Cox v. National Jockey Club

• Decision Date: 11 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 60316,60316
• Citation: 323 N.E.2d 104,25 Ill.App.3d 160
• Parties: Roger COX, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL JOCKEY CLUB, an Illinois corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 104

323 N.E.2d 104

25 Ill.App.3d 160

Roger COX, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL JOCKEY CLUB, an Illinois corporation, et al Defendants-Appellants.

No. 60316.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Dec. 11, 1974.

Thomas D. Nash, Jr., Robert M. Ahern, Thomas J. Cisar, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

Coghlan & Joyce, William J. Nellis, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

ADESKO, Presiding Justice.

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order of the trial court granting the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction against the defendants. This appeal is brought pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 110A, par. 307(a)(1).)

Plaintiff, Roger Cox, is a jockey and brought suit against the defendants seeking injunctive relief. Plaintiff sought an order which would prohibit the defendants from excluding him from participating as a jockey in a thoroughbred horse racing meet to be conducted by the National Jockey Club. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that plaintiff is engaged in the occupation of a jockey for profit and that he was issued his 1974 jockey license by the Illinois Racing Board on April 17, 1974. The defendant, National Jockey Club, is an Illinois Corporation that conducts thoroughbred horse racing meets and was licensed by the Illinois Racing Board to hold such a meeting at Sportsman's Park, Cicero, Illinois, commencing April, 19, 1974. The individual defendants, Bidwill, Johnston and Scott are respectively the president, secretary and entry clerk of the National Jackey Club.

Plaintiff's complaint stated that on and prior to April 17, 1974, he had been employed to ride several horses which had been entered in the races to be held by the defendants on April 19, 1974 at Sportsman's Park. Plaintiff was so employed by four different horse trainers. The fact of this employment was communicated by plaintiff to the National Jockey Club and defendant Bidwill. Plaintiff's complaint stated that 'on April 17, 1974, after plaintiff Roger Cox had been issued his 1974 license as a jockey by the Illinois Racing Board, and during the drawing of races for Friday, April 19, 1974, defendant National Jockey Club and its officers and employees, including defendants Charles W. Bidwill, Jr. and Thomas Scott, and other persons unknown to plaintiff Roger Cox, by concerted, arbitrary and unlawful action caused the name of plaintiff Roger Cox to be removed, eliminated and scratched from the listing of all horses he had been employed and retained to ride on Friday, April 19, 1974, * * * with the direct result of malicious and unlawful interference with the employment and contractual relationships of plaintiff Roger Cox and his inability to conduct his business as a jockey on April 19, 1974, and thereafter, and extensive damages to his business reputation.' Plaintiff alleged that the defendants had a duty and obligation under the laws of Illinois not to interfere directly or indirectly with him in his business and occupation as a jockey and not to interfere directly or indirectly with him in his business employment and contractual relationships with third persons. Plaintiff alleged financial damages by virtue of the defendants' interference with his business, employment, and contractual relationships and damages to his reputation.

Plaintiff's complaint also stated that unless plaintiff was awarded a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before 7:00 a.m. on Friday, April 19, 1974, he would suffer immediate and irreparable injury in that he would be prevented from employment as a jockey not only on April 19, but throughout the horse racing meet to be conducted by defendant, National Jockey Club, at Sportsman's Park during 1974. It was at that hour that the programs for the races to be held on April 19, were to be printed which would include the names of the jockeys riding the horses entered in the races for that day. As previously stated, plaintiff requested that the trial court grant a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against the defendants. In addition the plaintiff's prayer for relief requested that upon a final hearing and determination the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction be made permanent and that plaintiff be awarded a judgment including actual damages, exemplary damages, a reasonable attorneys' fee and costs.

The plaintiff's complaint was filed on April 18, 1974 and at the same time plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. The defendant responded to the plaintiff's complaint and motion by filing a motion to dismiss on April 18, 1974. The motion to dismiss was premised on the grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which any relief could be granted; the complaint was insufficient in law; the complaint did not state sufficient facts upon which the relief requested could be granted; that since the National Jockey Club is a private corporation it can exclude any person from its premises or deny any person racing privileges for any reason except race, color, creed or place of national origin; and that the allegations of the complaint failed to establish any unlawful corporate conduct or conduct by any of the individual defendants which would permit the granting of the relief requested.

On April 18, 1974, after a hearing, the trial court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. The trial court's order prohibited the National Jockey Club and the individual defendants from (1) directly or indirectly interfering with the lawful business and occupation of the plaintiff as a licensed jockey; (2) from directly of indirectly interfering with the business, employment and contractual relationships of the plaintiff as a licensed jockey; (3) from directly or indirectly causing plaintiff or his name to be removed from any horse he had been employed or retained to ride as a jockey; and (4) from directly or indirectly impeding plaintiff in the lawful pursuit of his business and relationships as a licensed jockey at Sportsman's Park race track throughout the 1974 horse racing meet being conducted by the National Jockey Club at Sportsman's Park. In addition, the trial court found that there was no just cause for delay in any enforcement of or appeal from its order. The defendants appeal and seek a reversal of the trial court's order.

The defendants maintain that a private corporation which is licensed by the State to conduct a horse racing meet on privately owned premises may unqualifiedly deny a licensed jockey permission to participate in its racing meet if the exclusion is not based upon reasons of race, religion, color or national origin. The plaintiff contends that a licensee conducting a horse racing meet in Illinois cannot arbitrarily and without reason or justification exclude a licensed jockey from participation in its meet. The plaintiff's contention is premised on three grounds: (1) that the license issued to him by the Illinois Racing Board constitutes a ticket of admission to any race track in which he desires to ply his trade; (2) that the rules and regulations adopted by the Illinois Racing Board regarding stewards and their power and authority indicate that the licensee conducting a horse racing meet is to relinquish all control over such meet to the stewards; and (3) that by virtue of section 2 of the Horse Racing Act (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 8, par. 37b.) the National Jockey Club had a monopoly over thoroughbred horse racing at the time in question and therefore, could not exclude a jockey without reason or justification. While we do not agree with the plaintiff's position in all respects, we are of the opinion that a private corporation licensed by the State of Illinois to conduct a horse racing meet on private property cannot arbitrarily deny a licensed jockey permission to participate in its racing meet.

A license issued to a jockey by the Illinois Racing Board does not constitute a ticket of admission to any race track in which the jockey desires to ply his trade. The Horse Racing Act, § 3.1, allows the Illinois Racing Board to issue licenses to jockeys 'to engage in their vocation within such race track enclosures.' (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, ch. 8, par. 37c--2.) The information which the applicant is required to supply, the procedures the Board is to follow in issuing a license and the reasons upon which the Board can refuse to issue a license indicate that this provision of the Act is primarily directed toward preventing undesirables from engaging in horse racing activities. As was stated in Town of Cicero v. Weilander, 35 Ill.App.2d 456, 461, 183 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1962):

'The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not exist without it, and it may be to regulate and control the occupation or privilege for which the license is granted, so as to subserve the public good or prevent its being conducted in a manner injurious to the public welfare, or to raise revenue. 53 C.J.S. Licenses, § 2.'

Although an applicant for a jockey's license is required to pay a fee, section 3.1 of the Horse Racing Act is not primarily intended to raise revenue. Its purpose is to regulate and control the occupation of a jockey and to insure that the occupation is...