Cox v. Department of Human Resources, 58099

• Decision Date: 07 September 1979
• Docket Number: No. 58099,58099
• Citation: 151 Ga.App. 257,259 S.E.2d 664
• Parties: COX v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 664

259 S.E.2d 664

151 Ga.App. 257

COX v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.

No. 58099.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Submitted July 2, 1979.

Decided Sept. 7, 1979.

Joseph M. Todd, Jonesboro, for appellant.

Larry A. Foster, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Carol Atha Cosgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

CARLEY, Judge.

Appellant, the natural father of a two-year old child, appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights to the child.

1. Appellant complains of the trial court's overruling of his objection to testimony of the representative of the Department of Human Resources concerning the representative's discussions with the natural mother of the child with regard to the conditions in the home. The department's representative explained that as the result of these discussions, further investigation ensued and culminated in the filing of the petition to terminate appellant's parental rights. Code Ann. § 38-302 provides that "(w)hen, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence, not as hearsay, but as original evidence." Since the testimony to which objection was made explained the conduct of the representative in connection with the subsequent investigation and the institution of this proceeding and was not offered for the purpose of showing the truth or falsity of any of the statements made, the same was admissible as original evidence. Johnson v. State, 149 Ga.App. 775, 776, 256 S.E.2d 51 (1979); Lundy v. State, 130 Ga.App. 171, 174(4), 202 S.E.2d 536 (1973); Farley v. State, 145 Ga.App. 98, 102, 243 S.E.2d 322 (1978).

2. We likewise find non-meritorious appellant's contention that the trial court erred in allowing the department's representative to testify as to her opinion concerning appellant's ability to care for the two-year old child. The representative whose opinion was attacked testified that she had known appellant for about ten years and that she had personally observed him many times including at least five separate occasions during the year immediately preceding the hearing in this case. This court has held that "it is well settled that when the subject matter of any inquiry relates to numerous facts perceived by the senses, from a series of instances passing under the observation of a witness, or to a variety of circumstances and a combination of appearances, which, under the limitation of language, cannot be adequately described and presented to the jury with the same force and clearness as they appeared to the witness, the witness may state his impressions drawn from, and opinions based upon, the facts and circumstances observed by him or the effect which they produced upon his mind." In the Interest of Gwen Smith, 143 Ga.App. 358, 360, 238 S.E.2d 725, 727 (1977). The representative's testimony was properly admitted.

3. The appellant contends that the findings of the juvenile court terminating appellant's parental rights are without foundation "in fact and in law" and that there is no evidence to support the order terminating appellant's parental rights. The order appealed from reveals that the juvenile court found "that in spite of constant intervention of the agencies, (appellant and his wife) have been unable to learn even the basic skills necessary to provide for the child." There was evidence that the child was often filthy, was given spoiled milk, was...