Cox v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 21 February 1913
• Docket Number: Nos. 17,837-(165).,s. 17,837-(165).
• Parties: ADA M. COX v. WILLIAM RUFUS EDWARDS.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

120 Minn. 512

ADA M. COX v. WILLIAM RUFUS EDWARDS.¹

Nos. 17,837-(165).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

February 21, 1913.

Action in the district court for Ramsey county to recover $25,000 for breach of promise to marry. The answer alleged a former action between the same parties, for the same cause of action, and the execution and delivery of a release of all claims thereunder upon the payment of $250. The reply admitted plaintiff signed her name to a writing, but denied knowledge of its contents, and set up that the signature was obtained by fraud, duress and overreaching of plaintiff, and not with her will, knowledge and consent. The case was tried before Kelly, J., and a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $15,208. Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied, and a motion for a new trial was granted unless plaintiff consented to a reduction of the verdict to $12,500. Plaintiff consented to the reduction. From the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granting the motion for a new trial, unless plaintiff agreed to the reduction of the verdict, defendant appealed. Order affirmed so far as it denied judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Order reversed so far as it denied a new trial.

Owen Morris, for appellant.

Drill & Drill and Stan J. Donnelly, for respondent.

HOLT, J.

The action is for damages for breach of promise to marry, wherein the defense is a denial of the promise, and also a settlement and release of the cause of action. The trial resulted in a large verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appeals from the order denying his alternative motion for judgment non obstante veredicto or a new trial.

We apprehend that the reputation of neither party to this action will be enhanced by a discussion of the testimony herein. Nor are we disposed to sully the pages of our Reports with the same, except in so far as it may be necessary to allude thereto in considering the errors alleged.

In denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the court stated that the question whether or not plaintiff's cause of action was not barred by the release was a close one. With this opinion we fully agree. We are also of the opinion that the question is extremely close whether the evidence supports the finding that defendant ever promised to marry plaintiff. The improbability of such a promise being made under the circumstances detailed by plaintiff, want of any allusion to marriage in the voluminous correspondence of the parties after the time of the alleged engagement, and their subsequent conduct, wholly at variance with what would be expected if an engagement of marriage existed between them, strongly corroborates the contention of defendant that no promise was ever made. With some hesitancy we have, however, come to the conclusion that the trial court was justified in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant.

But, where a verdict has so doubtful or meager support in the evidence, the inference of prejudice from errors in rulings or inadequate instructions becomes persuasive and strong. The learned and experienced trial judge manifested his fairness and impartiality to the litigants, and a desire that the jury should also be imbued with the idea that as between plaintiff and defendant the pot should not call the kettle black. But on one phase of the controversy the legal rights of defendant were not fully protected by the charge.

Previous to the institution of the present action, plaintiff, through another attorney, had begun an action against defendant for the same cause. Subsequently the parties met, and, as defendant claims, settled the cause of action. In the instant case the defendant pleaded this settlement as a bar, setting out the written contract of settlement and release, signed and acknowledged by plaintiff. In her reply plaintiff admitted the execution of the instrument, but sought to avoid it by alleging that it was obtained by fraud and duress. Under the issue thus raised the burden rested on plaintiff to show that the release was so procured. The law is to the effect that the written instrument "becomes a `strong wall of evidence,' not to be lightly overcome by unsatisfactory oral testimony." McCall v. Bushnell, 41 Minn. 37, 42 N. W. 545. Justice Mitchell, in Cummings v. Baars, 36 Minn. 350, 354, 31 N. W. 449, says: "There is a strong presumption that the written instrument, which the parties have deliberately executed, expresses their intentions; and if the written contract is to go for nothing, and the one party may oppose his oath to that of the other as to fraud, written contracts would amount to very little."

In Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. 67 Minn. 94, 98, 69 N. W. 640, the court observes that "where a party has, for a valuable consideration, executed a solemn instrument of release, there ought to be pretty strong and clear evidence impeaching it to warrant a court or jury in avoiding it." In Winter v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 118 Minn. 487, 136 N. W. 1089, the trial court charged the jury, with reference to a release pleaded as a defense to which plaintiff replied that it was obtained by fraud, that "the burden was on the plaintiff, to establish the alleged fraud by evidence clear and convincing to a reasonable certainty," and Chief Justice Start, in writing the opinion, characterized the instructions of the court as "clear and fair, neither party excepting to any of them." Section 8374, 3 Dunnell, Minn. Digest, states that the evidence of fraud must be clear. In cases like the one now before the court, where a formal release executed by plaintiff is set up as a defense, and plaintiff seeks to avoid its legal effect on the ground that it was procured through the fraud or deception of defendant, the burden is undoubtedly on plaintiff to prove the fraud, for the presumption is also in aid of the validity of the writing on that score. Of course, what is here said as to fraud is equally applicable to duress.

In the charge the court wholly omitted to state upon which litigant rested the burden of proof upon this issue, and no reference was made to the quality or character of evidence required to sustain the charge of fraud or duress. In fact, the inference from the charge is rather that defendant had the burden of proof on this proposition; for, in speaking of the release, the court says:

"I present this question at the outset, because, if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff signed and delivered the release freely and voluntarily, and was not fraudulently deceived by the defendant, or coerced by threats by him...