Cowards v. State
| Decision Date | 29 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. S95A1663,S95A1663 |
| Citation | 266 Ga. 191,465 S.E.2d 677 |
| Parties | COWARDS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Lee Sexton, Lee Sexton & Associates, P.C., Jonesboro, for Rodger Lee Cowards.
Todd E. Naugle, Asst. Dist. Atty., Robert E. Keller, Dist. Atty., Jonesboro, Hon. Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen. and Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Caroline Wight Donaldson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
Appellant Roger Lee Cowards was found guilty of and sentenced to life imprisonment for felony murder. 1
1. The indictment charged appellant with malice murder, felony murder with armed robbery as the underlying felony, and armed robbery. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motions for directed verdicts of acquittal on the felony murder and armed robbery charges.
There is no error in denying a defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal where the evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Blackwell v. State, 264 Ga. 517, 448 S.E.2d 359 (1994); Palmore v. State, 264 Ga. 108, 441 S.E.2d 405 (1994).
The State produced evidence that the victim, the 79-year-old manager of the boardinghouse where appellant resided, bled to death as a result of 57 knife wounds which were inflicted upon him in his room at the boardinghouse. The victim suffered 29 stab wounds to his upper left chest area and his neck was sliced 17 times. Defensive wounds were found on his hands and arms. Drawers of the victim's dresser and desk were found open, as was his briefcase. The victim's wallet and keys were missing, and his car was not parked as he would have parked it.
Two women testified that appellant had bicycled to an apartment where he had smoked and shared crack cocaine with them. When they ran out of contraband, appellant left on his bicycle to go to the bank to get money to buy more crack cocaine. When he returned to the two women, he had blood on his clothing and was driving what was identified as the victim's car. The women took from appellant's bag a wallet which contained photographs of a man later identified as the victim.
As part of its case-in-chief, the State read into evidence appellant's testimony at his pre-trial bond hearing wherein appellant asserted he had not killed anyone, but admitted he had seen the dying victim and had taken his car keys without calling for emergency assistance for the victim. In that testimony, appellant acknowledged that he had been smoking crack cocaine the night of the murder and had returned to the boarding house to retrieve money to buy more contraband. He also admitted that he owned a 4-inch knife with a belt pouch and that he had initially lied to investigating officers by telling them he had been in his room at the boarding house all night.
The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both felony murder and the underlying felony of armed robbery. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The evidence that appellant took the victim's property from the immediate presence of the victim while the victim lay dying from the stab wounds appellant inflicted in order to commit the theft authorized the finding that appellant had committed armed robbery. Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625(1), 212 S.E.2d 802 (1975). See also White v. State, 255 Ga. 210(10), 336 S.E.2d 777 (1985). The trial court did not err when it denied the motions for directed verdicts of acquittal.
2. Citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), counsel for appellant objected to the admission at trial of appellant's bond hearing testimony on the ground that its use in the trial required appellant to surrender his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to assert his Eighth Amendment right to a reasonable bond pending trial. See U.S. Constitution, Amendment Eight; Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIII. In Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, 88 S.Ct. at 976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled inadmissible at trial on the issue of guilt the suppression hearing testimony of a defendant who was required, in order to assert his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, to incriminate himself at the suppression hearing by admitting ownership of incriminating evidence. The Court found it "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." Id. See also Culpepper v. State, 132 Ga.App. 733(3), 209 S.E.2d 18 (1974).
We fully concur with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding, but conclude it is inapplicable to the case at bar because appellant was not required to make incriminating statements at his bond hearing in order to receive the benefits of the Eighth Amendment's right to bail. See United States v. Dohm, 618 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc). A defendant who has filed a petition seeking release on bail has the initial burden of showing, by means of evidence indicating roots in the community, that the defendant does not pose a significant risk of fleeing, threatening the community, committing another crime, or intimidating a witness. Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704(1), 425 S.E.2d 282 (1993); OCGA § 17-6-1(e). The defendant's guilt or innocence of the underlying charge is not an issue at the bail hearing, especially since the defendant enters the proceeding cloaked with a presumption of innocence. Id., at 706. Absent objections grounded on the Fifth Amendment at the bail hearing, the decision of defense counsel to bring the extraneous issue of guilt or innocence into the bail proceeding did not preclude, on Fifth Amendment grounds, use of incriminating testimony given at the bail hearing. See also Vaxter v. State, 508 N.E.2d 809 (Ind.1987), and Raffield v. State, 333 So.2d 534 (Fla.App.1976) ().
3. Appellant takes issue with several rulings made during the course of the trial by the trial court.
(a) During cross-examination of the lead investigator, the trial court sustained the State's hearsay objection when appellant's counsel sought information not personally known to the investigator, but contained in the case investigation file. Such a line of questioning could...
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