Covington v. Pritchett, C1-88-266
| Decision Date | 30 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. C1-88-266,C1-88-266 |
| Citation | 428 N.W.2d 121 |
| Parties | Dale F. COVINGTON, Jr., et al., Respondents, v. James F. PRITCHETT, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The trial court did not err in canceling the contract for deed or in denying the recovery of additional damages.
Keith Edward Ekstrom, David L. Soucy, Richard A. Saliterman Law Firm, Minneapolis, for respondents.
David Gronbeck, Hagberg & Gronbeck, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Heard, considered, and decided by WOZNIAK, C.J., and FOLEY and NORTON, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order and judgment canceling a contract for deed between appellant James Pritchett and respondents Dale and Linda Covington. Pritchett contends the trial court erred in failing to allow him to recover funds paid to cover contract payments after the Covingtons' default and also erred in failing to allow recovery of funds equaling the reasonable rental value of the property. We affirm.
In 1980, Pritchett and his wife purchased a home from John and Rosemary Rawson pursuant to a contract for deed. They purchased the property for $90,000, paid $18,000 at closing, and agreed to pay the remaining $72,000 balance through monthly installments of $635.
In February 1984, the Covingtons were attempting to sell their home. Pritchett proposed to trade the Covingtons' home for the home he purchased by contract for deed from the Rawsons. The Covingtons' down payment to Pritchett consisted of $3,000 cash and $10,000 in equity from the Covingtons' home. A $7,000 balance of equity attributed to Pritchett's home remained.
The terms of the contract for deed provided that the Covingtons agreed to pay the monthly installments on the underlying contract for deed and to pay the remaining $7,000 balance. The method of paying the $7,000 balance is the root of the difficulties between the parties.
One portion of the contract for deed provides that the $7,000 "shall be paid in full on October 15, 1984." However, additional contract language provides that payment shall be made as follows:
In monthly installments of $____ per month or more at the option of the buyers, including interest at the rate of 13% per annum, computation on unpaid balances. Interest shall run from the date hereof. The first payment shall be due and payable on ____, 1984, and subsequent payments shall be due and payable on the ____ day of each succeeding month. * * * The entire unpaid balance of this contract for deed shall be due and payable in full no later than August 15, 1987.
The Covingtons testified that they believed it would take six months to sell Pritchett's house, and the contract language was drafted to permit a balloon payment in October if the house was sold, but permit an installment payment plan if the house was not sold. They claim this provision is the reason the dates and the amount of the installment payments were left blank.
Pritchett, however, understood the agreement to preclude any option for installment payments. He refused the Covingtons' attempt to commence installment payments after they were unable to sell the house. The Covingtons continued to make the $635 monthly payments under the Rawson contract for deed, but did not make any payments on the $7,000 balance.
In March 1985, Pritchett served the Covingtons with a notice of cancellation of the contract for deed. The Covingtons wrote to Pritchett the same day proposing a method to pay the $7,000 through installments, but Pritchett did not answer the letter. In April 1985, the Covingtons served a summons and complaint upon Pritchett, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and that the notice of cancellation was void for failure to list a 90-day period to cure the default pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 559.21, subd. 6 (1986). They also moved for injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of the cancellation of the contract for deed.
The trial court granted a temporary injunction prohibiting cancellation of the contract. The court ruled that the notice was invalid because of the improper time period to cure the default and because the terms in the contract for deed were ambiguous.
Pritchett subsequently served the Covingtons with a second notice of cancellation of the contract for deed. In July, a second judge upheld the previous injunction and requested that the parties reach a settlement, advice they should have heeded. The parties were unable to reach a settlement, and the Covingtons continued to make the monthly payments to the Rawsons pursuant to the underlying contract for deed.
In January 1986, the Covingtons withheld the $635 payment, and testified that this was to get Pritchett's "attention." Later that month, they contacted the Rawsons to resume payments pursuant to the underlying contract, but Mr. Rawson refused to accept further payments. Pritchett also refused to accept any further monthly payments. In March 1986, the Rawsons served a notice of cancellation of contract for deed on both parties. Pritchett cured the default. The Covingtons testified that at this time Pritchett denied their offer to quitclaim the property back to him for a release of all claims.
In September 1986, Pritchett's motion to lift the temporary injunction was denied. In January 1987, the Covingtons found a buyer for the house and offered to transfer the net proceeds to Pritchett. However, Pritchett did not approve the sale, and the proposed purchase failed. In May 1987, the Covingtons moved off the property, and filed a quit claim deed to convey their interest in the property to Pritchett. They understood that they forfeited the $26,335 paid on the property, but testified they were forced to give up any claim to the property because neither vendor would accept contract payments and because they could not refinance or sell the property.
In June 1987, the trial court finally lifted the 1985 injunction, canceled the contract for deed, and awarded Pritchett all right, title, and interest in the property. The court also dismissed the parties' respective claims and counterclaims for monetary damages. The trial court found that Pritchett did not make reasonable efforts to negotiate a monthly installment amount under the contract and that the amounts paid by the Covingtons since February 1984 constituted an equitable return for their occupancy of the property. The trial court noted the lengthy and convoluted procedural history, the Covingtons' repeated attempts to fulfill the contract's ambiguous provisions, and ruled that both sides must share the burden of the transaction.
Did the trial court err in canceling the contract for deed and denying recovery of additional damages?
The scope of review on an appeal from an order denying a new trial or amended findings includes each issue properly submitted as error in the post-trial motion. Rein v. Town of Spring Lake, 275 Minn. 79, 82, 145 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1966), reh'g denied (Minn. Nov. 1, 1966). The denial of a motion for a new trial will not be reversed unless the trial court abused its discretion. Templin v. Crestliner, Inc., 263 Minn. 149, 151, 116 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1962). Pritchett contends the trial court abused its...
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...the two remedies are inconsistent and result in a windfall recovery to the vendor." Id. at 407, 618 P.2d at 1025. In Covington v. Pritchett, 428 N.W.2d 121 (Minn.App.1988), the court held that a vendor is bound by the election of remedies doctrine if the action has been pursued to a determi......
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...doctrine. The election of remedies doctrine applies when a party seeks two or more inconsistent remedies. Covington v. Pritchett, 428 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn.Ct.App.1988). The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent "double redress for a single wrong." Northwestern State Bank v. Foss, 293 Minn.......
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...v. Flynn, 190 Minn. 102, 106-07, 250 N.W. 806, 808 (1933); Kosbau v. Dress, 400 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn.App.1987); Covington v. Pritchett, 428 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn.App.1988). In short, one cannot ordinarily cancel a contract by the statutory procedure and then recover benefits due under I. W......
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...Appellate review from an order denying a motion for new trial is limited to the errors alleged in the motion. Covington v. Pritchett, 428 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn.App.1988) (citation omitted). Debtors allege that the court's refusal to allow the breach of contract claim was error because the s......