Cox v. HP Inc.

• Citation: 368 Or. 477,492 P.3d 1245
• Decision Date: 05 August 2021
• Docket Number: SC S067138
• Court: Supreme Court of Oregon
• Parties: William COX and Diosdada "Josie" Cox, Plaintiffs, v. HP INC., dba HP Computing and Printing, Inc., a foreign corporation; Charter Mechanical Contractors, Inc., dba Charter Mechanical, an Oregon corporation; and Spirax Sarco, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendants. HP Inc., dba HP Computing and Printing, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Adverse Party, v. TÜV Rheinland of North America, Inc., a foreign corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Relator, and Proton Energy Systems, Inc., a foreign corporation, Third-Party Defendant.

368 Or. 477

492 P.3d 1245

William COX and Diosdada "Josie" Cox, Plaintiffs,

v.HP INC., dba HP Computing and Printing, Inc., a foreign corporation; Charter Mechanical Contractors, Inc., dba Charter Mechanical, an Oregon corporation; and Spirax Sarco, Inc., a foreign corporation, Defendants.

HP Inc., dba HP Computing and Printing, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Adverse Party,

v.TÜV Rheinland of North America, Inc., a foreign corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Relator,andProton Energy Systems, Inc., a foreign corporation, Third-Party Defendant.

SC S067138

Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc.

Argued and submitted November 16, 2020.

August 5, 2021

William P. Taaffe, Smith Freed Eberhard PC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for adverse party. Also on the brief was Sean K. Conner.

David W. Cramer, MB Law Group LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for relator. Also on the briefs was Jonathan M. Hoffman.

FLYNN, J.

This case requires us to revisit the requirements for Oregon to exercise specific personal jurisdiction in claims against an out-of-state defendant, in the wake of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court , 592 U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021). The action stems from the explosion of a hydrogen generator at the campus of HP, Inc., which severely injured plaintiff William Cox. After Cox and his wife filed suit against HP in an Oregon court, HP brought a third-party claim against relator, TÜV Rheinland of North America, Inc. (TÜV). HP alleged that TÜV—a Delaware company that tests and certifies products manufactured by others as conforming to established industry safety standards—had negligently certified the design of the generator at issue in this case. TÜV sought to dismiss HP's claim against TÜV for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and TÜV sought an alternative writ of mandamus, which this court allowed.

In the mandamus proceeding before us, there is no suggestion that TÜV has the kind of "continuous operations" within Oregon that are "so substantial and of such a nature" as to give rise to general personal jurisdiction.¹ See Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. , 354 Or. 572, 578, 316 P.3d 287 (2013) (explaining the nature of general personal jurisdiction (internal quotation marks omitted)). But there also is no dispute that TÜV has some contacts with Oregon that might support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over TÜV in some case. That posture focuses the dispute in this case on the limits of what we have called the "relatedness" requirement of specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 581, 316 P.3d 287. This court explored the requirement in Robinson , ultimately concluding that the plaintiff's claims for negligent repair work performed in Idaho were not related to the Idaho defendant's only "relevant" Oregon activity—"generalized website promotions"—"in a manner that allows our courts to exercise specific jurisdiction." Id. at 595-96, 316 P.3d 287. And the Supreme Court explored the requirement in Ford Motor Co. , ultimately concluding that Ford's extensive activities in the forum states created a "relationship among the defendant, the forums, and the litigation" that was "close enough to support specific jurisdiction." 592 U.S. at ––––, 141 S. Ct. at 1032 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). But those cases arose in factual contexts at opposite ends of the spectrum, whereas this case falls in the uncharted middle.

Thus, the question in this case is whether there is a connection between TÜV's Oregon activities and HP's claim against TÜV that is sufficient to permit Oregon to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over TÜV. See id. (concluding that the connection between the plaintiffs’ claims and the defendant's activities in the forum states was "close enough to support specific jurisdiction").² Ultimately, under the specific facts of this case, we conclude that Oregon lacks personal jurisdiction to resolve HP's claim against TÜV. Accordingly, we issue a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the claim against TÜV.

I. INTRODUCTION TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION

In a civil case, an Oregon court having subject matter jurisdiction also has jurisdiction over a properly served out-of-state defendant if the exercise of personal jurisdiction is authorized under ORCP 4, Oregon's "long-arm statute," and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction is compatible with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.³ Robinson , 354 Or. at 576-77, 316 P.3d 287 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 918, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011), for the proposition that "[a] state court's assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the State's coercive power, and is therefore subject to review for compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"); ORCP 4 L. Among the bases on which ORCP 4 authorizes personal jurisdiction is a "catchall provision under ORCP 4 L that confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process."⁴

Robinson , 354 Or. at 576-77, 316 P.3d 287. Accordingly, our inquiries under ORCP 4 L and the Due Process Clause collapse into one. In that inquiry, "this court is guided by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the constitutionality of [a court's] exercise [of personal jurisdiction] under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." State ex rel Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope , 317 Or. 151, 156, 854 P.2d 461 (1993) ; accord Robinson , 354 Or. at 577, 316 P.3d 287.

As we explained in Robinson , under Supreme Court precedent, a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant "comports with due process" if sufficient contacts exist "between the defendant and the forum state such that maintaining suit in the state would ‘not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ " 354 Or. at 577-78, 316 P.3d 287 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291-92, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980) ). Another way of articulating the rule is that due process is "satisfied if ‘the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he [or she] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’ " Id. at 578, 316 P.3d 287 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559 (brackets in Robinson )). For those defendants whose contacts with Oregon are not "so substantial" as to give rise to so-called "general jurisdiction," which would permit Oregon to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even "on causes of actions arising from dealings entirely distinct from" the defendant's Oregon activities, those Oregon contacts nevertheless may permit the state to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in a specific case before it. Id. at 578-79, 316 P.3d 287 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specific jurisdiction "covers defendants less intimately connected with a State [than does general jurisdiction], but only as to a narrower class of claims." Ford Motor Co. , 592 U.S. at ––––, 141 S. Ct. at 1024.

As set out above, the issue in this mandamus proceeding is whether the demands of due process permit Oregon to exercise specific personal jurisdiction—also called "case-linked" jurisdiction. See Ford Motor Co. , 592 U.S. at ––––, 141 S. Ct. at 1024 (explaining that specific jurisdiction is sometimes called "case-linked" jurisdiction). The justification for permitting a state to exercise specific personal jurisdiction is rooted in the principle that, when a nonresident defendant engages in business activity in the forum state, it is "reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there." Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945) (allowing the State of Washington to enforce unemployment insurance fund obligations against a nonresident defendant doing business through employees working in the state).

II. BACKGROUND OF THIS CASE

The primary claims in this case are those filed by Cox and his wife against HP after Cox was severely injured in the explosion of a Proton H Series Hydrogen Generator, a piece of equipment manufactured by Proton Energy Systems, Inc. in Connecticut.⁵ HP had purchased the hydrogen generator from Proton for use at the HP Corvallis campus. Plaintiffs brought several claims against HP, alleging that HP had made changes to Proton's generator that had rendered it unsafe. HP, in turn, filed a third-party claim for contribution against TÜV.⁶

TÜV is a nationally recognized testing laboratory (NRTL), meaning that it has been officially approved by the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to perform independent testing of equipment and materials that will be used in a workplace and to certify that they conform to established industry safety standards. See 29 CFR § 1910.7 (2020) (defining and setting out requirements for nationally recognized testing laboratories). TÜV had been retained by Proton to evaluate and certify the design of the H Series Hydrogen Generator as in conformance with applicable industry safety standards,⁷ and TÜV performed that work at Proton's facility in Connecticut. In HP's third-party claim for contribution, it alleged that Proton had designed the hydrogen generator to contain a component part that was defective or otherwise not suitable for use with a combustible fluid like hydrogen; that, despite the defect, TÜV had certified the Proton generator "as meeting applicable standards for the operation of hydrogen generators" of that type; and that, in doing so, TÜV had been negligent and a cause of the injuries that plaintiffs had alleged.

TÜV...