Cox v. General Motors Corp.
Citation | 369 S.E.2d 525,187 Ga.App. 176 |
Decision Date | 16 May 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 76318,76318 |
Parties | COX et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Carol D. Sweet, Decatur, for appellants.
Myra H. Dixon, Moultrie, for appellee.
Nick and Lisa Cox filed an action in multiple counts against General Motors Corporation, alleging that an automobile they purchased was defective. The jury returned a verdict in favor of General Motors, and after denial of their motion for a new trial, the Coxes appeal.
In their sole enumeration of error, appellants contend the trial court deprived them of their right to a fair and impartial jury verdict by impermissibly expressing an opinion when responding to a question posed by the jurors during the course of their deliberations. The question posed by the jurors was as follows: After thorough discussion with counsel, and general agreement of the parties, the court called the jury back into the courtroom and responded to their question on the record, instructing them that rather than rereading any portions of the charge, she would state that Appellants do not except to this portion of the recharge, and admit that these instructions were completely in accordance with the agreements reached by the court and the parties moments before. However, the court went on to state: Appellants enumerate as error this latter portion of the recharge, contending that it placed undue emphasis on liability, thereby impermissibly intimating the opinion that the jury's previously announced intention to award damages in favor of appellants was wrong. We do not agree.
First, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Chandler, 152 Ga.App. 427, 432(2), 263 S.E.2d 171 (1979). Thus, appellants may not rely on the jury's indication that it was considering a monetary award in favor of them.
Second, it is clear that unlike the situation in Garner v. Young, 214 Ga. 109, 103 S.E.2d 302 (1958), Benefield v. Benefield, 224 Ga. 208, 160 S.E.2d 895 (1968), and Graham v. Malone, 105 Ga.App. 863, 126 S.E.2d 272 (1962), cases cited by appellants, in which the trial court's remarks clearly expressed an opinion and removed at least one issue from jury consideration, in the case sub judice the trial court's answer did not itself express an opinion. Rather, because the jury did not ask the court about liability but the trial court's response made reference to that issue, appellants' objection to the recharge is based on a perceived overemphasis on the question of liability. However, the trial court "has a discretion in supplementing the charge or in giving an additional charge to the jury." Southern R. Co. v. Lee, 59 Ga.App. 316, 319(6), 200 S.E. 569 (1938), cited in Barnes v. State, 71 Ga.App. 9,...
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...has or has not been proved." The charge must be viewed as a whole to determine whether the trial court violated OCGA § 9-10-7. See Cox v. Gen. Motors Corp.29 Here, the court prefaced its reading of the contested charge with a clear statement that it was about to discuss the "plaintiffs' con......
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