Coyle v. Taunton Safe Deposit & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1913
• Citation: 216 Mass. 156,103 N.E. 288
• Parties: COYLE et al. v. TAUNTON SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

216 Mass. 156

103 N.E. 288

COYLE et al. v. TAUNTON SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

November 25, 1913

COUNSEL

Frederick S. Hall, of Taunton, in pro. per.

Samuel D. Conant, of Greenfield, for defendants Augustus C. Walker and others.

Geo. A Sweetser, of Boston, for defendants B. Baker and others.

F. E Sweet, of Brockton, for defendants Bridgewater Savings Bank and others.

Wm Reed Bigelow, of Boston, for defendant Charlotte H. Conant.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

1. The single justice found that the final decree dismissing the bill of Nichols against these defendants, reported in 203 Mass. 551, 89 N.E. 1035, was entered on the ground of a defect in the preliminary proceedings, and not upon the merits. But it is contended that the entry of the decree, 'Bill dismissed,' after a hearing upon the merits, is of itself an absolute bar to the maintenance of another bill between the same parties for the same cause of action, and that evidence to show that the decree was entered, not upon the merits, but for some other reason which did require a dismissal of the bill, but did not go to the real merits of the case, cannot be received Reliance for this contention is put mainly upon the cases of Bigelow v. Winsor, 1 Gray, 299, and Foote v. Gibbs, 1 Gray, 412. Some of the language used in those opinions, taken by itself, would support this position. In the first of them, it was said that 'a plea in bar stating the dismissal of a former bill is conclusive against a new bill if the dismissal was upon hearing and if that dismissal be not in direct terms without prejudice.' But in that case, as the opinion goes on the show, the decree in the former suit stated the grounds upon which it was made and thereby showed that it had been entered upon the merits and that the point afterwards sought to be raised had been tried and determined in the former suit. The language which we have quoted must be limited to the circumstances thus presented, or it would be the merest dictum. And in the second case nothing more appeared than that the bill, after issue joined, had been dismissed upon the defendants' motion. There was nothing to indicate that the dismissal had not been made upon the merits. Prima facie, at least, it is abundantly settled that this would be so. Corbett v. Craven, 193 Mass. 30, 78 N.E. 748. But in neither of these cases was it decided, and so far as we have been able to discover it never has been decided in this commonwealth, that where a bill has been dismissed, though the decree was without qualifying words, evidence either from the record or dehors that record may not be received to show what was the actual ground of the dismissal.

Exactly the contrary has been held by this court. In Butchers' Slaughtering & Melting Ass'n v. Boston, 137 Mass. 186, an action at law, it appeared that before bringing that action the plaintiff had brought a bill in equity against the defendant for the same cause of action, but there had been no further pleadings, and after several continuances the court, by the agreement of the parties, had entered a decree dismissing the bill with costs. This decree, though entered by consent, was of course no less binding upon the parties in other litigation between themselves as to the same subject-matter. C. A. Briggs Co. v. National Wafer Co., 215 Mass. 100, 109, 102 N.E. 87. The defendant contended that this decree, not having been made without prejudice or without prejudice to an action at law, was conclusively presumed to have been entered upon the merits. But the court, although citing the cases of Bigelow v. Winsor and Foote v. Gibbs, ubi supra, rejected this contention and said, on page 35: 'A decree dismissing a bill upon a hearing and adjudication of the merits is a bar to another suit, either in equity or at law, between the same parties for the same cause of action. * * * But if a bill is dismissed for some cause not involving an adjudication upon the merits, such as that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, such dismissal is not a bar to an action at law. Foote v. Gibbs, ubi supra; Kempton v. Burgess, 136 Mass. 192. If the record does not show for what cause the bill was dismissed, resort may be had to extrinsic evidence to show this.' To the same effect is the decision in Maxwell v. Clarke, 139 Mass. 112, 29 N.E. 224, in which a plaintiff at law was allowed to show that a decree dismissing his prior bill in equity was rendered upon the bare ground that he could not come into equity without having first obtained a judgment at law. The only difference between that case and the case at bar is that there the plaintiff could not bring his bill until he had obtained a judgment at law, while here the plaintiff cannot have relief in equity until he has obtained a judgment, made demand upon his execution, and remained unpaid and unsatisfied for 30 days thereafter. But in each case there is a right to show that the general decree of 'Bill dismissed' in the former suit was entered because of the failure to take a preliminary step before coming into equity, and not upon the merits of the claims set out in the bill.

The decision in Nashua & Lowell R. R. v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 164 Mass. 222, 41 N.E. 268, 49 Am. St. Rep. 454, rests upon the same ground, though there it was a decree in favor of the plaintiff which was explained, and the doctrine was carried much further than here is necessary.

In Newburyport Inst. for Savings v. Puffer, 201 Mass. 41, 87 N.E. 562, it was held that if a decree of 'Bill dismissed' might have been entered upon either one of two grounds, evidence could be introduced to show which was the actual ground, and the decree would not be necessarily conclusive upon all grounds in other litigation between the parties. And the reasoning of the court in Newhall v. Enterprise Mining Co., 205 Mass. 585, 91 N.E. 905, 137 Am. St. Rep. 461, Leverett v. Rivers, 208 Mass. 241, 94 N.E. 470, and Cote v. New England Navigation Co., 213 Mass. 177, 99 N.E. 972, goes in the same direction.

It sufficiently appears by the record of the Nichols Case, the rescript which is a part thereof and the opinion of the court (203 Mass. 551, 89 N.E. 1035) which is referred to in the rescript, that the decree of 'Bill dismissed' was entered by reason of the fact that the execution on which the bill was grounded had been returned too early to the court, so that there was in the preliminary proceedings no sufficient foundation for the bill, and the real merits of the suit were not and could not have been considered.

Nothing in what we have said is at variance with the well settled rule that between the parties and their privies a judgment or final decree upon the merits includes everything that was or might have been litigated in the case as it came before the court. Corbett v. Craven, 193 Mass. 30, 78 N.E. 748, and cases cited.

It follows that the defense of res judicata cannot be sustained; and the order to that effect made by the single justice must be affirmed.

2. The remedy is not barred by any statute of limitations. The right of action did not arise until the execution against the company had been returned duly to court unsatisfied. Nichols v. Taunton Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 203 Mass. 551, 89 N.E. 1035. The bill was brought within less than four months...