Cox v. Kirch
Decision Date | 16 March 1942 |
Docket Number | 28562. |
Citation | 123 P.2d 328,12 Wn.2d 678 |
Parties | COX v. KIRCH. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Action by George Cox against John C. Kirch to recover for injuries sustained when plaintiff was struck by defendant's automobile. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, Stevens County; W. Lon Johnson, Judge.
Smith Troy and John E. Belcher, both of Olympia, for appellant.
O. G Follevaag, of Deer Park, and Williams & Cooney, of Spokane for respondent.
Plaintiff a pedestrian, brought suit for damages for personal injuries which he sustained in a collision with an automobile driven by the defendant. The court heard the case without a jury and found: 'That the defendant was operating said automobile at a greater speed than what was reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation, and commenced to pull his car to the left of the center line of the highway, about 150 to 175 feet Before striking the plaintiff, and at the point of colliding with plaintiff, the defendant was four feet on the south [his left] side of the yellow center line of said highway.'
The court further found that the defendant 'skidded his car' thirty-five feet Before and thirty feet after striking the plaintiff, which indicated excessive speed; that defendant failed to exercise due care when he observed plaintiff on the highway two hundred feet distant, and negligently and carelessly drove his car to the left of the center of the highway, striking and injuring the plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff was entered, and defendant appealed.
Appellant does not challenge the trial court's findings as to his own negligence. As stated in his opening brief, his assignments of error raise only the question whether the record shows that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence.
There was no court reporter functioning at the trial, and the statement of facts consists of a narrative summary of the testimony of the witnesses. The facts which bear upon the one question under consideration are as follows: The highway on which the accident occurred extends easterly and westerly through the unincorporated town of Clayton. There was no direct testimony as to its width. A map admitted in evidence as an exhibit, which appears to be a blue-print copy of the plat of Clayton, depicts it as sixty feet wide, but evidently that is the width of the entire right of way. From another exhibit, a picture of the scene of the collision, the roadway appears to consist of a central oil surfaced portion about twenty feet wide, flanked on either side by a graded shoulder.
At 4:30 in the afternoon of October 27, 1939, respondent left the brickyard on the north side of the highway, where he was employed, and started to walk across the road to the southerly side, following a pathway which the brickyard workers have used for sixteen years. At the same time appellant was approaching along the highway from the east. As respondent stood on the north shoulder, facing south, the highway to his left (east) was straight for at least a thousand feet, while to his right (west), it turned southward in a pronounced curve. Respondent testified:
A Clayton storekeeper testified that he heard the crash of the collision and saw respondent 'up in the air,' with his arms stretched out, in front of appellant's car; that respondent 'was on the south side of the yellow line when he was hit'; and that appellant's car came to rest at the curb on the south side of the highway, about thirty-five feet from the point of impact.
Another witness for respondent stated that he heard a loud crash and, upon runnin across the road, found respondent in the gutter on the south side. There had been a slight mist, he said, and the pavement was wet and
The appellant's version of the accident was as follows:
On cross-examination, appellant stated:
An employee of the brickyard company, a witness for appellant, testified that he was crossing the road about three hundred feet east of the point where the collision occurred when he heard a crash and a horn 'about the same time.' On cross-examination, he stated that he did not know how fast appellant's car was going, 'but I would say about 25 or 30 miles an hour.'
Another brickyard workman, also called as a witness for appellant said that he had worked with respondent 'practically all afternoon on the date of the accident'; that 'The place is noisy and leaves one deaf for about two hours'; that he had crossed the highway from the brickyard somewhat ahead of respondent, and, when he reached the sidewalk on the south side and turned around On cross-examination, he testified he did not know why he had...
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