Cowper v. Nyberg

• Decision Date: 09 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 5–12–0415.,5–12–0415.
• Citation: 381 Ill.Dec. 350,2014 IL App (5th) 120415,10 N.E.3d 435
• Parties: Deangelo M. COWPER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Randy NYBERG, in His Capacity as Saline County Circuit Clerk, and Keith Brown, in His Capacity as Saline County Sheriff, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2014 IL App (5th) 120415

10 N.E.3d 435

381 Ill.Dec. 350

Deangelo M. COWPER, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Randy NYBERG, in His Capacity as Saline County Circuit Clerk, and Keith Brown, in His Capacity as Saline County Sheriff, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 5–12–0415.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

May 9, 2014.

Andrew T. Flynn and Glenn R. Tetzlaff, both of Glenn R. Tetzlaff & Associates, of Marion, for appellant.

Joseph A. Bleyer and K. Rockne Bleyer, both of Bleyer & Bleyer, of Marion, for appellees.

OPINION

Justice CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Deangelo M. Cowper was convicted of retail theft in 2003, which resulted in a probation violation. The trial court sentenced Cowper to 27 months of imprisonment for the probation violation. In 2012, Cowper filed his complaint alleging negligence against the Saline County circuit clerk, Randy Nyberg, and the Saline County sheriff, Keith Brown, for not transmitting to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) the accurate number of days he had served in jail for which he was to receive credit against the 27–month sentence. As a result of the incorrect credit against his sentence, Cowper was incarcerated beyond his legal release date. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Cowper's complaint pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2010)). The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Cowper's complaint. Cowper appeals and argues that section 5–4–1(e)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–4–1(e)(4) (West 2010)) imposes legal duties upon the defendants to compile and transmit to the IDOC the days of credit against a sentence of imprisonment. He also claims that he has a right to pursue a private cause of action against these defendants for breach of those duties.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On May 12, 2011, Cowper pled guilty to three counts of a 2003 felony case. The court sentenced him to 27 months' imprisonment with 1 year of mandatory supervised release upon discharge. The judgment-sentence filed on June 1, 2011, included a lengthy summary of the days Cowper spent in custody for which he was to receive credit. The judgment-sentence order gave Cowper 275 days of credit against the 27–month sentence. Cowper was transferred to prison on June 2, 2011. After application of the 275 days of credit, Cowper's sentence was reduced from 27 months to 13 months and 15 days. On June 23, 2011, Cowper filed a motion in the Saline County criminal court to recalculate the time. On November 22, 2011, the State filed its response, stating that after an investigation, the State concluded that the 275 days calculation of credit was wrong. The State's investigation revealed that Cowper was in Saline County custody from January 8, 2008, until February 2, 2008, and from November 29, 2010, until May 11, 2011, and that the State did not give him credit for those days in the original judgment-sentence. The court entered an order directing the State to prepare an amended mittimus to reflect the correct number of days of credit for time served. The State filed its amended judgment-sentence directed to the IDOC on November 22, 2011. Cowper had already been released from the Illinois Department of Corrections on October 16, 2011, after serving the full sentence. The corrected mittimus allowed an additional 191 days' credit for time served-for a total of 466 days of credit. As a result of his release from prison, Cowper received no benefit from the additional 191 days of credit for time served.

¶ 4 On January 20, 2012, Cowper filed suit against the defendants alleging negligence. He claimed that each defendant had a duty to transmit the accurate number of days for which he was entitled to credit. Cowper claims that this duty is derived from section 5–4–1(e)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–4–1(e)(4) (West 2010)). He alleged that if he had received proper credit for time served, the credit would have been greater than the sentence—that defendants breached their duty by failing to transmit to the IDOC the accurate number of days Cowper had been in custody for which he was entitled credit against his sentence. Because of the error in credit against his sentence, Cowper was incarcerated from June 2, 2011, through October 16, 2011—a period of 137 days. Cowper alleged that as a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence, he was deprived of his freedom and liberties which resulted in his inability to find and retain employment and an inability to be with and care for his family. Cowper asked the court to award him compensatory damages.

¶ 5 On March 1, 2012, defendants filed a motion seeking to dismiss Cowper's complaint pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2010)). Defendants claimed that Cowper's complaint was defective on its face and did not allege sufficient facts upon which a negligence cause of action could be sustained. Defendants argued that section 5–4–1(e)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections did not allow a private cause of action for negligence.

¶ 6 On July 6, 2012, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The trial court's stated reasoning frames the issues on appeal, and so we include portions of that order for reference:

“Before the Court is [Defendant]s' Motion to Dismiss. The Court GRANTS said Motion in respect to the [Defendant] Clerk. [Pursuant to the statute], the Clerk is required to send to DOC information he receives from the Sheriff concerning time served. No allegation has been made by [Plaintiff] that the [Defendant] Clerk failed to transmit such information. As transmission of such information is the only duty of the [Defendant] Clerk pursuant to said statute, and no allegation has been made that the [Defendant] Clerk failed to do so, [Plaintiff] has failed to allege a duty on the part of the [Defendant] Clerk, a breach of which would result in a cause of action. As [Defendant]'s Motion pertains to the [Defendant] Sheriff, said Motion is GRANTED as well for the reason that said statute fails to convey a private cause of action. * * * [Plaintiff] could have appealed from his sentence and/or filed a post-conviction petition to correct any wrong calculation of his good time credit. Therefore this action is not necessary to correct that wrong. Additionally, the statute is a criminal sentencing statute. [Plaintiff] is not part of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was designed. None of the other requirements are satisfied as well. [Plaintiff]'s Complaint is therefore dismissed.”

¶ 7 Cowper appeals this order.

¶ 8 LAW AND ANALYSIS

¶ 9 When the trial court is presented with a motion to dismiss a case for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–615 (West 2010)), the court must determine whether the complaint sets forth sufficient facts that, if established, could entitle the plaintiff to relief. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill.2d 77, 86, 220 Ill.Dec. 195, 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (1996). The trial court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw reasonable inferences from those facts that are favorable to the plaintiff. Bryson, 174 Ill.2d at 86, 220 Ill.Dec. 195, 672 N.E.2d at 1213. Because the trial court is not being called upon to judge any witness's credibility or weigh facts, on appeal we review the matter de novo. Jackson v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 294 Ill.App.3d 1, 9, 228 Ill.Dec. 333, 689 N.E.2d 205, 211 (1997).

¶ 10 We begin the legal analysis in this case by determining whether an inmate can pursue a private cause of action pursuant to section 5–4–1(e)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5–4–1(e)(4) (West 2010)). We note that Cowper has not cited, nor have we found, any reported case addressing whether an inmate can file a civil cause of action pursuant to section 5–4–1(e)(4) of the Code for errors in calculating credits.

¶ 11 In analyzing Cowper's claim that section 5–4–1(e)(4) of the Code allows a private cause of action, we review the statute itself to determine whether an express cause of action is allowed. Moore v. Lumpkin, 258 Ill.App.3d 980, 989, 196 Ill.Dec. 817, 630 N.E.2d 982, 989 (1994); Jordan v. O'Fallon Township High School District No. 203 Board of Education, 302 Ill.App.3d 1070, 1079, 235 Ill.Dec. 877, 706 N.E.2d 137, 143 (1999). If the court can determine the legislature's intent from the plain language of the statute, then the court should not resort to other interpretative aids. Jordan, 302 Ill.App.3d at 1079, 235 Ill.Dec. 877, 706 N.E.2d at 143 (citing People v. Fitzpatrick, 158 Ill.2d 360, 364–65, 198 Ill.Dec. 844, 633 N.E.2d 685, 687 (1994)).

¶ 12 Section 5–4–1(e)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:

“(e) The clerk of the court shall transmit to the department, agency or institution, if any, to which the defendant is committed, the following:

* * *

(4) the number of days, if any, which the defendant has been in custody and for which he is entitled to credit against the sentence, which information shall be provided to the clerk by the sheriff [.]” 730 ILCS 5/5–4–1(e)(4) (West 2010).

¶ 13 Section 5–4–1(e)(4) sets forth the actions the clerk of the court and the county sheriff must take in compiling and transmitting information regarding a defendant's credits against sentence. The use of the word “shall” generally indicates that the legislative intent is mandatory. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill.2d 435, 445, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935, 940 (1997). However, the language of the statute does not set forth any inmate rights in the event of an error in credit calculation. Thus, we find that the Code fails to provide an inmate with an express right to pursue a cause of action for an improper calculation of credits against sentence.

¶ 14 The fact that the wording of the statute does not expressly allow a...