Cox v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 30 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CIV-13-821-HE |
| Parties | PAMELA S. COX, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Plaintiff Pamela S. Cox brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying Plaintiff's applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental sencurity income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1383f. United States District Judge Joe Heaton has referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Commissioner has answered and filed the administrative record (Doc. No. 11, hereinafter "R._"). The parties have briefed their positions, and the case is now ready for decision. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on April 14, 2010, alleging a disability onset date of November 1, 2008, and seeking benefits on the basis ofarthritis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), and high blood pressure. R. 104-14, 144, 148. Following denial of her applications initially and on reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was held on March 9, 2012. R. 21-40, 66. Plaintiff testified and was represented by an attorney at the hearing. R. 23-39. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on April 27, 2012. R. 11-17.
The Commissioner uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine entitlement to disability benefits. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged disability onset date through the date of the decision. R. 13; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571, 416.971. At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: hypertension, stable angina, COPD, nicotine addiction, and osteoarthritis. R. 13; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's condition did not meet or equal any of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings". R. 13-14; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).
The ALJ next assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") based on all of her impairments. R. 14-16; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform "the very wide range of light work" as defined by the relevant regulations:
Specifically, [Plaintiff] can lift, carry, push, and pull 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. She can stand and walk, with normal breaks, 6 hours total in an 8-hour workday. She can sit, with normal breaks, for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. She can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel and crawl. She can remember, understand, and carry [out] simple and some complex instructions and job tasks, make adaption to work situations, and respond appropriately to changes in routine work settings and processes. She can frequently relate[] to and interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the general public.
R. 14; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (defining "light work"); id. § 416.967(b) (same).
The ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff's past relevant work was considered light, unskilled work and was categorized as "housekeeper." R. 16. The ALJ recited that he reached this conclusion based upon Plaintiff's description of her past relevant work and on how such work is generally performed in the economy. R. 16 (citing Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT")); see DOT (4th rev. ed. 1991) 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783 (Cleaner, Housekeeping). The ALJ concluded that the work of housekeeper does not require Plaintiff to perform work-related activities that are precluded by Plaintiff's RFC. R. 16; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565, 416.965. On that basis, the ALJ held that Plaintiff had not been disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from November 1, 2008, through the date of the decision. R. 16; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's unfavorable determination of April 27, 2012, the final decision of the Commissioner. R. 1-5; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determiningwhether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and whether correct legal standards were applied. Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A decision is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it." Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court "meticulously examine[s] the record as a whole," including any evidence that may undercut or detract from the administrative law judge's findings, to determine if the substantiality test has been met. Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the court considers whether the Commissioner followed applicable rules of law in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, the court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff raises several claims of error on appeal. Plaintiff first alleges that the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff's RFC. Relatedly, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to perform the proper analysis in determining that Plaintiff's RFC allowed Plaintiff to perform her past relevant work. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess Plaintiff's credibility and complaints of pain. See Pl.'s Br. (Doc. No. 13) at 3-15.
The ALJ denied Plaintiff's claims at step four on the basis that Plaintiff retained the ability to return to her past job as housekeeper. R. 16. Step four of the sequential analysis comprises three phases:
In the first phase, the ALJ must evaluate a claimant's physical and mental residual functional capacity (RFC), and in the second phase, he must determine the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work. In the final phase, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the ability to meet the job demands found in phase two despite the mental and/or physical limitations found in phase one. At each of these phases, the ALJ must make specific findings.
Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *4 (Aug. 20, 1980); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's RFC assessment was not "accurate" because despite the ALJ having found that Plaintiff's COPD and left-shoulder osteoarthritis were severe impairments, the ALJ failed to impose limitations specifically based on those impairments in Plaintiff's RFC. Pl.'s Br. at 9-12.
Having found that Plaintiff was subject to "severe impairment(s)" that would "significantly limit[]" Plaintiff's ability to work, the ALJ was obligated to adequately address functional restrictions associated with those impairments See R. 13; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c), (e), (g); id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c), (e), (g). An RFC assessment is a determination "of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis." SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996). An ALJ may consider "only limitations andrestrictions attributable to medically determinable impairments" in determining a claimant's RFC. Id. at *2.
Here, as noted, although the ALJ found at step two that Plaintiff had a severe impairment of COPD, the ALJ did not include any specific environmental limitations deriving from Plaintiff's COPD in the RFC assessment. See R. 14-16. Contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, however, the reason for that determination was adequately supported and explained by the ALJ. In formulating the RFC, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff's testimony that she was unable to work due to afflictions including "respiratory/pulmonary difficulties." R. 15; see R. 32-33, 38-39. The ALJ concluded, however, that Plaintiff's COPD, among other conditions, is controlled by Plaintiff's medication and therapies. R. 15. The ALJ further noted: "Although the claimant's continued smoking has produced some progression of her COPD (October 2009 prebronchodilat[o]r [forced expiratory volume in one second] 1.75 compared to June 2010 prebronchodilator [forced expiratory volume in one second] of 1.56), there is no showing that she experienced marked deterioration of her respiratory/pulmonary functions to extent that oxygen therapy is required." R. 16; see R. 182, 243. In reaching his RFC, the ALJ referenced the lack of any showing that Plaintiff had experienced "frequent or prolonged acute episodes of . . . respiratory distress" "requiring hospital admissions, emergency room treatments, or other crisis treatments." R. 15-16.
Plaintiff did testify at the hearing that "dust, fumes, the heat," and temperature extremes affected...
To continue reading
Request your trial