Cowan v. State
Decision Date | 11 March 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 4D07-1065.,4D07-1065. |
Citation | 3 So.3d 446 |
Parties | Johnny COWAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tom Wm. Odom, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Heidi L. Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Defendant and a companion were arrested for burglary, handcuffed and left unattended in the rear seat of a police car. No one else was present, but a video monitor recorded them.
At trial the prosecution sought to admit excerpts of the recording. The state attorney contended that the companion could be understood as saying to defendant: "Damn, you think they caught us for the home invasion, home burglary?" and "Hey, we did not leave anything in there?" The prosecution argued that defendant's lips seemed to be moving, that he appeared to say: 1
Defendant objected, saying that he did not respond in any way to his companion. He argued that, because he had been just arrested and taken into custody, the admission of the tape showing his silence to any declarations by his companion would violate his right against self-incrimination. The court allowed the evidence, reasoning that defendant was not being interrogated by police at the time.
Later, defendant testified on his own behalf, denying involvement in the burglary. He testified that he did not say anything while seated in the police car. When asked on cross-examination why his mouth seemed to be moving as in speech, he denied that his lips were moving. He denied ever saying: "they've got it; they've got it." He explained that he remained silent in the police vehicle in spite of his companion's declarations because he was angry at being arrested. Then this inquiry by the prosecutor:
Q. Did you at any point say to him: `What are you talking about, what burglary?'
A. No, because I was mad that he got me arrested.
Q. How come you didn't say: `What burglary are you talking about?' How come you didn't say that?
A. I don't know what you're talking about.
Q. How come you didn't say — when he said `damn, you think they caught us?' — why didn't you say
A. Because I didn't even talk to him.
Q. Do you have a problem with your hearing?
A. No.
Over defendant's objection the trial court allowed the line of questioning. The state then asked defendant: " Again defense counsel objected without success.
In closing argument the prosecutor told the jury the following:
...
From a conviction, we have the appeal.
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his Florida right against self-incrimination when it admitted the recording and thereupon permitted the above cross-examination, allowing the prosecutor in closing argument repeatedly to emphasize defendant's silence when the companion was said to have spoken to him in the police car. In particular defendant argues that in admitting the recording, the trial court allowed the prosecution to go beyond resolving any dispute as to whether defendant actually said anything in a conversation with the companion. He contends that the recording became the foundation for the State instead to question him about remaining silent and to argue that his silence was really evidence that he was guilty.
The record establishes that the prosecution's sole justification in the trial court for the evidence and argument concerning silence was that he had waived his right against self-incrimination by participating in a conversation.2 As to the cross-examination and argument about his failure to respond to the companion's assertions, it simply argues that it was not at all commenting on silence but instead merely impeaching his direct testimony that he never responded to the companion's declarations.
We agree that the video recording may have been admissible for a limited purpose of showing that defendant may have actually spoken to the companion during their vehicular confinement, that he might thereby have voluntarily said something incriminating. But we do not agree that any attempt at impeachment justified cross-examination about things he did not say and corresponding argument set forth above. In other words, we draw a distinction between evidence of voluntary inculpatory comments by a defendant under arrest, on the one hand, and defendant's silence — the absence of speech — on the other. The comments would be admissible because declarations by an accused then could be deemed his own voluntary statements. The video record would therefore be admissible to show actual speech by defendant but not for any purpose involving an exercise in silence.
Post-arrest, custodial silence of the defendant is simply inadmissible as evidence of guilt and is not a proper subject of argument. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), concerned unexpected testimony at trial by defendants as to an exculpatory defense not stated before. The trial court allowed the prosecution to cross-examine them as to why they had not previously told the police or the prosecutor before trial about this defense. The Ohio prosecutor was also permitted to argue in closing that their pretrial silence as to the defense should be weighed against them. In holding all of this constitutionally impermissible, the Court made clear that "it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240. The Court explained:
[e.s., c.o.]
Id. at 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 2240. Hence, because of the constitutional right against self-incrimination, under Doyle "every post-arrest silence" should be deemed insolubly ambiguous as inculpatory evidence and, for that reason, unavailable as proof of guilt. [e.s.]
In this case, it does not appear that the Miranda warnings had yet been administered when defendant and his companion were left in the police vehicle. But that omission hardly weakens defendant's right against self-incrimination in this State because Florida law does not require a prior incantation of a Miranda warning. The Florida Supreme Court has held that regardless of whether the federal Miranda warning has been given, the Florida right against self-incrimination attaches at the time of arrest. State v. Hoggins, 718 So.2d 761, 768-69 (Fla.1998); Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. ( ); see also Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331, 333 (Fla.1978) (); Hicks v. State, 590 So.2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ( ). Therefore, defendant's right against self incrimination attached at the instant of his arrest — even without Miranda warnings.
We see no significance in the...
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