred by the statute of limitations and should be dismissed.²

II. COVINGTON'S CLAIMS OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, MISCONDUCT BEFORE THE GRAND JURY AND CONSPIRACY ARE BARRED BY ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY

The "doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity creates a formidable obstacle for a plaintiff seeking to maintain a civil rights action against a district attorney." Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d at 1147. The doctrine provides that "prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct in `initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case,' insofar as that conduct is `intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.'" Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)); accord, e.g., Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d at 1147. The absolute immunity doctrine is "well-established and has been held to be needed `to preserve the integrity of the judicial process' and to enable "zealous performance of prosecutorial duties ... without the constant threat of legal reprisals." Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 656 (2d Cir.1995)).

"Absolute immunity depends on `the nature of the function performed, not on the identity of the actor who performed it.'" Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 545, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)). While a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for acts "within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution," he or she is entitled only to "qualified immunity" for engaging in "administrative or investigative activities." Day v. Morgenthau, 909 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir.1990).

Covington's allegations against the District Attorney Defendants for (1) maliciously and wrongfully commencing the prosecution; (2) presenting false testimony to and withholding exculpatory evidence from the grand jury; and (3) conspiracy, are "intimately associated with the...