Cowtown Found. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric.

• Docket Number: Civil Action 22-1258 (RC)
• Decision Date: 25 August 2023
• Parties: COWTOWN FOUNDATION, INC., et. al, Plaintiffs, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et. al, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

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COWTOWN FOUNDATION, INC., et. al, Plaintiffs,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et. al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-1258 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 25, 2023

Re Document Nos.: 122, 123, 132, 133

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge.

Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter Judgment; Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint; Denying Association Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Cowtown Foundation, Inc. (“Cowtown”) and Andrew Douglas on behalf of the Estate of Ed and Odell Douglas (“Douglas Estate”) brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief based on alleged discrimination by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) in administering financial assistance programs and a consent decree. Plaintiffs' complaint made seven claims against USDA and Thomas J. Vilsack, in his role as Secretary of Agriculture (collectively, “Federal Defendants”) for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. It also made one claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause against the Independent Community Bankers of America, the American Bankers Association, and the National Rural Lenders Association (collectively, “Association Defendants”). The Court granted both Federal Defendants' and Association Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See Cowtown Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 22-cv-1258, 2022 WL 16571189, at *1

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(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2022). Plaintiffs now bring a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and 60(b) to alter or amend that judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court presumes familiarity with the background laid out in its prior opinion. See Id. at *1-2. In that opinion, the Court held that Association Defendants are not state actors and therefore that the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims against them under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at *3. The Court further found that, even if it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Association Defendants, Plaintiffs failed to state a claim that Association Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at *4. As to Plaintiffs' claims against Federal Defendants, the Court found that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they failed to adequately allege that they suffered a concrete and particularized injury caused by Federal Defendants. Id. at *5-7.

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

A. Rule 59(e)

Under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment” within “28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).^[1] Motions under Rule 59(e) are “disfavored and relief from judgment is granted only when the moving party establishes extraordinary circumstances.” Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus, 153 F.Supp.2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001); see Schoenman v. FBI, 857 F.Supp.2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2012). Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) “should be used sparingly,” Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

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Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed. 2012)), and only granted in “rare circumstances,” Martin v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 321 F.R.D. 35, 38 (D.D.C. 2017).

Rule 59(e) does not permit the moving party to “relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)); see also Niedermeier, 153 F.Supp.2d at 28; Turner v. U.S. Capitol Police, No. 12-45, 2014 WL 169871, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2014). This is because “Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at ‘reconsideration, not initial consideration.'” Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (emphasis added) (quoting District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); see also Doe 1 v. Buratai, No. 17-cv-1033, 2018 WL 5650015, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2018) (“[A] Rule 59(e) motion is not the appropriate vehicle for relitigating questions the Court has already decided.”); Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle to present a new legal theory that was available prior to judgment[.]”).

District courts have “considerable discretion in ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion.” Lair v. Dep't of Treasury, No. Civ.A. 03-827, 2005 WL 1330722, at *1 (D.D.C. June 3, 2005) (quoting Rann v. Chao, 209 F.Supp.2d 75, 78 (D.D.C. 2002)). A Rule 59 motion may be granted only “(1) if there is an ‘intervening change of controlling law'; (2) if new evidence becomes available; or (3) if the judgment should be amended in order to ‘correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'” Leidos, 881 F.3d at 217 (quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). And in the Rule 59(e) context, “clear error” is a “very exacting standard,” Bond v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 286 F.R.D. 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted), “tantamount to a requirement that the judgment be ‘dead wrong,'” McNeil v. Brown, No. 17-cv-2602,

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2019 WL 1003583, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2019) (quoting Lardner v. FBI, 875 F.Supp.2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2012)). Similarly, “manifest injustice” under Rule 59(e) exists only if “a result . . . is fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.” Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., 12 F.Supp.3d 30, 3536 (D.D.C. 2013). The party seeking reconsideration bears the burden of establishing that relief should be granted under Rule 59(e). See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 811 F.Supp.2d 216, 226 (D.D.C. 2011).

B. Rule 60(b)

Under Rule 60(b), parties may seek relief from a final judgment “within a reasonable time” following the entry of the judgment for any of six enumerated reasons. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), (c); Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility, 309 F.R.D. 94, 97 (D.D.C. 2015). The reasons include, as relevant here, “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b),” id. 60(b)(2), and “any other reason that justifies relief,” id. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b) therefore “preserve[s] ‘the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant command of the court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.'” Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The Rule “cannot . . . be employed simply to rescue a litigant from strategic choices that later turn out to be improvident.” Id.

“The D.C. Circuit allows Rule 60(b) motions to challenge alleged legal errors only in the most extreme situations,” such as where “the district court based its legal reasoning on case law that it had failed to realize had recently been overturned.” Ward v. Kennard, 200 F.R.D. 137, 139 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451, 451-53 (D.C. Cir.

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1975)). District courts enjoy “a large measure of discretion” in deciding Rule 60(b) motions. Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857 (3d ed. 2012). “The party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to relief.” Oladokun, 309 F.R.D. at 97; see also Green v. AFL-CIO, 287 F.R.D. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 2012); Jarvis v. Parker, 13 F.Supp.3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2014).

IV. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs make no argument challenging the Court's judgment as to Association Defendants. Indeed, Association Defendants are not mentioned at all in Plaintiffs' motion. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiffs intended to make any motion as to Association Defendants under either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), they did not meet their burden.

As to Federal Defendants, Plaintiffs argue that relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) is appropriate based on overlapping arguments that (1) the Court misapplied the rules of standing in its earlier opinion, see Pls.' Mot. Alter J. at 2, ECF No. 122; and (2) Plaintiffs have standing to bring a conspiracy claim under the District of Columbia Human Right Act (DCHRA), see id. at 3. Although Plaintiffs do not clearly separate out their arguments under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b), the Court nonetheless reviews their allegations under both sets of standards.

A. Rule 59(e)

1. No Clear Error

Plaintiffs argue that “this Court's ruling [on November 1, 2022,] constituted clear error.” Id. at 2. It bears repeating that, in the Rule 59(e) context, “clear error” is “a very exacting standard,” Bond, 286 F.R.D. at 22 (quoting Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 355 F.Supp.2d 414, 422 (D.D.C. 2005)), only met when the judgment is “dead wrong” Lardner,

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875 F.Supp.2d at 53 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)).

In its previous opinion, the Court found that “Plaintiffs lack standing because they have failed to adequately allege that they suffered a concrete and particularized injury caused by Federal Defendants.” Cowtown, 2022 WL 16571189, at *5. Specifically, the Court first explained that Plaintiff the Douglas Estate “is mentioned in just one of the 145 paragraphs in the complaint,” which included “no factual allegations whatsoever . . . indicating that Mr. Douglas or the decedents whose estate he represents are affiliated with Cowtown or that the Douglas Estate was harmed by Defendants.” Id. Turning to Plaintiff Cowtown, the Court explained, with respect to organizational...