Crabbs v. Pitts
| Decision Date | 27 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:16-cv-387 |
| Parties | ANNE CRABBS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RASHAD PITTS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
ORDER
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Anne Crabbs' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) and Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (ECF Nos. 180, 181). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for a New Trial are DENIED.
This Court has set out the the facts of this case on numerous occasions, most thoroughly in its order on Motions for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 100). Only the following factual summary is necessary at this time.
On September 30, 2014 the Delaware County Sheriff's Office ("DCSO") dispatch received a 911 call from Dora and Ronald D'Amato notifying the police that their neighbor, Keith Crabbs, had threatened Mrs. D'Amato's life while she was walking her dog in the neighborhood. (ECF No. 58-3). DCSO Deputies responded to the call and after interviewing the D'Amatos and reviewing a video-recording of the incident determined there was probable cause to charge Keith Crabbs with the misdemeanor of Aggravated Menacing. (ECF No. 57-10 at 19; ECF No. 57-7 at 89); O.R.C. 2903.21. The Deputies proceeded to the Crabbs' residence. When Deputies arrived, Keith Crabbs was not at the residence (ECF No. 57-2 at 22). Deputies left the property, but waited in the neighborhood for Mr. Crabbs' return (ECF No. 57-10 at 18). Upon Mr. Crabbs' entrance into the neighborhood, DCSO Deputies positively identified Plaintiffs' vehicle and followed him to the residence (ECF No. 57-10 at 28). There, DCSO Deputies allege that they immediately told Mr. Crabbs to stop, but Mr. Crabbs attempted to enter the home anyway. (ECF No. 57-9 at 53; ECF No. 58-8). Officer Pitts followed Mr. Crabbs into the home. A struggle ensued that culminated in Mr. Crabbs being tased, arrested, and taken into custody. (ECF No. 57-9 at 53; ECF No. 57-7 at 106-07).
Anne Crabbs, Keith Crabbs, and James Crabbs initiated suit against Deputies Pitts, Wilson, Lee, Keller, Andrews, and Mox, and Sheriff Martin on various constitutional and civil grounds. (ECF No. 1). On June 13, 2017, this Court granted an order substituting "Ms. Crabbs, personal representative of Keith Crabbs, deceased," as a plaintiff in this action, after Mr. Crabbs passed away. (ECF No. 49). After motions for summary judgment from both parties, the case proceeded to trial, after which the jury rendered judgment for the Defense. (ECF No. 100 at 30-31; ECF No. 172). Following the verdict, the Plaintiffs filed the present Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for a New Trial. These motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for review.
A Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law "may be granted only if in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for the jury, and reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, in favor of the moving party." Radvansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 496 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 2007) (citingGray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 263 F.3d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 2001)). In making this determination, this court "may not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury." New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1065 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 489 (6th Cir. 2010)); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). To succeed on a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Plaintiffs must "overcome the substantial deference owed a jury verdict." Radvansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 496 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs must demonstrate that "there was no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the prevailing] party." White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 59 allows parties to move for a court to alter or amend a previously issued judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). Courts are permitted to grant a new trial if a previous judgment "is against the weight of the evidence, if the damages award is excessive, or if the trial was influenced by prejudice or bias, or [was] otherwise unfair to the moving party." Conte v. Gen. Housewares Corp., 215 F.3d 628, 637 (6th Cir. 2000). Determining whether a new trial is appropriate is "within the discretion of the trial court." Kramer Consulting, Inc. v. McCarthy, 2006 WL581244 (S.D. Ohio 2006). When a party argues that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the verdict will be upheld "if it was one which the jury reasonably could have reached." Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distributing, Inc., 763 F.3d 524, 534 (6th Cir. 2014). Motions on those grounds are rarely granted. Id.
Plaintiffs have moved for judgment as a matter of law against Officer Pitts on the issue of unconstitutional entry. (ECF No. 180). Plaintiffs argue that Pitts's entry into the home was unconstitutional if Pitts made the entry, even in part, to arrest Keith Crabbs. Plaintiffs argue in the alternative that Pitts loses on the affirmative defense of exigent circumstances and that this Court need not even address the affirmative defense of exigent circumstances. (ECF No. 180 at 10).
There was never any doubt, in this case, that Officer Pitts entered the Crabbs' home without a warrant. It is a "'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971)). Plaintiffs rely on Payton v. New York for the proposition that if Officer Pitts entered the home with the intention of arresting Keith Crabbs, then the entry was unlawful. But Plaintiffs overlook the key reasoning in Payton. Payton struck down "New York statutes that authorize[d] police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine arrest." Payton, 445 U.S. at 574. Payton was not a case about officer intent, per se, but about warrantless entry. Thus, to say that under Payton, it is unlawful for an officer to enter a suspect's home without a warrant for the purpose of making an arrest is to misplace the emphasis on what part of the New York statute the Supreme Court found objectionable under the Fourth Amendment—Payton was about the importance of a warrant. Most importantly, Payton v. New York left intact the standard exceptions to the warrant requirement, including exigent circumstances. As the Supreme Court noted, the state judge did not examine whether the exigentcircumstances exception "would have justified the failure to obtain a warrant, because he concluded that the warrantless entry was adequately supported by the statute without regard to the circumstances." Payton, 445 U.S. at 578.
Because it is "presumptively unreasonable" for an officer to enter a home without a warrant, and Officer Pitts entered the Crabbs' home without a warrant, the question becomes whether exigent circumstances justified doing so. That was the basis of this Court's ruling on summary judgment, and it remains a correct interpretation of the law.
As this Court noted at summary judgment, exigent circumstances that justify warrantless entry are "situations where real immediate and serious consequences will certainly occur if a police officer postpones action to obtain a warrant." Thorne v. Steubenville Police Officer, 463 F. Supp. 2d 760, 771 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (Marbley, J.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds and Thorne v. Lelles, 243 F. App'x 157 (6th Cir. 2007). (ECF No. 100 at 15). This Court allowed the Defendants' claim of exigent circumstances based on "risk of danger to the police or others," United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 679 (6th Cir. 1994), to survive summary judgment.
Plaintiffs argue that, under Payton, the risk of danger exception cannot apply "if the officer's intent in entering is in any way motivated by the intent to arrest or to search for criminal evidence." (ECF No. 180 at 13). But, as noted, Payton did not look to the intent of the arresting officers. As even Plaintiffs have acknowledged, the test for whether exigent circumstances exist is objective—"the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, "it does not matter here . . . whether [officers] entered the [home] to arrest respondentsand gather evidence or to assist the injured and prevent further violence." Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (2006). In Brigham, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that the officers' actions were unreasonable because they "were more interested in making arrests than in quelling violence," emphasizing instead, that "[t]he officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant." Id. at 404.
Plaintiffs rely on United States v. Williams for the proposition that the risk of danger exception only applies when officers are acting in their "community care-taking function" and thus when the police actions "are totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497, 508 (6th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff confuses the issue. In Williams, the Sixth Circuit...
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