Lightfoot v. District of Columbia

Decision Date28 January 2005
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. 01-1484CKK.,CIV.A. 01-1484CKK.
Citation355 F.Supp.2d 414
PartiesElizabeth LIGHTFOOT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Duncan Norman Stevens, Miller & Chevalier, Chartered, Jeffrey S. Gutman, The George Washington University Law School, Jeffrey C. Walker, Securities and Exchange Commission Office of General Counsel, Kirk D. Williams, Law Offices of Kirk D. Williams, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Jacques Philippe Lerner, Office of Corporation Counsel, D.C., Laura Nachowitz Steel, Wilson Eiser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, Aaron L. Handleman, Eccleston & Wolf, Washington, DC, Alfred Long Scanlan, Jr., Eccleston and Wolf, P.C., Baltimore, MD, Laura E. Jordan, Law Offices of Laura E. Jordan, P.C., Washington, DC, Andrea Suzanne Marshall, S. Todd Willson, Eccleston & Wolf, P.C., Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in this case are members of a class of former and current District of Columbia employees whose disability compensation benefits were terminated, suspended, or reduced by the District of Columbia, its officials, and a third-party administrator. Plaintiffs brought the above-captioned action alleging, inter alia, that (1) Defendants' failure to adopt written and consistently applied standards, policies, and procedures governing the termination, suspension, and modification of their benefits violated the Due Process Clause; and (2) Defendants' implicit adoption of unwritten practices regarding the termination, suspension, and modification of Plaintiffs' disability benefits without publishing notice in the District of Columbia Register and without public comment violated the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act ("DCAPA"). In order to obtain judicial resolution as to these claims, Plaintiffs previously filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning Counts VI and VII contained within their Third Amended Complaint. This Court, in a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 24, 2004, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and found that Defendants' system of inadequate notice and insufficient process contravened both the fundamental guarantees of Due Process and the restrictions created by the DCAPA. See Lightfoot v. Dist. of Columbia, 339 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C.2004).

Currently pending before the Court is Government Defendants' Motion For Reconsideration, or to Alter or Amend the Order of September 24, 2004, or, in the Alternative, for Clarification of Such Order ("Motion to Reconsider"). Upon consideration of the Government Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs' Opposition, Government Defendants' Reply, Government Defendants' Notice Regarding Supplemental Authority, Plaintiffs' Response, and the entire record herein, the Court shall deny Government Defendants' Motion to Reconsider.

I: BACKGROUND

On July 6, 2001, Plaintiffs filed this action, initially seeking a preliminary injunction to reinstate their previously-denied disability benefits and to enjoin any future termination of benefits until the District of Columbia instituted a more thorough pre-termination process. In a Memorandum Opinion dated October 29, 2001, this Court, while finding a likelihood of success on the merits, denied Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction for failure to establish irreparable injury. Lightfoot v. Dist. of Columbia, Civ. No. 01-1484, at 21, 29 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2001) (memorandum opinion and order denying preliminary injunction).

After a series of amendments and discovery-related motions, Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Class Action Complaint on January 22, 2003. Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Third Am. Compl."). Named as Defendants were the District of Columbia, and the following who were sued in their official capacities as employees of the District of Columbia: Anthony Williams, Mayor of the District of Columbia; Gregory P. Irish, Director of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services; Milou Carolyn, Director of the District of Columbia Office of Personnel; and James Jacobs, Director of the District of Columbia Office of Risk Management (collectively, the "Government Defendants"). Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 10-14. Also named as a Defendant was CLW/Creative Disability Management ("CLW/CDM"), a private entity with which the District has contractually delegated the power to make determinations on disability compensation claims and to terminate, suspend, or modify existing benefit awards. Id. at ¶ 15.

In a ruling issued on January 14, 2004, this Court, over Defendant CLW/CDM's objections, approved Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Class Certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lightfoot, Civ. No. 01-1484, at 19 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2004) (memorandum opinion and order granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification). As such, the six named plaintiffs now represent a class that constitutes:

All persons who have received or will receive disability compensation benefits pursuant to D.C.Code § 1-623.1, et seq. and whose benefits have been terminated, suspended or reduced since June 27, 1998 or whose benefits may be terminated, suspended or reduced in the future. "Disability compensation benefits" is defined to exclude a scheduled award provided in D.C.Code § 1-623.7 expiring at the end of the statutory term, continuation of pay provided in D.C.Code § 1-623.18(a) expiring at the end of the statutory term, funeral expenses provided in D.C.Code § 1-623.34, a fully paid lump sum settlement provided in D.C.Code § 1-623.35, and credited compensation leave provided in D.C.Code § 1-623.43.

Id. at 4 (quoting Pls.' Renewed Mot. for Class Certification at 1).

After a series of unsuccessful settlement negotiations, the Court addressed Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning two counts contained within the Third Amended Complaint. Count VI alleges that Defendants' failure to adopt written and consistently applied standards, policies and procedures governing the termination, suspension, and modification of disability compensation benefits violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Third Am. Compl. at ¶ 142. Count VII alleges that the Government Defendants' implicit adoption of unwritten practices regarding the termination, suspension, and modification of disability benefits without publishing notice in the District of Columbia Register and without public comment violates D.C.Code § 2-505. Id. at ¶ 144.

The Court, in a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on September 24, 2004, granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Counts VI and VII. Lightfoot, 339 F.Supp.2d at 92, 95-96. Essentially, the Court's ruling consisted of two major holdings: First, the Court found that Defendants' system of vague, unwritten "best practices" employed under the current Disability Compensation Program ("the Program") provides "insufficient notice, opaque standards of review, and undetectable procedure" to such a degree that it violates the strictures of Due Process. Id. at 91. The Court identified specific considerations that Defendants should evaluate in issuing written guidelines to "make the `implicit' explicit and provide stakeholders with transparent guidelines and accountable administration." Id. at 92. Second, the Court concluded that the policies regarding eligibility for the disability benefit program constitute "rules" as defined by the DCAPA. Id. at 93. Because "Defendants' reliance on unwritten `best practices' and unpublished procedures to guide the Disability Compensation Program constitutes rule-making under the DCAPA," id. at 95, the Court found that Defendants failure to follow the notice and comment procedures outlined in D.C.Code § 2-505(a) renders those rules unlawful, id. at 96.

In the "Remedy" section of its September 24, 2004, Opinion and Order, the Court ordered that "the disability compensation benefits, both cash and medical, of all members of the Plaintiff class be reinstated as of the date of this Opinion and Order until individualized termination, modification, or suspension determinations may be made under validly promulgated rules." Id. While its ruling dealt with prospective relief for the class members, the Court reserved a ruling on possible retrospective relief, referring the parties to Magistrate Judge Facciola for possible resolution of "the issue of possible retroactive relief for Plaintiffs to recover monies for the period stretching from the date of the termination, modification or suspension of their benefits to the date of" the September 24, 2004 Opinion and Order. Id.

On October 6, 2004, Plaintiffs moved for an order requiring the District of Columbia to identify all class members and, in cooperation with Plaintiffs, arranging for their notification of the lawsuit and the Court's September 24, 2004, Opinion and Order. Pls.' Mot. for an Order Providing Notice to All Class Members. The Court, in an Order on November 3, 2004, referred this motion to Magistrate Judge Facciola for a Report and Recommendation to aid in the resolution of this complex issue. Lightfoot, No. 01-1484 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2004) (minute order referring Plaintiffs' motion for order providing notice to all class members to Magistrate Judge).

Subsequent to the Court's September 24, 2004, ruling, Government Defendants filed two motions on October 8, 2004, in an effort to forestall the consequences of the Court's holding. First, Government Defendants moved this Court for reconsideration and to alter or amend its Order, pursuant to the Court's authority and Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, to the extent that the Court did not reconsider, alter, or amend its order, for clarification thereof pursuant to this...

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