Coy v. Kansas City, Mo.
Decision Date | 12 June 1922 |
Docket Number | No. 14394.,14394. |
Citation | 243 S.W. 418 |
Parties | COY v. KANSAS CITY, MO. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Charles A. Pence, Judge.
"Not to be officially published."
Action by Hattie Coy against Kansas City, Mo. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
E. Harbor and Ilus M. Lee, both of Kansas City, for appellant.
Milton J. Oldham, of Kansas City, for respondent.
Plaintiff's action is to recover damages received in a fall upon an icy sidewalk, breaking her arm. Nine jurors found for her and returned a verdict of $2,500. Defendant, unsuccessful in its efforts to prevent a judgment being rendered therein in her favor, has appealed.
At the conclusion of the testimony in. plaintiff's side of the case, defendant offered a demurrer to the evidence, and when it was overruled declined to introduce any testimony. Whether plaintiff made any case entitling her to go to the jury is therefore the most important Question herein.
Plaintiff's own testimony, and that offered in her behalf, shows the following state of facts:
Later she said it had snowed some few days before, and the thawing and freezing had caused ice to form there, and evidently the reference in the first statement to the thawing and melting and subsequent freezing has reference to snow, rather than to rain or sleet.
From the general statement above, it might readily be inferred that there was,. at the one place where she fell, a formation of snow and ice caused by snow changed into ice by being compacted or by melting and then freezing, and that, as this was "rough and uneven," it constituted at that place an obstruction or defect for which the city would be liable, and which the snow of the night before covered and hid so that plaintiff could not see it, and consequently all these things would make a case for the jury. But when plaintiff and her witnesses were called upon to specify and explain the facts sustaining such general statement, it is manifest that no such situation is presented. The facts to which they testify show only the following:
That some four or five days before the fall, there was a snow, which was general in extent, and this snow "kind of thawed in the day and froze at night," and while in a thawing condition or state of slush the footprints of persons walking through it were left therein, and these impressions froze at night, creating the "rough and uneven" condition referred to, and this thawing and freezing converted the melting snow into ice, which was "all over the walk" and over other walks the same way, except, of course, at some places where the snow and slush had been entirely cleaned off. The walks that had not been cleaned "were in the same condition as this walk." It had "thawed at some time before, and the people walking over it when it was in that slushy, mushy condition had left their footprints," and these footprints were all over the sidewalk. Such was the condition at 3:30 the afternoon before plaintiff's fall, and the weather that night turned suddenly colder, and froze the footprints into hard and set form. There was no evidence showing any ridge or elevation such as would constitute any dangerous obstruction. One of plaintiff's witnesses in testifying as to the condition the afternoon before when she passed along, said, "it was just slick then, and there was no snow, and the next morning there was snow." But plaintiff's counsel immediately asked this witness, "That [what] was the condition, rough?" and she then said it was "rough," and later said, "Well, it was `slick and rough.'" "It was slick and kind of rough," and when asked which was it, was it slick or was it rough, answered, "It had the footprints in it where it kind of thawed in the day and froze at night, and didn't have any snow on it."
In describing conditions at the time of plaintiff's fall, the above-mentioned witness said:
It was "slick and rough, real rough.
Another of plaintiff's witnesses, a man who passed over the walk in question practically every day, said that snow and ice had been on the walk for several days, ...
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Walsh v. City of St. Louis
... ... of St. Louis ... (1) It ... is essential to plaintiff's cause of action to prove ... compliance with Section 7493, Revised Statutes 1929, ... regarding notice of accident. Sec. 7493, R. S. 1929; Cole ... v. St. Joseph, 50 S.W.2d 623; Shuff v. Kansas ... City, 257 S.W. 844; Kling v. Kansas City, 61 ... S.W.2d 411, 227 Mo.App. 1248; Rice v. Kansas City, ... 16 S.W.2d 659; Reid v. Kansas City, 192 S.W. 1047 ... (a) A municipality is not liable for injury resulting soley ... from a general condition of snow and ice where the condition ... ...
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Walsh v. St. Louis, 36605.
...v. Kansas City, 192 Mo. App. 574, 188 S.W. 239; Armstrong v. Monett, 228 S.W. 771; Gist v. St. Joseph, 220 S.W. 722; Coy v. Kansas City, 243 S.W. 418; 25 Amer. Juris., p. 796; 13 R.C.L., p. 413; 7 McQuillin on Municipal Corp., p. 192; Broburg v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 523; Huston v. Council B......
- Rice v. Kansas City
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Rice v. Kansas City
...down by this court in Lueking v. Sedalia, above cited. We hold this not to be contrary to the rulings in the cited cases of Coy v. City (Mo. App.) 243 S. W. 418; Vonkey v. St. Louis, 219 Mo. 37, 45, 117 S. W. 733; Snyder v. Kansas City, 218 Mo. App. 24, 262 S. W. 695; Wheat v. St. Louis, 17......