Cowan v. State

• Decision Date: 16 November 1990
• Citation: 579 So.2d 13
• Parties: Hugh Anthony COWAN v. STATE. CR 89-276.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 13

579 So.2d 13

Hugh Anthony COWAN v. STATE.

CR 89-276.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 16, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 18, 1991.

Certiorari Denied April 11, 1991

Alabama Supreme Court 1900659.

Michael B. Beers of Beers, Anderson, Jackson & Smith, Montgomery, for appellant.

Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Robin Blevins, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOWEN, Judge.

Hugh Anthony Cowan was convicted of the capital murder of Felicia McCall, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(2). He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and was ordered to pay $5,617.11 in restitution and $500 to the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund. Cowan raises five issues on this appeal from that conviction.

I.

The appellant argues that he was not competent to stand trial.

The appellant was arrested on May 26, 1987. He was transported to the Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility on July 14, 1987, and was returned to the Montgomery County Jail on October 2, 1987. The appellant was indicted in August 1987. On April 5, 1988, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the appellant incompetent to stand trial and ordered him transferred to the Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility for evaluation and treatment. The appellant was returned to the county jail on August 4, 1988. On December 20, 1988, and April 19, 1989, the appellant was evaluated at the Secure Medical Facility as an outpatient.

On May 17, 1989, a jury was empaneled under the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 15-16-21, to determine the issue of the appellant's competency to stand trial. Because the appellant had previously been adjudged incompetent to stand trial, the trial court placed the burden on the State to prove that the appellant was competent. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that "in this case the burden is on the State to prove by the greater weight of the credible evidence that [the appellant], one, has a present ability to consult with his attorneys with a reasonable degree of understanding. And two, that he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him on the charge of capital murder." ¹ Upon directly conflicting and highly contested evidence, the jury found the appellant competent to stand trial. The appellant's trial on the indictment began on June 12, 1989, and a verdict was returned on June 16, 1989.

In this case, it is undisputed that the defendant has some type of a mental problem or problems. In his sentencing order the trial court found the presence of two mitigating factors:

"The Court finds that the capital offense was committed while Cowan was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The evidence regarding Cowan's mental state at the time of the offense was sharply disputed, and Cowan failed to carry his burden of proving that at the time of the offense that as a result of mental disease or defect he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. However, there is ample testimony, mental health records and physical evidence to support a finding of Cowan's abnormal mental history and that at the time of the homicide he was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance.

"....

"The Court finds that Cowan's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.

"The Court bases this finding on the same grounds that it bases its finding that Cowan acted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."

However, " '[t]he test for determining competency to stand trial is whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against im." ' " Reese v. State, 549 So.2d 148, 150 (Ala.Cr.App.1989).

"The question of defendant's competency to stand trial is limited to his mental abilities at the time of trial. Thus, the fact that defendant may have been insane when he committed the act charged is not the test for present incompetency to stand trial, and where it affirmatively appears that defendant is presently sane and competent to stand trial, notwithstanding the fact that he may have been insane when he committed the act charged, there is no barrier to proceeding with the trial.

"A distinction must be made between mental illness and metal incompetency to stand trial, and the fact that a defendant is mentally ill does not necessarily mean that he is legally incompetent to stand trial. Thus, not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence of defendant's mental unfitness must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges.

"Furthermore, the commission of a seemingly irrational crime does not per se render a defendant incompetent to stand trial.... Likewise, a general inability to communicate is not equated with incompetency to stand trial...."

22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 550 (1989) (footnotes omitted).

At the competency hearing, the State presented the testimony of a psychiatrist and a forensic psychologist that the appellant was competent to stand trial. In addition, there was testimony presented through these witnesses that other mental health experts at the Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility who were on the "Lunacy Commission" agreed with the determination of competency. Furthermore, the State presented evidence that the appellant may have been fabricating and exaggerating his symptoms. The appellant presented the expert testimony of psychiatrist Dr. Claude L. Brown and lay testimony, including that of the appellant's two attorneys, supporting a finding that he was incompetent to stand trial.

In this case, the verdict of the jury that the appellant was competent to stand trial is not so contrary to the "sharply disputed" evidence that this Court can find that the verdict of the jury was wrong or unjust. Thompson v. State, 384 So.2d 1131, 1133 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 384 So.2d 1135 (Ala.1980). Cf. Eathorne v. State, 448 So.2d 445, 449 (Ala.Cr.App.1984) (affirming trial court's finding of competency made on the basis of conflicting evidence). While the State did present a prima facie case that the appellant was competent to stand trial, the defense presented testimony which, if believed by the jury, would support a verdict finding the appellant incompetent. The question of the appellant's competency to stand trial depended almost entirely upon the credibility of the expert witnesses. "The weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, where susceptible of more than one rational conclusion, are for the jury alone." Willcutt v. State, 284 Ala. 547, 549, 226 So.2d 328, 330 (1969). "It was not for the court to determine what weight the jury should give to this evidence, as they are made the exclusive judges of its credibility." Reeves v. State, 186 Ala. 14, 21, 65 So. 160, 162 (1914). "A verdict on conflicting evidence is conclusive on appeal." Granger v. State, 473 So.2d 1137, 1139 (Ala.Cr.App.1985). A verdict on conflicting evidence is conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal. See Roberson v. State, 162 Ala. 30, 32, 50 So. 345, 346 (1909). "A multitude of cases could be cited in support of the proposition that where there is ample evidence offered by the state to support a verdict, it should not be overturned even though the evidence offered by the defendant is in sharp conflict therewith and presents a substantial defense." Fuller v. State, 269 Ala. 312, 333, 113 So.2d 153, 172 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936, 80 S.Ct. 380, 4 L.Ed.2d 358 (1960).

In finding that the jury's verdict of competent to stand trial is due to be upheld, this Court has considered the entire record presented on appeal. Immediately before trial on the indictment, the appellant made a pro se request to be tried without a jury. After questioning the appellant, the trial court denied that motion finding that the appellant could not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive the right to jury trial. When defense counsel renewed the motion for a reconsideration of the competency issue, the trial court stated:

"Finding as I have expressly said on the record that he can't knowingly and voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to jury trial is not a comment on his present competence to stand trial. Conversation with which I have just had with Mr. Cowan reenforces my decision that I don't find any bonafide reason to believe that he is not competent to stand trial. He seems to be aware of what's going on, continuing to have an awareness of court proceedings and what they are and what the possible outcomes of them are...."

With regard to the disturbances created by the appellant's conduct at trial, the trial court stated, "I'm not going to say that Mr. Cowan is play acting in this case. But I am going to say the record is strong and suggestive of that."

In this case, the trial court was entitled to rely upon the jury's determination of the appellant's competency to stand trial.

II.

The appellant argues that the evidence is constitutionally insufficient to support a conviction for capital murder-robbery under Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(2), because the State failed to prove that the murder was committed during the commission of a first degree robbery. The appellant argues that the tragic killing was "a random, bizarre and senseless shooting with no apparent motive," and that the taking of the automobile was "a mere afterthought." Appellant's brief at 6. We reject this argument based upon the facts presented at trial.

In his sentencing order, the trial court summarized the facts of the crime:

"On May 26, 1987, Felecia McCall was driving her mother's car to...