Cozzens v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:18-cv-1346-T-02JSS |
| Parties | WILLIAM COZZENS Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
William Cozzens petitions for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1) and challenges the validity of his state conviction for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, for which conviction Mr. Cozzens serves thirty years imprisonment. The Respondent admits the petition's timeliness. (Dkt. 6 at 7).
Background and Procedural history1
The victim was out of town for work. A neighbor, Stuart Turnbull, saw a man, later identified as Mr. Cozzens, exiting the victim's house two times carrying boxes. Mr. Turnbull called out to Mr. Cozzens but Mr. Cozzens ignored him, placed the boxes in a van, and left. Mr. Turnbull called the victim to confirm thatthe victim had not given anyone permission to enter his house. Mr. Turnbull called the police and provided a description of the perpetrator. Based on both Mr. Turnbull's description and past dealings with Mr. Cozzens, the victim believed that Mr. Cozzens was the man Mr. Turnbull saw removing the boxes from the house. Upon returning from out of town, the victim attempted without success to retrieve from Mr. Cozzens the items that Mr. Cozzens had taken from the home. Mr. Cozzens was subsequently was arrested and, after receiving Miranda warnings, admitted to the police that he had broken into the victim's house. Mr. Cozzens was charged with burglary. He proceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury. Mr. Cozzens was sentenced as a violent career criminal to thirty years imprisonment.2
The Respondent correctly argues that Grounds One, Two, and Four are unexhausted and procedurally barred from federal review.
In Ground One Mr. Cozzens contends that the victim committed perjury during his deposition and at trial. In Ground Two Mr. Cozzens contends that he was wrongfully convicted based on the allegedly perjured evidence. He argues that these alleged errors violated his right to due process. The Respondent opposesboth Ground One and Ground Two as unexhausted and procedurally barred because Mr. Cozzens did not present the federal dimension of either claim to the state court.
A petitioner must present each claim to a state court before raising the claim in federal court. "[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly presen[t]' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995), Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Accord Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 19 (1982) ("A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error."), and Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576, 578 (11th Cir. 1995) (). Also, a petitioner must present to the federal court the same claim presented to the state court. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275 (). "Mere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust." Henry, 513 U.S. at 366.
As Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004), explains, a petitioner must alert the state court that he is raising a federal claim and not just a state law claim:
A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim "federal."
As a consequence, "[i]t is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts, or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made." Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). See also Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1271, 1345 (11th Cir. 2004) () (citations omitted).
When Mr. Cozzens presented these grounds to the state court in his Rule 3.850 motion he neither cited a federal case, nor asserted a violation of a federal constitutional right, nor labeled his grounds as "federal." (Dkt. 7, Ex. 4 at 6-8). Consequently, Mr. Cozzens did not "fairly present" the federal grounds to the state court. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 27; Lucas v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 682 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2012) ()(quoting Jimenez v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007)); Preston v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 785 F.3d 449, 458 (11th Cir. 2015) ().
Mr. Cozzens's failure to present to the state court a federal due process claim challenging the allegedly perjured testimony deprived the state court of a "full and fair opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845. See also Preston, 785 F.3d at 460 (). Consequently, Grounds One and Two are unexhausted. State procedural rules preclude Mr. Cozzens from returning to state court to present his federal claims in either a second direct appeal or a second Rule 3.850 motion. Mr. Cozzens's failure to properly exhaust his federal claims in the state court results in a procedural default.
"If the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justiceexception is applicable." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner "must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in state court." Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999). To show prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate not only that an error at the trial created the possibility of prejudice but that the error worked to her actual and substantial disadvantage and infected the entire trial with error of constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). In other words, a petitioner must show at least a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
Absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim only if review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 96 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs if a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is "actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001). To meet the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception, Mr. Cozzens must show constitutional error coupled with "new reliable evidence — whether . . .exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
Mr. Cozzens fails to demonstrate cause for the default of his federal due process claims because he fails to show that some "external factor" prevented him from raising the federal claims in state court. Wright, 169 F.3d at 703. Mr. Cozzens likewise fails to establish prejudice because he does not show that the alleged errors infected the entire trial with constitutional error. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. He cannot meet the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception because he presents no "new reliable evidence" that he is actually innocent. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. Because Mr. Cozzens satisfies neither exception to procedural default, both Ground One and Ground Two are procedurally barred from federal review.
Mr. Cozzens contends that the trial court erred by not providing him notice of the State's intent to seek application of the violent career criminal sentencing enhancement. Mr. Cozzens asserts no federal constitutional violation resulting from this alleged error. To the extent that the petition, liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), asserts a federal due process claim, Mr. Cozzens cannot obtain relief because he did not present this ground to the state court, rendering the ground unexhausted. Because Florida procedural rules preclude the filing of a second direct appeal, the ground is procedurally defaulted.
Mr. Cozzens fails to demonstrate cause for the default of a federal due process claims because he fails to show that some "external factor" prevented him from raising the federal claim in state court. Wright, 169 F.3d at 703. Mr. Cozzens likewise fails to establish prejudice because he does not show that the alleged error infected the entire trial with constitutional error. Frady, 456...
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