Covington v. State

Decision Date22 January 1993
Citation620 So.2d 122
PartiesBruce Wade COVINGTON v. STATE. CR 91-1580.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Robert Clark and W. Lloyd Copeland, Mobile, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Gilda Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOWEN, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Bruce Wade Covington, was convicted of burglary in the second degree and rape in the first degree. He was given concurrent sentences of 10 years' and 20 years' imprisonment, respectively. On this appeal from those convictions the appellant argues that he was entitled to a mistrial because "[t]he prosecutor's questions, and statements made in the presence of the jury, constituted blatant assertions that there was evidence not before the jury of an extremely damning fact: that threats made by Covington and his brother had induced [defense witness David] Smith to give false exculpatory testimony." Appellant's brief at 30.

THE FACTS

The victim in this case was a 20-year-old Korean female. She knew the appellant, having met him on two prior occasions, and positively identified him as her assailant.

The appellant's defense was alibi. He claimed that he was at home at the time of the burglary and rape. It is undisputed Quinley was a witness for the prosecution and testified that shortly before the rape, the appellant made statements to him and Smith indicating his desire to have sexual intercourse with an oriental female.

                that shortly before the rape, the appellant was in the company of David Quinley and David Smith.  The appellant also claimed that he had shaved his pubic hair at that time "in order to get rid of the crabs."   R. 236.  The victim testified that she saw the appellant's pubic hair at the time of the rape
                

At trial, Smith testified as a defense witness that he, Quinley, and the appellant were at his sister's house prior to the rape. He testified that "sex" was not a subject of their conversation. However, Smith admitted on direct examination that he had previously told a Mobile County sheriff's detective that the appellant had made some remarks that night "about getting some oriental stuff that night." R. 289. At trial, Smith claimed that he had lied to the detective and that the appellant "did not tell [him] that. David Quinley told [him] that. And [he] told the detective that because [he] was mad because [he] thought [the appellant] had done that to Kim." R. 290. Later, on cross-examination, Smith stated, "I don't know if I believe that he did it or not. So I ain't going to sit up here and lie and that is why I'm saying this now." R. 297. Smith also testified that Quinley was "known to lie." R. 303. However, when asked, "And you are saying that David Quinley is just making this up?" Smith responded, "I ain't saying that one bit." R. 303.

During her cross-examination of the appellant, the assistant district attorney sought to establish that Smith's trial testimony was false and that either the appellant or the appellant's brother had coerced or threatened Smith into giving false testimony. On cross-examination of the appellant, the following occurred in the presence and hearing of the jury:

"Q. Have either you or your brother Brian made threats against David Smith or--

"MR. POWERS [defense counsel]: Object to the question as insulting.

"THE COURT: I sustain the objection unless you are prepared to offer evidence to that effect, Ms. Murphree [assistant district attorney].

"MS. MURPHREE: I can put on David Smith's mother.

"THE COURT: I mean if you tell me that you have evidence to this effect then I am going to allow the question to be asked and answered. If you tell me you do not then I will not let him answer.

"MS. MURPHREE: Your Honor, I can represent to you that I do not have David Smith's mother subpoenaed but I can represent to the Court and I will do it outside the presence of the jury if you want me to, what she has personally told me regarding threats--

"THE COURT: If she is not a witness to testify then you can't prove it unless you represent to me that you will get her.

"MS. MURPHREE: May I take--I will do my best to. If I--

"THE COURT: Well, then I will not allow the question.

"MS. MURPHREE: She may be out in the hall.

"THE COURT: All right. I will let you check on that before I will allow the question to be asked. But unless you are able to substantiate such a question then the question is an improper question." R. 250-51.

The prosecutor then questioned the appellant about another matter and established that the appellant did intend to call Smith as a defense witness. R. 255

On cross-examination of defense witness Smith, the following occurred:

"Q. [by the prosecutor]: Mr. Smith, isn't it a fact that shortly after this happened you told the truth when you talked to David Hill and you have talked to Bruce [the appellant] since then haven't you?

"A. On and off.

"....

"Q. Okay. Have you talked to Bruce [the appellant] about your testimony in this case?

"A. No, I haven't.

"Q. Has Bruce threatened you?

"A. No, he hasn't.

"Q. Has his brother Brian threatened you?

"A. No, he hasn't.

"Q. Are you aware that your mother called me last night to tell me--

"MR. POWERS: I am going to object to that your Honor.

"THE COURT: I have already sustained the objection--

"MS. MURPHREE: He had indicated that he could get his mother to Court.

"THE COURT: I have already sustained the objection previously unless you make the proper representation to this Court.

"MS. MURPHREE: The representation I am making is that he said he could get his mother to Court. 1

"Q. Is that correct Mr. Smith?

"THE COURT: No, that's not your question though, is it, Ms. Murphree?

"MS. MURHPREE: It is now.

"THE COURT: I am not going to allow you to go into that matter unless you can show the Court that you can go ahead and back up any question that you ask this witness. Not whether or not you can get his mother to Court but whether or not you can back up anything that is said.

"MR. POWERS: Your Honor, I move for a mistrial.

"THE COURT: Only proper evidence.

"MR. POWERS: I move for a mistrial.

"THE COURT: The Court will deny the motion. Go ahead Ms. Murphree.

"Q. David Smith, i[s] your mother available to come to Court today?

"MR. POWERS: Your Honor, I am going to object to this line of questioning. It's getting back to what Your Honor has already ruled on.

"THE COURT: I will let him answer that question if he knows the answer.

"A. No, she is not available today.

"Q. Do you see that lady sitting back there in the back of the Court? Stand up for me. Did you initially tell her when I sent her out to--

"THE COURT: Ms. Murphree, you are beating a dead horse. I have already ruled on that issue.

"MS. MURPHREE: I'm sorry then, Your Honor. I am missing your point.

"THE COURT: Proceed to another matter.

"MS. MURPHREE: If I can--

"THE COURT: Proceed to another matter.

"MS. MURPHREE: May I just ask one other--

"THE COURT: Proceed to another matter. Well, we will take a recess. May I see the lawyers in my office?" R. 297-300 (footnote added).

There is no record of what occurred in the judge's office.

When the trial resumed, the following occurred:

"MR. POWERS: I renew at this time my motion for a mistrial.

"THE COURT: I deny the motion. You may proceed Ms. Murphree." R. 300.

Shortly after this exchange, the defense rested its case. The prosecution presented no rebuttal.

THE IMPROPRIETY OF THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS

We find the prosecutor's conduct highly improper. Statements made by the prosecution that imply or suggest that there exists additional evidence, which has not been introduced and which could prove the defendant's guilt are "intolerable" and highly prejudicial. Ex parte Washington, 507 So.2d 1360, 1362 (Ala.1986).

"It has long been the rule in Alabama that, although counsel should be given considerable latitude in drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence, they may not argue as a fact that which is not " '[C]ounsel should not be permitted to comment upon facts not proved before the jury as true, and not legally competent and admissible as evidence. However reluctant an appellate court may be to interfere with the discretion of a primary court in regulating the trial of cases, if it should appear that it had refused, to the prejudice of a party, to compel counsel to confine their arguments and comments to the jury, to the law and evidence of the case under consideration--if it had permitted them to refer to and comment upon facts not in evidence, or which would not be admissible as evidence, it would be a fatal error....' "

supported by the evidence.... This has been the rule since it was first stated in McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154[, 163] (1878):

Washington, 507 So.2d at 1361-62. See also King v. State, 518 So.2d 191, 194 ((Ala.Cr.App.1987). "[F]or the state's attorney to ask a question which implies the existence of a factual predicate which the examiner knows he [or she] cannot support by the evidence is unprofessional conduct." Daniel v. State, 534 So.2d 1122, 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.1988).

"The alleged prosecutorial misconduct consisted of making prejudicial allegations without being able to prove them by lawful evidence. The 'lawful evidence' standard applies in Alabama and the good faith of [the] prosecutor or lack thereof is not the test.

"....

" 'Laying prejudicial allegations before the jury "by dint of cross-examination without being prepared to prove them is generally regarded as reversible error." United States v. Brown, 519 F.2d 1368, 1370 (6th Cir.1975). It is improper for the prosecutor "to ask a question which implies a factual predicate which the examiner knows he cannot support by evidence or for which he has no reason to believe that there is a foundation of truth." United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1307 (7th Cir.1976).' "

Daniel v. State, 534 So.2d 1122, 1126 (Ala.Cr.App.1988). See also Hooper v. State, ...

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